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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Carriers-the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's Authority to Approve Tolerance Regulations-Their Effective-
ness
In 1947 shell egg carload freight constituted 0.072 per cent of the
value of the total carload traffic handled by the railroads that year; but
in the same year 1.91 per cent of all claim payments made by the rail-
roads on carload traffic was for damaged eggs !'
The existence of this condition caused the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1948, on its own motion, to institute proceedings to in-
vestigate the transportation of shell eggs in order that it might make
findings and prescribe reasonable regulations for the shipments of eggs
via railroads.2  At the hearings testimony was taken as to the damage
to eggs caused by inherent weaknesses in eggshell structure,8 the com-
ponents of damage claims submitted to the railroads, 4 the geographical
areas in which the greatest damage claims arose,5 and the methods used
in packing and loading eggs.6 At the close of the hearings the Commis-
sion adopted regulations 7 to allow the damage to 5% of the eggs packed
1 Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 399 (1952). In 1941 claims against
railroads for damage to eggs throughout the country amounted to approximately
$110,000. In 1947 the claims amounted to $2,338,462.
284 I. C. C. 377 (1952). One hundred thirty-one railroads participated in the
proceedings. The proceedings, begun in 1948, were not concluded until 1952.
3 Id. at 383-384. Undetected weaknesses in the shell structure are known as
"checks" and "blind checks." "Checks" are small cracks which do not penetrate
below the shell membrane, and which are difficult to discern by ordinary sight
inspection. "Blind checks" are small cracks in the shell which occurred prior to
the laying of the eggs and over which a calcium deposit has formed, making it
impossible to discern the cracks without "candling" the eggs. When these weak-
shelled eggs are packed and shipped they are naturally liable to give under even
light strain.
' Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 399 (1952). "Many elements
other than the actual value of the eggs enter into a damage claim. For instance,
such claims include the loss incident to the damage, the labor charges and the
materials used in reconditioning the cases, and the warehouse charges covering the
extra expense of handling the cases containing damaged eggs."
'1d. at 396-400. The largest volume of claims arose in the New York City area.
' Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 390 (1952). The packaging and
loading procedure had been of concern to the Commission previously, 52 I. C. C.
47 (1919). The railroads have conducted "extensive research" relative to loss and
damage claims to shell eggs. Buffing materials of rubber and excelsior pads were
utilized to minimize shock. Apparently many of these experiments were unsuc-
cessful, and no practical method was discovered whereby occurrence of damage
could be reduced.7 Id. at 407-408. The following schedule was proposed by the railroads during
the hearings:
"Section 6.-On eggs placed in packages at rail point of origin of the shipment,
no claim shall be allowed where the physical damage to the eggs at destination does
not exceed 4% of the contents of the packages containing damaged eggs. Where
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at points other than railheads to go uncompensated, and the damage to
3% of the eggs packed at railheads to go uncompensated. An exception
was made when the shipper supplied the carrier with a certificate from
a bona fide inspector, either state or federal, indicating the amount of
damaged eggs delivered to the carriers in each shipment. In such cases
the shipper could recover all damage shown to be in excess of that re-
corded on the certificate, minus a deduction of 1%.8 From this, it is
patent that the five and three per cent tolerance allowances were in-
tended to offset damage estimated to have occurred prior to the shipment
of eggs.
Subsequently, suit was brought to have the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission effectuating the tolerance regulations set aside
and enjoined.9 Taking a long range view of the situation, the district
court found the Commission's rules to be reasonable.' 0 In so doing, the
court pointed to the tremendous economic interests concerned,," the
difficulties extant in evolving a method whereby those interests could
be balanced, 1 2 and the Commission's responsibility to foster sound eco-
nomic conditions in transportation.' 3
damage exceeds 4%, claims shall be for all damage in excess of 4% if investigation
develops carrier liability.
"Exception.-Where bona fide certificates of Federal or State egg inspection
agencies showing extent of physical damage to eggs determined at rail point of
origin of the shipment immediately prior to tender for rail transportation indicate
the actual shell damage to be other than 3%, the percentage of actual damage as
shown on such certificates, plus 1% shall be used in lieu of 4% specified in this
Section.
"Section 7.-On eggs placed in packages at points other than the rail point of
origin, no claim shall be allowed where the physical damage to the eggs at destina-
tion does not exceed 6% of the contents of the packages containing damaged eggs.
Where damage exceeds 6% claims shall be allowed in excess of 6%, if investigation
develops carrier liability."8Id. at 402-403.
'Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. United -States, 119 F. Supp. 846 (D. C. Utah
1954).10 Id. at 864.
" Id. at 850. "Where such an immense volume of traffic, running into thousands
of cars and millions of cases of eggs,... and such tremendous freight charges and
damage claim payments, running into millions of dollars .... are involved, the eco-
nomic stability of carriers and the maintenance of an adequate national system of
railroads, were [sic] substantially affected."
" Id. at 851. "The problem of claims against railroads for damage to egg ship-
ments had been before the railroads and the Commission for many years and never
satisfactorily solved. It is extremely difficult of solution. It constitutes a part of
the whole problem of the rate structure, which courts many times have held re-
quires the experience and judgment of the Commission.
"The Commission could not expect the railroads to continue to take these losses.
That was uneconomic to the point of being injurious to the national railroad trans-
portation system ....
.... "Rate increases were not the remedy. That would have imposed a
greater cost upon the shippers throughout the nation than the present regulation.
That would have been more unjust for it would penalize some shippers for the
benefit of others. That would not have benefited the shippers of eggs. That would
tend to cause the railroads to lose all of the business."
'3 Id. at 850.
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Complainants14 appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,"0
attacking the regulations on six grounds.' 6 The Court considered only
the appellants' contention that the Commission's findings did not support
the conclusion that tolerance regulations placed no limitation on the car-
rier's liability. On the grounds that the Commission had not shown
that the tolerance did not in part consist of damage caused by the carrier,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.
A crucial point raised by the appellants in the hearings below 17 was
not considered by the majority of the Court. Did the Interstate Com-
merce Commission have the power to promulgate tolerance regulations,
or is it precluded from so doing by § 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce
Act?' 8
The answer to this question depends upon: (1) the scope of the Com-
mission's power to require and to determine that rates and services
established by the common carriers are reasonable, and whether the
making of tolerance regulations is a part of this power; (2) the limita-
tion that § 20(11)19 imposes on the Commission's power to determine
1, The complainants were: Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative; Armour &
Co. (Intervenor) ; Swift & Co. (Intervenor) ; United States Department of Agri-
culture.
1 Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162 (1956).
" The bases for attack were: "(1) the Commission has no jurisdiction over
damage clahns and hence no power to prescribe regulations governing their dispo-
sition; (2) tolerances based on averages necessarily embrace a forbidden limitation
of liability since, by definition, some shipments will contain less than the 'average'
damage, resulting in those cases in the carrier being relieved of its full liability;
(3) the railroads are liable for in-transit damage even though 'unavoidable'; (4)
the averages found by the Commission are not supported by the evidence; (5) the
approval of uniform nation-wide tolerances was unreasonable in light of the wide
differences in the egg-damage experience of consignees located in different areas
of the country; and (6) the conclusion that the tolerances do not limit liability is
not supported by the Commission's findings." [Emphasis added.] Id. at 165.
" This point was raised in -the hearing in the District Court, Utah Poultry &
Farmers Coop. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846 (D. C. Utah 1954), and in the
Commission hearings, Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 401 (1952).
18 Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162, 176 (1956) (Dis-
senting opinion).
19 For the purposes of this note, the pertinent part of 24 STAT. 385 (1887), as
amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1953) is as follows:
"Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the pro-
visions of this chapter receiving property for transportation from a point in one
State or Territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another State, ...
shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder
thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may
be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United
States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill
of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any
character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transporta-
tion company from the liability hereby imposed; and any such common carrier,
railroad or transportation company so receiving property for transportation, . ..
or . . . delivering said property so received and transported shall be liable to the
lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover
thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for the full
actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any such com-
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the reasonableness of rates and services; and (3) the procedure for de-
termining the common law liability of carriers and the exemptions there-
from.
Power to Regulate Rates
Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act20 by the Hepburn
Amendment of 1906.21 By that amendment, under § 15,22 Congress gave
the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to establish and en-
force "just and reasonable" charges for services "rendered or to be
rendered" in the transportation of persons and property.23 Although
the immediate aim of the amendment was to eliminate unfair practices
by railroads against the shippers, 24 it was also intended to insure the
carriers a reasonable return for their services.2 5 Necessarily, the Com-
mon carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be
delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United
States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill
of lading, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of
recovery or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of
lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or
form in which it is sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void. . .
2024 STAT. 384 (1887). 2134 STAT. 589 (1906).2 For the purpose of this note the pertinent part of 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as
amended, 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1953) is as follows:
"Whenever, after full hearing, upon a complaint made as provided in section 13
of this title, or after full hearing under an order for investigation and hearing made
by the commission on its own initiative, either in extension of any pending com-
plaint or without any complaint whatever, the commission shall be of the opinion
that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge whatsoever demanded, charged,
or collected by any common carrier or carriers subject to this chapter for the trans-
portation of persons or property .... or that any individual or joint classification,
regulation, or practice whatsoever of such carrier or carriers subject to the pro-
visions of this chapter, is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discrimina-
tory or unduly preferential or prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of any of the
provisions of this chapter, the commission is authorized and empowered to deter-
mine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate,
fare, or charge, or rates, fares or charges, to be thereafter observed in such
case ... "
2240 CONG. REc. 2230 (1906). "We have declared in virtue of our powers,
"That all charges for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation
of persons or property or in connection therewith shall be just and reasonable."
, 40 CONG. REC. 2224 (1906). "The immediate and most pressing need, so far
as legislation is concerned, is the enactment into law of some scheme to secure to
the agents of the Government such supervision and regulation of the rates charged
by the railroads of the country engaged in interstate traffic as shall summarily and
effectively prevent the imposition of unjust or unreasonable rates."
2540 CONG. REC. 2234 (1906). "The corporation . . . is bound to render the
best service consistent with security of the capital embarked in it, and security
of capital includes the right to employ it at a profit. If the community is entitled
to the best service consistent with the safety of capital, the just rate to each indi-
vidual must be the actual cost of the service rendered to him plus a reasonable
profit to the company. There can be no other rate consistent with justice, as a
moment's reflection will show ... All who use a railroad can not have their goods
transported for less than the actual cost. If they did, in a very short space of
time the railway would be bankrupt and could not transport any goods at all,
because it has no source of revenue except the rates which it charges to the people
who use its facilities."
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mission's power had to be one of a flexible nature to enable the Commis-
sion to deal with the conditions affecting both carriers and shippers.20
Therefore, all the components that affect the rates and thereby the
economy of carriers is of concern to the Commission in the exercise of
its expert discretion in determining the reasonableness of rates. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has refused to take jurisdiction to determine the
components of rate charges where to do so would effect a readjustment
of the carrier's rate schedule. This the Court held was a matter for
primary determination by the Commission.27
Unquestionably, habitual damage to a commodity which must be
compensated by the carrier affects the over-all cost of the transportation
of that commodity regardless of the causes of such damage.28 In the
case of eggs, this cannot be absorbed through rate increases. 20 Tolerance
regulations offer one solution whereby adjustments for the habitual
breakage of eggs can be made without requiring over-all rate charges.
A tolerance is a margin of damage which must be exceeded before
a claim may be made for additional damage.30  Tolerances were origi-
nally allowed by the Commission to account for a difference in weights
of coal3l and grain 32 at points of origin and at destination estimated to
be caused by moisture evaporation,33 and variances in outdoor railway
scales.3 4  They were first applied to "current receipt" shell eggs in
2" Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 546 (1942).
"The process of rate making is essentially empiric. The stuff of the process is
fluid and changing-the resultant of factors that must be valued as well as weighed.
Congress has therefore delegated enforcement of transportation policy to a perma-
nent expert body and has charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dy-
namic character of transportation problems." Freas, Problems in Rateviaking,
23 I. C. C. PRACITIONERS' JouRNAL, 552 (March, 1956). ".... Ratemaking has been
referred to as a pragmatic business. By this is meant, no doubt, that in a rate
structure the individual considerations are so balanced and interdependent that a
manipulation of a part calls for a consideration of the whole, and that the proper
functioning of the whole depends upon the adequacy of the parts. .. ."
27 Armour & Co. v. Alton R. R., 312 U. S. 195 (1941) ; See also Note 2, follow-
ing 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1929).
28 LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 143 (4th ed. 1954). "[D]ifferences
in rates may be explained on two grounds. First, there are differences in the cost
of service. Some articles are more expensive to transport than others-some re-
quire more expensive types of equipment; some require special facilities of one
sort or another; some require expedited service; some are more bulky than others,
and hence the cost, per unit of weight, is greater than when the weight-density is
greater. Differences in liability and risk also make differences in the cost of serv-
ice." [Emphasis added.]
2" Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846, 851 (D. C.
Utah 1954) ; See LOCKLIN, EcoNomics oF TRANSPORTATION 154 (4th ed. 1954).
Probably one reason a higher rate could not be charged for eggs is that the value
of the eggs at the market price could not stand the higher rate.
'0 Northwestern Tariff & Service Bureau, Inc. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ry., 47 I. C. C. 549 (1917).
" Ibid. It Re Weighing of Freight, 28 I. C. C. 7 (1913).
2 A. B. Crouch Grain Co. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 41 L C. C.
717 (1916).
22 In Re Weighing of Freight, 28 I. C. C. 7 (1913).
24 Weight Tolerance Rule, 192 I. C. C. 71 (1933).
[Vol. 34
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1919.35 A tolerance allowance was first attacked as "limiting the lia-
bility of carriers in violation of § 20(11)" in a Commission hearing in
1916.36 At that time, as in the lower court hearing of the principal
case,37 the Commission defended the tolerance regulations on the grounds
that the "limitation was not against losses caused by the carrier, but
rather against liability for losses due to the inherent nature of the com-
modities themselves, and attributable to no human agency."33s Therefore,
it contended, the regulation did not violate § 20(11) of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Such an argument is justified by the necessity for mak-
ing some type of rate adjustment for habitual shrinkage or breakage
which affect the transportation cost of grain, coal and eggs. Neverthe-
less, there is a possible argument that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission inadvertently may have come through the back door to a viola-
tion of § 20 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The Limitations in § 20(11)
The Carmack 9 and Cummins4" amendments to § 20(11)41 were
passed during the early part of this century. The first was intended to
establish uniformity of obligation and liability among carriers. The sec-
ond was intended to insure the shipper full recovery for the value of his
goods transported by the carrier in the event of damage.
Prior to the Carmack amendment:
".... [T]he Federal courts sitting in various States were follow-
ing the local rule, a carrier being held liable in one court when
" National Poultry, Butter & Egg Ass'n v. New York Cent. R. R., 52 I. C. C.
47 (1919).
"o A. B. Crouch Grain Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 41 I. C. C.
717, 717-718 (1916).
" Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846, 849 (D. C.
Utah 1954).
"A. B. Crouch Grain Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 41 I. C. C.
717 (1916).
"'34 STAT. 593 (1906). The Carmack Amendment read as follows:
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving prop-
erty for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall
issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder
thereof for any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which
such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such propety may pass
and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, rail-
road, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; Provided, that
nothing in this section shall deprive the holder of such receipt or bill of lading of
any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.
"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such
receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, rail-
road, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage or injury shall
have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be re-
quired to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt,
judgment or transcript thereof."
"38 STAT. 1196 (1915).
"124 STAT. 386 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1953). See note 19
supra.
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under the same state of facts he would be exempt from liability in
another; hence this branch of interstate commerce was being sub-
jected to such diversity of legislative and judicial holding that it
was practically impossible for a shipper engaged in a business that
extended beyond the confines of his own State, or a carrier whose
lines were extensive, to know without considerable investigation
and trouble, and even then oftentimes with but little certainty,
what would be the carrier's actual responsibility as to goods de-
livered to it for transportation from one state to another. The
congressional action has made an end to this diversity .... -42
The Carmack Amendment, however, had unforeseen effects upon the
common law liability of carriers. In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger8
the Supreme Court construed the act to permit a carrier to limit a ship-
per's recovery for damages to the value of the property stated on the bill
of lading. Under this construction, a carrier could file with the Com-
mission two rates, one to cover commodities shipped at an agreed
value, and a second and higher rate to cover unlimited carrier liability.
44
In some instances while two rates were allowed, only the first rate was
incorporated into the tariff schedules published under the auspices of
the Commission. If this was the case, the second rate was agreed upon
by the individual carrier and shipper when the shipper did not elect to
ship under the "agreed" value and its corresponding published rate.40
Since the second rate was not always supervised by the Commission,
there were abuses. In some instances the second rate was so exhorbitant
that the shipper was obliged to accept the lower rate and the correspond-
ing lower valuation of his goods to stay in business. 46
The Cummins Amendment was passed in 1915 to reinstate the lia-
bility of the carrier as it had been prior to 1915. 47 To the earlier act the
'Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 505 (1913).
"226 U. S. 491 (1913).
"It Re The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 683 (1915).
46 Id. at 686-687.
" 51 CoNG. REc. 9624 (1914). Such a situation existed in the case of livestock:
"All the railroads at this time have rates dependent on value in the shipment of
live stock. The value is determined by the declaration of the shipper .... If the
shipper wants full value, and the value is not beyond the ordinary or common value
of registered or pure-bred stock, he must pay 10 per cent or 15 per cent or 25
per cent more than the rate upon an ordinary live-stock shipment. That rate as
applied to the ordinary case is prohibitive; the shipper cannot pay it and do busi-
ness for, of course, the amount of it is absurdly high. It is based only on the idea
that the higher rate is necessary to compensate the railway company for the in-
creased risk; but it is greatly more than that in all the cases I have examined. ...
The live-stock shipments that are made under the rule established by the railroad
companies, and which we seek to overturn here, I suppose, constitute 90 per cent of
all the shipments that would be affected by this rule."
41 Id. at 9621. "In this bill we have tried to restore to the shippers of this coun-
try not all, but a measure, of the rights which they possessed and which they exer-
cised prior to the passage of the Carmack amendment, which inadvertently destroyed
those rights. Therefore we provided that the railroad company should be liable to
[Vol. 34
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Cummins Amendment added: "[S]hall be liable to the lawful holder of
such receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recovery there-
from, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for
the full, actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it.
[Emphasis added.] Thus, the import of the act was to save the shipper
from the risk which he had been previously forced to take in accepting
the lower rate, and to prevent carriers from limiting their liability.
This amendment was passed by Congress while it was charged with
indignation over the repercussions of the decision in the Croninger
case. At that time there appears to have been no consideration of the
effect that § 20(11) would have on the other sections of the Interstate
Commerce Act, the Hepburn Amendment, and the rate making power of
the Commission. It is, therefore, submitted that Congress did not in-
tend to undermine the Commission's power to determine the fair cost
of transportation.
Nevertheless, the amendment did amount to a fiat by Congress to
the Commission prohibiting it, in the course of its general rate making
power, from limiting the liability of carriers, in any manner inconsistent
with the act. The Commission could no longer approve schedules where-
by the individual shipper would be obliged to contract away his common
law right to recover the full value of his goods.
However, Congress intended the exemptions which were inherent in
the common law rule of the liability of carriers to be part of the law.
48
The carrier was not to be "an insurer against the act of God, or the
public enemy, the unprecedented storm or anything of the kind."49 The
last, it is submitted, includes damage "for breakage unavoidable in the
nature of things." 50 But can the Interstate Commerce Commission make
the lawful holder of the receipt or any other person to the full actual loss, damage
or injury caused by it." See also Notes, 20 MICH. L. REv. 765 (1920); 1 NEw
YORK LAW REv. 108 (1924): 12 VA. L. Rv. 235 (1925).
" In Re The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682, 695 (1915). "... A
carrier, after the Cummins amendment goes into effect, may not contract to limit
its liability for loss or damage caused by it to the property. There is, however,
no inhibition as to the limitation of the liability of a carrier for losses not caused
by it or a succeeding carrier to which the property may be delivered. The amend-
ment has expressly reapplied the limitation of the prior act with respect to loss or
damage caused by the carriers chargeable therewith. It follows, therefore, that
the interpretation applied to the act before it was amended is equally applicable
to the amendment in so far as the latter affects the right of a carrier to establish
rates conditional upon the shipper's assumption of the entire risk of loss attributable
to causes beyond the carrier's control. From this it follows that under the amend-
ment a contract or tariff may lawfully limit to a reasonable maximum the liability
of a carrier for losses which it does not cause."
51 CONG. RFc. 9621 (1914).
o Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162, 173 (1956). ".
[T]he Cummins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, §20(11), does not
constitute an affirmative congressional formulation of a carrier's liability for damage
to goods transported by it. The legal import of that Amendment is to bar the Inter-
state Commerce Commission from legalizing the tariffs limiting the common-law
liability of a carrier for such damage. The common law, in imposing liability,
1956]
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tolerance regulations of uniform effectiveness on the premise that the
allowances take care of damage caused by the inherent nature of the
goods?
The solution to this problem lies in the procedure for determining
that shrinkage and breakage is loss caused by the natural propensity of
the goods.
Determination of Common Law Liability
At common law a carrier is in the nature of an insurer.Y' The
carrier is exempted from liability only when the loss results from acts
of God, the public enemy, the inherent vice of the goods, or the default of
the shipper.52
After the shipper has established his case by proving that the property
was in good condition when received, and in damaged condition when
delivered, the carrier must bring the case within one of the excepted
causes.5 3 In the case of eggs the carrier must show that the damage was
occasioned by inherent defects in the eggs.54 The same rule applies
where the shipper has shown loss in transit of grain or coal.55 Thus each
case must stand on its own facts as to whether loss was caused by the
inherent vice of the goods. No court is bound to allow any percentage
of damage to go uncompensated if it finds that the damage was caused
by the carrier. In addition, the courts vary in their determination as to
what constitutes causes beyond the control of the carrier. For instance,
while one carrier has been held liable for damage to eggs frozen in
transit,5 6 another was not liable for onions similarly damaged.57
dispensed with proof by a shipper of a carrier's negligence in causing the damage.
But for breakage unavoidable in the nature of things-whether nature be operat-
ing within a thing or from without, it is equally an 'inherent vice'-there would
be no liability since the common law did not impose a liability unrelated to the
carrier's conduct."
51 Beale, The Carrier's Liability: Its History, 11 HARV. L. Rav. 158 (1897).
r2 Joseph Toker Co., Inc. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12 N. J. 608, 97 A. 2d 598,
599 (1953).
"
3 Annot., 53 A. L. R. 997 (1928).
5' Mitchell v. The United States Express Co., 46 Iowa 214 (1877).
" In the following cases the carrier clearly had the burden of establishing that
loss was caused by the inherent defect of the commodity. Joseph Toker Co. Inc.
v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12 N. 3. 608, 97 A. 2d 598 (1953) (the defendant failed
to prove that weight loss was due to the natural evaporation of moisture from
coal during transit) ; Smith v. Louisville & N. R. R., 202 Iowa 292, 209 N. W. 465
(1926) (the defendant had the burden of establishing that loss was caused by the
evaporation of moisture from coal and was therefor loss caused by a natural pro-
pensity) ; National Elevator Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 137 Minn. 217, 163 N. W.
164 (1917) (defendant had the burden of establishing that the loss of weight from
grain was due to the evaporation of moisture). In the following cases evaporation
of moisture was judicially recognized as a "natural propensity" causing loss: Nye
Schrader-Fowler Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 106 Neb. 149, 182 N. W. 967
(1921) ; Shellaberger Elevator Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 212 IlI. App. 1 (1917).
In the following case evaporation of moisture causing loss of weight in wheat was
recognized as a "natural propensity" by statute: Cardwell v. Union Pacific R. R.,
90 Kan. 707, 136 Pac. 244 (1913).
" Akerly v. Railway Express Agency, 96 N. H. 396, 77 A. 2d 856 (1951).
" Close v. Missouri Pac. R. R., - La. App. -, 191 So. 596 (1936).
[VCol. 34
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These decisions of the courts are beyond the control of the Interstate
Commerce Commission because under § 958 of the Interstate Commerce
Act the jurisdiction of the Commission over claims is confined to claims
arising from violations of the Act.59 Thus any regulations regarding
the "inherent nature" of the commodities that the Commission may make
are at best only guides for the discretion of the courts.60 Under these
circumstances the tolerance regulations have no legal effect and the
attempts of the Commission to adjust the economic unbalance created
by habitual shrinkage or breakage are ineffectual if shippers do not con-
tinue to accept claim settlements based on the tolerance regulations.6 '
Admittedly, the above reasoning has its logic. However, it is sub-
mitted that to deny effect to tolerance regulations because the Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction over claims arising out of the carrier's common
law liability is basically unsound. The Commission does have jurisdic-
tion to determine what service is to be offered for what rate. The extent
of breakage or other loss which as a matter of experience is chargeable
to the nature of the goods is an inherent part of determining the cost of
" 24 STAT. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 9 (1953) is in part as follows:
"Any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this chapter may either make complaint to the commission as here-
inafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery
of the damnages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions
of this chapter... ." [Emphasis added.]
" Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 81 Fed. 545, 546 (C. C. Iowa 1897).
'0 An example of the attitudes that courts may take regarding tolerances is con-
veyed by the following: Joseph Toker Co., Inc., v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12 N. J. 608,
615, 97 A. 2d 598, 602 (1953). In reference to a tolerance regulation for the shrink-
age of the weight of coal the court said: "The tolerance related solely to freight
charges within the jurisdiction and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and had no relation to loss claims beyond the jurisdiction and control of the Commis-
sion. It is not disputed that the Commission has no authority and does not purport to
exercise authority over civil claims for the recovery of the value of property lost
in transit .... The shipper's right to assert such claim against the initial carrier
where, as here, there has been an interstate shipment is expressly provided for in
the Carmack Amendment which provides not only that the initial carrier shall be
liable but also that, apart from exceptions not material here, there shall be no
limitation of liability for the full actual loss. Neither the carrier nor the commission
could lawfully provide that liability to shipper for loss of coal in transit shall not
accrue until the loss exceeds 12'Ao of coal shipped." [Emphasis added.] Shella-
berger Elevator Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 212 Il1. App. 1, 6 (1917). In ref-
erence to an allowance for shrinkage of the weight of corn the court said: "The
liability of a carrier for loss or damages to an interstate shipment is governed by
the federal law and all State statutes .. are thereby superseded .... The only loss
or damage the appellant is liable for under the Carmack Amendment is the loss or
damage caused by it, and shrinkage would not come within that rule unless the proof
should show the shrinkage was caused by it." [Emphasis added.]
"l Probably the greatest number of claims are settled outside of the courts. For
this reason, if most shippers and carriers continued to adhere to the tolerance regu-
lations when settling their claims, the Commission's purpose would be accom-
plished. That is, the economic adjustment what the Commission intended would
operate in the larger number of cases. However, quaere whether shippers will
continue to allow adjustments on the basis of tolerances if the Commission can-
not legally enforce the regulations, and the courts will do no more than use them
as guides, and in some instances will not recognize them at all as in the Toker case,
12 N. J. 608, 97 A. 2d 598 (1953).
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transportation. The complexity of the economic factors involved in the
tolerance problem calls for solution by the expert body.
Since tolerance regulations seem to be reasonable measures for ad-
justing losses caused by commodities which are by their nature inevitably
damaged in transportation, it may be desirable to make express provi-
sions for such regulations. The obvious solution is to amend § 20 (11)
of the Interstate Commerce Act so as to give the Commission the power
either (1) to construe the meaning of "inherent vice" so that it will have
uniform application in the courts in suits for loss or damage, or (2) as
suggested by one writer,62 to amend the act so as to allow the "Commis-
sion to provide tolerances when reasonably justified." The latter would
seem to be the better solution as it would best cover the complex eco-
nomic factors involved and allow the Commission greater discretion in
striking a balance between the interests of the shippers and carriers.
HARRIET D. HOLT.
Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over State
Courts
In the recent case of Naim v. Naim,' the United States Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Virginia because
the federal question was not presented in "clean-cut and concrete form." 2
The facts of the case were not in dispute. Suit was brought by
appellee, a white woman duly domiciled in Virginia. The appellant was
a non-resident Chinese. The parties left Virginia, married in North
Carolina, and returned immediately to Virginia. There they cohabited
as man and wife in direct contravention of the Virginia miscegenation
law which forbade their marriage.3 Both conceded that they left Vir-
ginia to marry for the purpose of evading this law. At the instigation
of the wife, the marriage was annulled by the Circuit Court of the City
of Portsmouth, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was
based on the sole ground that the Virginia miscegenation statute was
unconstitutional because it contravened the due process and equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower court, expressly holding that
the Virginia statute in question was not repugnant to the federal con-
stitution.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
62103 PENN. L. Rv. 113, 115 (1954).
197 Va. 80, 90 S. E. 2d 749 (1956); vacated and remanded 350 U. S. 891
(1956) ; reaff'd 197 Va. 734, 90 S. E. 2d 849 (1956) ; appeal dismissed 350 U. S.
985 (1956).
'Naim v. Naim, 350 U. S. 891 (1956).
'VA. CODE § 20-54 (1950). The Virginia miscegenation statute declares a mar-
riage between a white person and a person of any other race a nullity.
'Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90 S. E. 2d 749 (1956).
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judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court was vacated and the case re-
manded to the Virginia Supreme Court to be returned to the Circuit
Court of the City of Portsmouth in order for the latter court to make
further findings of fact so that the case might present a constitutional
issue in "clean-cut and concrete form." 5 On remand, the Virginia Su-
preme Court rendered a further opinion 6 in which it declared that there
was no procedure for sending a cause back to the circuit court with
directions to rehear the case, gather additional evidence, and render a
new decision. It declared that the issues presented had been decided and
that the previous judgment annulling the marriage was again affirmed.
In a second appeal to the United States Supreme Court,1 it ruled that
the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in response to its original
order left the case devoid of a properly presented federal question and
consequently the case was dismissed. Apparently, therefore, the initial
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court constitutes a valid and binding
adjudication of the issues of this case.
Appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over state
courts is derived from the United States Constitution, Art. III, §§1, 2;
which provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases and Con-
troversies arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and the Treaties made.., under their authority. ... In all other Cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make." (Emphasis added.) This provision
has been the basis for much controversy because it does not expressly
provide from what courts the Supreme Court may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. From 1815 to 1859 the Commonwealth of Virginia in two
cases-Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,8 Cohens v. Virginia--and the State
of Wisconsin in one case-Ableman v. Boothe'10 -directly challenged the
authority of the Supreme Court to review their decisions. With the
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in the Hunter case as the keystone,
these cases apparently settled the matter by holding that "the appellate
power of the United States does extend to cases pending in the state
courts; and the ... judiciary act, which authorizes the exercise of this
jurisdiction in the specified cases, . . . is supported by the letter and
spirit of the Constitution."" Today the problem is not whether the
Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction over state
'Naim v. Naim, supra note 2.Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 734, 90 S. E. 2d 849 (1956).
7 Naim v. Naim, 350 U. S. 985 (1956).
8 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1815).
'6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821).
1021 How. 506 (U. S. 1859).
M artin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 314 (U. S. 1815).
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decisions involving federal questions, but rather the extent to which this
power has been limited.
There are three sources of limitations of the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction over federal questions arising in state courts. They are:
(1) Express limitations in the Constitution-Constitutional limitations
are, primarily, (a) the necessity for a case or controversy, 1 2 and (b) the
case or controversy must involve the exercise of judicial power.13 Thus
the Court cannot decide moot,14 academic,' 5 or political questions. 16
(2) Statutory limitations-Congressional regulations for the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction are set out in 28 U. S. C. A. § 1257.17 From this
statute, the Supreme Court has formulated five well established rules:
(a) There must be a final judgment or decree' 8 (b) from the highest
court of the state in which a decision could be had. 19 (c) There must
be a federal question raised and the question must be substantial.2 0
(d) The federal question to be reviewed must be properly raised and
preserved in the state courts. 21 (e) There can be no review if the case
can be decided on an independent state ground.22
(3) Self-imposed limitations-The Supreme Court has formulated sev-
eral self-imposed limitations to control its own docket. These rules are
with but one exception outlined in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority23 and have been approved in many subsequent cases.2 4 Briefly
12 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1936).
' Cohens v. Virginia, supra note 9.
14 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206 (1937).
15 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1945).
'
0 Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1942).
1? "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which
a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specifically set up or claimed under the Constitution, trea-
ties, statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised by the United States.
1" Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120 (1944) ; Republic Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Alabama, 334 U. S. 62 (1947).
1" Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1 (1944) ; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206 (1937).
" Patterson v. Stranolind Oil and Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939) ; Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206 (1937) ; Parker v. Duffy, 342 U. S.
33 (1951).
-" Osborne v. Clark, 204 U. S. 565 (1906) ; Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253(1943) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1944).
22 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1951) ; Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474
(1945).
23 297 U. S. 288, 346-48 (1935)
2' For example, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 328 (1935) ; Republic
Natural Gas Co. v. Alabama, 334 U. S. 62 (1947) ; Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1946).
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enumerated, the rules are: The Court will not (a) pass upon the con-
stitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding; (b)
decide a constitutional question unless it is absolutely necessary to a de-
cision of the case; (c) formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied; (d) pass
upon a constitutional question presented by the record if there is another
ground the case can be decided upon; (e) pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who has failed to show injury by its opera-
tion; and (f) pass upon the validity of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits. (g) When the validity of an
act of Congress is drawn into question, and even if serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, the Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided. (h) Rescue Army v. Municipal Court25 added a new self-
imposed rule which is probably the key to the Naim case-the court may
refuse to entertain jurisdiction in a constitutional case even on appeal
if it considers the record inadequate for a decision of the constitutional
issues. The Court has a broad discretion to determine what is "ade-
quate."
At first blush, the Naim case appears to be another instance of Su-
preme Court recognition of a state court evasion of a Supreme Court
mandate.26 - This seems to be true particularly in view of the fact that
there is no apparent defect in the record of the prerequisites enumerated
above and that the Supreme Court was not without remedy in such a
situation. There are at least two ways it could have contravened the
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia. First, it might have used
the same device used in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,27 i.e., it could have
by-passed the Supreme Court of Virginia and remanded the case directly
to the Circuit Court of Portsmouth. This was done in the Martin case
to avoid further friction with the Virginia Supreme Court. Second, the
Supreme Court of the United States could have recalled the mandate
and decided the case on the facts before it. Since it chose to do neither,
the court evidently did not wish to decide the question involved at this
time and refrained from doing so by apparently exercising its discretion
as to what constitutes an adequate record. This it could do by applying
"331 U. S. 549 (1946).
.' State courts have at times asserted their independence by an evasion of Su-
preme Court mandates and the Supreme Court has recognized the legality of such
evasion in certain instances. In Davis v. Packard, 8 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1834), the
United States Supreme Court permitted its mandate to be avoided by the New
York Court when the latter court declared that under state law the appellate court'sjurisdiction did not permit a reversal of the trial court for a factual error not ap-
pearing on the record. See generally, note, State Court Evasion of Supreme Court
Mandates, 56 YALE L. J. 574 (1947).
'1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1815).
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the well established doctrine28 which permits the taking of jurisdiction
in the first instance in order to determine jurisdiction. The refusal of
the Virginia Court to make a further finding of fact left the Supreme
Court in the position to dismiss the case for lack of a federal question
since, theoretically, it never had one before it. This would be only a
reaffirmance of the doctrine invoked in the Rescue Army case and not a
recognition of an evasion of its mandate. It should be noted that such
a disposition of the case would not prejudice the constitutional questions
involved from being raised again in a subsequent case.
TED G. WEST.
Bills and Notes-Holder in Due Course-Finance Companies
In an era characterized by a phenomenal upward surge of retail in-
stallment purchasing," the comparative serenity of appellate litigation in
the field of negotiable instruments has been consistently interrupted by
cases arising out of financial credit arrangements. Such arrangements
consist of informal agreements, usually of long standing, between dealers
and finance companies whereby the latter purchases commercial paper
arising out of a sale to the consumer. The finance company usually sup-
plies the blank forms for notes and conditional sales contracts as well as
supervises, to varying degrees, the terms of credit. The question is thus
presented: Do such credit arrangements cause the finance company to
become an active participator in the sale to the consumer so as to pre-
clude it from being a holder in due course of the transferred paper?
Notwithstanding the fact that the Negotiable Instruments Law sets
out precise standards2 for the determination of this question, several
jurisdictions have judicially effected other criteria which, upon applica-
tion to these credit arrangements, have denied the finance company the
protection afforded a holder in due course.3 In a recent case of first
2' "Whether the statutory requirements (for appellate review) have been met is
itself a federal question." Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 16 (1936).
' Installment credit reached an estimated total of $1,593,000,000 for the year
ending March 31, 1955. This figure represents credit extended only for the pur-
chase of consumer goods secured by the items purchased, title being held either by
the retail outlets or financial institutions. 39 CONsuMER FINANCE NEWS no. 12,
p. 31 (1955).
2 N. I. L. § 52: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument
under the following conditions: . . . (3) that he took it in good faith for value;(4) that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
N. I. L. § 56: "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated
must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
' Such results are reached on the basis that when the finance company and dealer
engage in preconceived credit arrangements, the company, which is better able to
bear the risk of loss than the hard pressed consumer, has become a party to the
original transaction and is subject to defenses available against the dealer. See
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impression,4 North Carolina was placed in accord with these jurisdictions.
In that decision, Roofing Co. negotiated to Mortgage Corp. Cus-
tomer's note secured by a deed of trust. Customer, alleging fraud by
Roofing Co., brought an action for cancellation of the note and deed of
trust. The issue of fraud having shifted the burden of proof to the
holder,5 Mortgage Corp. introduced evidence showing that it had fur-
nished the forms for the note and deed of trust, on the back of which
appeared its name; that it had purchased similar notes over a course
of dealing with Roofiing Co. without previous defenses being asserted;
that the note was payable at its offices and the deed of trust named
one of its officials as trustee; that it had no actual notice of any de-
fenses Customer might have, but took the instruments in reliance on
their ostensible regularity. The court held that such evidence was
sufficient to support a jury finding that Mortgage Corp. could not be
a holder in due course and was thus subject to defenses of Customer.
In so holding, the court completely shunned the test of actual notice or
bad faith and relied instead on the active role played by Mortgage Corp.
in the transaction between Roofing Co. and Customer.6
A survey of recent case law and existing statutes reveals that the area
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S. W. 2d 260 (1940) (finance
company supplied forms on which there was printed an assignment to the company;
transfer made immediately following the sale) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950) (finance company
supplied forms; twice consulted as to the dealer-purchaser transaction) ; Mutual
Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953) (finance company supplied forms;
its name in bold print on the instruments; company's office designated as place of
payment); General Motors Acceptance CQrp. v. Daigle, 72 So. 2d 319 (La. 1954)
(finance company furnished forms, financed sale; instruments made payable at
company's office). The Daigle case is discussed in Note, 53 MIcHa L. REV. 877
(1955).
In addition to the cases based on close participation, several courts have adopted
an agency theory, whereby the finance company, as a consequence of the credit
arrangement, is deemed to be the principal of the retailer and thus knowledge of
the dealer is imputed to the company. Palmer v. Associate Discount Corp., 124
F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir. 1941) ; Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742,
296 N. Y. Supp. 783 (City Ct. Buffalo 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N. Y. S.
2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937). For a discussion of these cases, see Note, 33 N. C. L.
Rav. 608 (1955).
' Whitfield v. Carolina Housing & Mortgage Corp., 243 N. C. 658, 92 S. E. 2d
78 (1956).
IN. I. L. § 59: "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some
person under whom be claims acquired the title as a holder in due course."
'Note, 33 N. C. L. RFv. 608, 613 (1955), where the writer points out that
"(N) othing but uncertainty can arise out of an encroachment upon these statutory
provisions [the Negotiable Instruments Law] by judicial decision." He further
comments that to undermine the position of the finance company's status as a holder
in due course, when no actual knowledge or bad faith has been shown, would
seriously curtail the outlet for the sale of commercial paper arising out of install-
ment purchasing and "limit the accessibility of this market to the public." See
also in this connection Note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 775, 776 (1955).
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upon which the North Carolina Supreme Court has so freshly trod is in
utter conflict.
In Public Loan Corp. of Little Rock v. Terrell,7 an Arkansas case,
buyer purchased an appliance from retailer, executing a note secured by
a conditional sales contract. On the same day, retailer assigned the note
and contract to finance company, which had prepared blank notes and
contract forms used in the transaction. There was no evidence of actual
notice or bad faith. In an action to collect on the note, buyer raised the
defense of failure of consideration, the appliance being wholly defective.
The court held that the defense was not tenable, since plaintiff was a
holder in due course. It stated that evidence of preparing forms and
taking an assignment immediately after the sale fell short of establishing
actual participation; that there being no evidence of actual notice or
bad faith, finance company was not precluded from being a bona fide
purchaser.
It should be noticed that only some years before, this same Arkansas
court held in Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs8 that the finance company
was not a holder in due course because it had prepared forms on which
there was- a written assignment to the company and the transfer of the
note and contract was on the same day as the sale.0 The Terrell case
neither cites nor mentions the Childs case.
In Clark v. Associated Discount Corp.,'0 the Georgia court stated
that merely because a note is made on a form furnished by the finance
company and made payable at its offices, and the company makes in-
quiries as to the purchaser's credit standing does not, without more,
subject the transferee to notice of any infirmity of the instrument or
defect in the title."
This decision should be compared with Mutual Finance Co. v. Mar-
tin,12 where the Florida court held that plaintiff finance company could
not be a holder in due course on ostensibly the same set of facts.
7 224 Ark. 616, 275 S. W. 2d 435 (1955).
8 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S. W. 2d 260 (1940).
' Also contrast with the Terrell case Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,
220 Ark. 56, 247 S. W. 2d 1 (1952), where the court held that the participation
of the finance company in the credit arrangement was such as to prevent it from
becoming a holder in due course.
1092 Ga. App. 583, 89 S. E. 2d 208 (1955).
11 See also Aid Investment & Discount, Inc. v. Younkin, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 514,
188 N. E. 2d 183 (1951), where the evidence disclosed that upon the face of the
instrument, in bold type, appeared "Payable at the Office of Aid Investment & Dis-
count, Inc." and on the reverse side appeared the plaintiff's name. The court held
that this fact would not alone support the conclusion that plaintiff is not a holder
in due course. "It is a custom of long standing for banking institutions to provide
notes for their customers on the face of which is printed in large type 'payable at
designated bank.' To hold that this in and of itself is proof that the bank is jointly
interested with the payee of a note would not be a reasonable deduction; nor would
the fact alone that an endorsee of a note makes inquiry as to the transaction wherein
the note was given and the financial ability of the maker to pay establish any joint
relationship...." Id., at 518, 188 N. E. 2d at 187.
'*63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
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Moreover, only one year after the Martin case was decided, a federal
court sitting in the same state held that evidence showing that the finance
company furnished forms to the dealer and that such forms contained
an advertisement of the company was not sufficient to constitute that
degree of participation necessary to render the finance company subject
to defenses.' 3
There is, however, support in recent cases for the North Carolina
position. In United States v. Klatt,14 defendant's note was assigned to
a bank before maturity, which it in turn assigned to the plaintiff after
maturity. Plaintiff contended that it was immune from defenses since
it derived its title from a holder in due course.', There was evidence
that the bank supplied the forms used in the dealer-purchaser transaction
together with a borrower's completion certificate required by legisla-
tion.'8 Although the court could have held the bank not a holder in due
course because it was charged with notice that the purchaser's name had
been forged on the certificate, it found that:
"... the relationship between the payee named in the instrument
in suit and the bank, as to the entire transaction giving rise to the
instrument was such that the bank must be considered in effect
a party to the transaction between named payee-dealer and the
defendant."' 7
The use of the close participation criteria on such meager evidence
undoubtedly invites criticism. But what is even more startling than the
result reached is the fact that here, a bank, rather than a finance com-
pany, was held not to be a bona fide purchaser because of an "active"
role played in the credit arrangement.1 8 Certainly banks do not engage
in the financing of consumer goods to that degree practiced by financing
companies. But even in those cases where banks do so engage, the
transaction is probably an isolated one, not a part of a preconceived
credit arrangement which anticipates the continual flow of commercial
paper. Seemingly it would follow that courts would scrutinize commer-
" Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N. D. Fla.
195 i35 F. Supp. 648 (S. D. Cal. 1955).15 N. I. L. § 58: "But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due
course and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment, has all the rights of such former holder in respect to all parties prior to the
latter."
", The loan being applied for under the National Housing Act, the borrower
was required by statute to fill out a borrower's completion certificate evidencing
the tite of the chattel securing the loan.
' United States v. Klatt, 135 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S. D. Cal. 1955).
x8 See also Public National Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernadez, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 721
(Mun. Ct. N. Y. C. 1952), where the court, in denying plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment, echoed the holding of the De Marsio case, cited note 3 supra, and
stated that the dealer could be found to be a mere agent of the plaintiff bank.
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cial transactions between banks and dealers less acutely and be guided,
not by judicially created standards, but rather by the presence of actual
notice or bad faith.1 9
In addition to the formula established by some courts in settling such
controversies, several states have adopted legislation which virtually
precludes the finance company or bank from becoming a holder in due
course.20  In essence, the fiat of these provisions is that all notes given
in credit transactions and secured by a conditional sale (or chattel mort-
gage) shall state upon their face that they are so secured, and that no
transferee of such notes shall be immune from the defenses available by
the maker against the payee.2 ' Since the vast majority of the cases under
consideration involve credit financing by means of promissory notes se-
cured by the retention of title of the item purchased, these statutes
obviously undermine the security of the finance company's position.
The law thus remains unsettled. However, the position taken by the
courts in the Terrell and Clark decisions in utilizing the standards as
incorporated in the Negotiable Instruments Law is encouraging. Cer-
tainly the innocent consumer should not be subjected to the unscrupulous
activities which might arise from a dealer-finance company partnership.
But in such cases of close participation, recourse may be had to the
elastic provisions of section 56 and if such participation renders the
finance company incapable of taking the commercial paper in good faith,
it will be denied the holder in due course status.
The protection of the consumer must be balanced against encourage-
ment of credit sales essential to the maintenance of national prosperity.
It is a policy conflict that cannot be arbitrarily settled; rather, there must
be flexibility. It is submitted that neither the judicially created criteria
of close participation, which categorically denounces the credit arrange-
ment whether there is bad faith or not, nor the above mentioned statutes,
which arbitrarily exclude an important segment of the economy from
protection, affords this flexibility; that the result expressed in the Terrell
" Compare with this observation the excerpt from an address by Owen L. Coon,
banker and finance company executive, concerning finance companies as opposed to
banks as appropriate financing agencies for installment selling: "You must under-
stand that the dealer is, to a great extent, a partner of the finance company. The
relationship in paper form may be that of debtor and creditor. Regardless of that
however, the finance company is, in many ways, the partner of the dealer and must
always so remain. Bankers, on the other hand, must always shun relationships that
in theory as well as in practice have possibilities of turning out to be partnerships."
23 AmERiCAN J. oF Ixs. No. 2, 18, 20 (1946).
20 ILL. Rxv. STAT. c. 95, § 26 (1953) ; MD. Conz ANN. art. 83, § 134 (FLAcK
1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 69, § 615G (PuRDoN, Supp. 1954).
" It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes do not set
out the consequences of not complying with the provisions. Only the Illinois
statute states thaf if these provisions are not met, the chattel mortgage securing the
notes "shall be absolutely void."
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and Clark decisions should be seriously considered in the determination
of future conflicts arising in this area.
WILLIAM E. ZUCKERMAN.
Conflict of Laws-Workmen's Compensation-Application of Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes and Awards
Shortly after the introduction of the first workmen's compensation
statutes,1 the courts faced the problem of their application where an
employee had been hired in one state and was injured in a sister state.
Prior to 1932 each state decided whether the situation permitted the
application of her own act.2  The claimant, suing in the locus deicti,
usually succeeded ini i'nvong the application of its statute.3  In some
instances, however, certain restrictive statutory provisions prevented the
state of the injury from applying her act4 and the employee had to resort
to suit in the state where his contract had been made.5 In these cases
suit had to be brought in the state of the contract in order to obtain the
benefit of that state's act, as the state of the injury considered the cause
of action created by the foreign act to be so interwoven with the remedy
that it felt compelled not to enforce it.6 Occasionally, the requirements
'Wisconsin's workmen's compensation act was the first to take effect (1911).
SoMERs, WORtmEN'S COMPENSATION 32 (1954). The New York statute was the
first to be declared constitutional by the United States Supreme Court. N. Y. Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
* LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 8620 (1954).
* Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac.
644 (1927); Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., 182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E. 833
(1921) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889 (1931).
However, where the statute of the place of the injury is of the contractual type, the
courts have refused to apply their acts to injuries within the state, if the hiring
had been elsewhere. Hall v. Ind. Comm'n, 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 1073 (1925);
Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675 (1925).
Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F. 2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied
323 U. S. 735 (1944) seems to be the first case in which a court permitted recovery
for an injury in the forum (Massachusetts) though all other incidents of employ-
ment were elsewhere (New York). But it is now well established that the state
in which the injury occurred may give an award. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408
(1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493
(1939).
12 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 87.14 (1952).
r Grinnel v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. 103 (1916) ; Gooding v. Ott, 77
W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862 (1916).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the state of the contract may
give an award. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532
(1935). Twelve states confer coverage regardless of where the injury occurred if
the contract was made in the state; Nevada requires also that the employee is in
regular employment in the state; California and Michigan require that the employee
also be in residence there. Other states permit recovery only if more than two
factors coincide; e.g., N. C.. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1950) : "If the contract of employ-
ment was made in this State, if the employer's place of business is in this State,
and if the residence of the employee is in this State; provided his contract of em-
ployment was not expressly for service exclusively outside of the State."
'In Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S. W. 762 (1925),
the claimant could not proceed in the Missouri court under the Kansas Work-
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in both statutes have been such as to preclude the employee from invok-
ing the application of the statute of either state ;7 however, the prevail-
ing view was that he could apply for relief in both states, Today, certain
states permit their acts to be applied even if the contract is made and the
injury is sustained elsewhere because an employer-employee relationship
exists,9 or because the employer's business is localized in the state.10
The first constitutional limitation upon the freedom of the states in
determining the applicability of their own acts came in 1932 when Brad-
ford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper11 was decided. Suit had been brought
in New Hampshire under its workmen's compensation act by the admin-
istratrix of the deceased employee. His residence, as well as his em-
ployer's place of business were in Vermont '1, law made the remedy
provided by it exclusive' 2 of all other remedies and liabilities between the
employer and employee, regardless of where the injury or death occurred.
The employer availed himself of the Vermont act in defense to this suit.
The Supreme Court held that the creation of the employment relation
between the decedent and his company under the law of Vermont re-
quired New Hampshire's recognition of the obligation created under the
Vermont law and that it be given full faith and credit3 in the New
Hampshire courts. 14 Furthermore, the Court found the interest of New
men's Compensation Act. He was remitted to the agency which Kansas had set up
to administer its law. There is, however, no obstacle to enforcement if the com-
pensation laws of a state are court administered. Thus, the Louisiana compensation
act was enforced by the Mississippi court in Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156
Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930).
'House v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P. 2d 611 (1941).
'Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U. S. 439 (1933).
' Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923). Regular employment
within the state is often sufficient to permit recovery. A few states (Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland) also require that the employer's business be within
the state. 2 LARSON, WORKCMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 87 (1952). The United
States Supreme Court held in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469
(1947) that the District of Columbia had a substantial interest in the employer-
employee relationship and permitted a recovery in the District for an injury sus-
tained in Virginia.
"0 Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N. W. 977 (1929) ; State
ex. rel. Chambers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185 (1918).
But no state statute permits recovery solely on the basis of residence. Horovitz,
Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 16 NACCA L. J. 38 (1955). An act limiting
recovery to residents was held unconstitutional in Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Indus-
trial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920), writ of error dismissed, 255
U. S. 445 (1921).
"286 U. S. 145 (1932) ; 11 N. C. L. Rwv. 116 (1933).
The operation of many workmen's compensation acts is exclusive of all other
remedies and liabilities between the employer and the employee with regard to the
injury sustained, unless the act or an agreement between the parties provide other-
wise. Jenkins v. American Enka Corp., 95 F. 2d 755 (4th Cir. 1938).
", The United States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State." U. S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. A statute is a "public act" within the
meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914).
, "It was clearly the purpose of the Vermont Act to preclude any recovery by
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Hampshire in this litigation to be only casual15 and her public policy not
affected by this decision.'
The following year, Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler and Tank CoY.7
reached the Supreme Court. The employer and employee had accepted
the Tennessee workmen's compensation act which applied to injuries
elsewhere than in the state if the contract of employment was made in
Tennessee. An award had been made in Ohio under the Ohio statute,
and the State of Ohio sought to recover from the employer in Tennessee.
The employer claimed that the award should have been made under the
Tennessee act and that making an award under the Ohio act failed to
give full faith and credit to the Tennessee law. The Supreme Court
rejected this defense and held that the Clapper case did not require the
application of full faith and credit where the state statute did not provide
an exclusive remedy between employer and employee.
In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,'5
the Supreme Court modified the formal approach of the Clapper and
Ohio cases under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and permitted the
state which had the greater interest to apply her act. Here the contract
had been entered into in California and the parties had provided for the
exclusive application of the Alaska workmen's compensation act. The
employee was injured in Alaska and, on his return to California, brought
suit there under the California law. In defense, the employer contended
that the full faith and credit required to be given to the Alaska act barred
the application of California's statute. The Supreme Court held that
California could apply its act since it had a greater interest in this litiga-
tion than Alaska. The Court evidently anticipated that the injured em-
ployee, an indigent Mexican, would have become a public charge if the
suit had not been allowed.
This decision created a second exception to the application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause: That an act which purports to provide an
exclusive remedy to an employee injured in the course of his employment
no longer controls if the state in which the suit is brought is substantially
concerned with the result of the proceedings.
proceedings brought in another state for injuries received in the course of a Ver-
mont employment." 286 U. S. 145, 153 (1932).
" In the light of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and the criticism
which has been made because recovery under the New Hampshire act had been
denied, it should be noted that the Supreme Court made this qualification: "We
have no occasion to consider whether if the injured employee had been a resident of
New Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had left dependents
there, recovery might validly have been permitted under the New Hampshire law."
286 U. S. at 163.
8 "[The courts] do. not close their doors unless help would violate some funda-
mental principles of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal." Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
17 289 U. S. 439 (1933). 18294 U. S. 532 (1935).
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Similar reasons prevailed in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission.19 The claimant had been hired in
Massachusetts whose workmen's compensation law provided the exclu-
sive remedy regardless of where the injury occurred. Here, too, suit was
brought in California, the locus injuriae, under the California statute.
Again the Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not require the application of the foreign exclusive statute and per-
mitted California to apply "the remedy given by its own statute to its
residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital and nursing
services rendered to the injured employee."'20  It would have been ob-
noxious to California's public policy to require that the parties seek their
remedy in Massachusetts.
Finally, Carroll v. Lanza2 ' seems to leave little doubt that the forum
need not give full faith and credit to the act of a sister state in deter-
mining its right to apply its own. Carroll entered into a Missouri em-
ployment contract with Hogan, a sub-contractor, who had contracted
with Lanza for work to be performed in Arkansas. Carroll was injured
on the job and brought suit in Arkansas against Lanza for common-law
damages. The Supreme Court rejected Lanza's defense based on the
exclusive Missouri statute and held that Arkansas had a sufficient in-
terest to safeguard non-resident employees within the state.2 2  Since
the claimant had been removed to a Missouri hospital immediately after
the injury, the court seemed to hold that the occurrence of the injury
in Arkansas alone was sufficient grounds for the employee to seek a
remedy under Arkansas laws: "Arkansas therefore has a legitimate in-
terest in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though in this
case Carroll's injury may have caused no burden on her or on her insti-
tutions." 23 Thus, with this decision the United States Supreme Court
seems to have come full circle since the Clapper case.2 4
" 306 U. S. 493 (1939).
201d. at 501. 21349 U. S. 408 (1955).
"Discussing the exclusive remedy provided by the Missouri statute, the Supreme
Court said: "Missouri can make her Compensation Act exclusive, if she chooses,
and enforce it as she pleases withinl her borders. Once that policy is extended into
other States, different considerations come into play. . . . We do not think the
Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that subserviency from the State of the
injury." (Emphasis added.) 349 U. S. at 413-414.
23 349 U. S. at 413.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Carroll v. Lanza, stated: "To make the
interest of Arkansas prevail over the interest of Missouri on the basis of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would require that Clapper be explicitly overruled and that,
in the area of workmen's compensation law, the place of injury be decisive ...
It should not be cast aside on the presupposition that full faith and credit need not
be given to a sister-state workmen's compensation statute if the law of the forum
happens to be more favorable to the claimant." 349 U. S. at 421-422. However,
the late Professor Beale would have been pleased with this turn of events: "It is
greatly to be hoped for that the decision in the Clapper case will not stand; so
opposed is it to authority and to the well-established rule of jurisdiction." 2 BEALE,
CoN1 Icr OF LAWS 1326 (1935).
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While the employee is free to make his choice of law, once he has
made that choice he may be barred from asserting any further rights.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is still a major consideration where
successive awards are being sought.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court decided Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt.25 The petitioner had been employed in Louisiana
and had suffered an injury while on his job in Texas. He applied for
compensation there, not knowing at the time that Louisiana could give
him greater benefits. The Texas Accident Board made an award. He
then sought additional compensation in Louisiana. The Supreme Court
denied the second recovery. It based its decision on the Texas work-
men's compensation act which provided that once an award had been
made elsewhere, a second recovery could not be had in Texas.2 6 The
Court interpreted this to mean also that once an award was had in Texas
it was "final" 2 7 and required that it be given full faith and credit in all
other states.
This decision was opposed to many well-considered state court opin-
ions which had permitted a second recovery and had given full faith and
credit to a prior award by crediting the employer with an amount equal
thereto.28  Some courts had allowed full recovery in both states on the
theory that the employer had paid for insurance policies in each,29 even
if the total of the sums received by the employee was greater than the
total permissible under their own acts.3 0 Following the Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. case many state courts continued to permit a second re-
covery.31
2r 320 U. S. 430 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U. S. 801 (1943).
.0 The section of the Texas statute which was relied on by the majority provides
that an employee who is injured outside of the state cannot recover under the
Texas Act if "he has elected to pursue his remedy and recover in the state where
such injury occurred." Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 § 19 (1936).
" "The Texas award had the force and effect of a judgment of a court of that
state and is res judicata there." 320 U. S. 430, 443 (1943).
-" McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931) ; Price v. Horton
Motor Lines, 201 S. C. 484, 23 S. E. 2d 744 (1942) ; Salvation Army v. Industrial
Comm'n, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIct OF LAWS§ 403, prior to the 1947 amendment. But ef. DeGray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co.,
106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556 (1934).
2 "Recovery of compensation in two states is no more illegal, and is not neces-
sarily more unjust than recovery upon two policies of accident or life insurance."
Rounsaville v. Central R. R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 371, 374, 94 Atl. 392, 393 (1915)
(dictum).
" Shelby Mfg. Co. v. Harris, - Ind. App. -, 44 N. E. 2d 315 (1942).
" Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 37 N. W. 2d 630 (1949) granted com-
pensation in Michigan following a recovery of medical payments in Florida;
Loudenslager v. Gorum, 355 Mo. 181, 195, S. W. 2d 498 (1946) permitted an
award under the Missouri act after Arkansas had denied a recovery; see also Indus-
trial Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 80 Cal. App. 2d 480, 182 P. 2d309 (1947) ; Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433, 43 N. W. 2d
792 (1950).
"Sufficient faith and credit are given to the first award when its entire amount
is deducted from the second award, and furthermore, the framers of the Constitu-
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In Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,3 2 Illinois, the
state of the contract, had made an award for an injury sustained by the
claimant in Wisconsin after a settlement between the employer and em-
ployee which provided that it did not affect any rights that the employee
wanted to exercise elsewhere. The employee then applied to Wisconsin
for a second award. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the applica-
tion,33 basing its decision on the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Illinois act, un-
like the Texas act in the Magnolia case, did not preclude an additional
award in another state: "If it were apparent that the Illinois award was
intended to be final and conclusive of all the employee's rights against
the employer ... the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case would be controlling
here." 34
Thus, the McCartin case seems to have limited the application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in actions for a second award to cases
where a prior award is "final" according to the express wording of the
first state's workmen's compensation statute.
The "finality" of an award was also considered by the Supreme Court
in Carroll v. Lanza.35 The injured employee bad received a number of
weekly payments under Missouri's workmen's compensation act, but no
formal award had been made. The payments were not final as they had
not been adjudicated. The Missouri act, unlike the Texas act in the
Magnolia case, did not deny a second recovery elsewhere. The Supreme
Court held that the employee was not precluded from maintaining a
second action in Arkansas, where he had been injured, and affirmed a
recovery there.
tion little dreamed that the full faith and credit clause would be applied to a theory
of work-injury liability unknown in their day." HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION 42 (1948). But cf. Butler v. Lee Bros. Trucking Contractors, 206 Ark.
884, 178 S. W. 2d 58 (1944); Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo. 993, 180
S. W. 2d 678 (1944).
22 330 U. S. 622 (1947).
" McCartin v. Ind. Comm'n, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N. W. 2d 522 (1946).
" Id. at 626. The import of the Texas statute and the Illinois act is similar:
"The employees . . . shall have no right of action against their employer . . . for
damages for personal injuries . . . but such employees . . . shall look for compen-
sation solely to the association. .. ." TEX. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 § 3 (1936).
The Illinois act provides that "no common law or statutory right to recover dam-
ages for injury or death sustained by an employee ... other than the compensation
herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions
of this act." ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48 § 143 (1931). Neither act expressly provides
that an award made in either Texas or Illinois is a bar to a second award elsewhere.
The writer submits that the Supreme Court properly could have relied on TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 § 3 to reach a different result in the Magnolia Petroleum
Co. case.
Professor Larson believes that since the majority of workmen's compensation
laws resemble the Illinois act, the decisions in the McCartin case can be taken to
mean that successive awards are now sanctioned. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAW § 85.20 (1952).
32349 U. S. 408 (1955).
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In reaching this decision the Supreme Court used language which
suggests a different interpretation of the meaning of "finality" in the.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. The Court, discussing the finality of the'
Missouri award in the present (Lanza) case, stated that the award
which Texas had made in the Magnolia case had been final; but that the
award made here was not final because, under Missouri law, payment
had been voluntary and no adjudication between the employer and the
employee had been sought. This distinction seems to kefer to the Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. decision as having been based on an award given
the finality of a judgment, instead of finality expressly contained in the
governing statute on which the Court had previously distinguished the
McCartin case. If the Supreme Court will abide by the Lanza interfpre-
tation of the Magnolia case, final (i.e. judgment) awards will have to
be given full faith and credit'in subsequent proceedings, and further re-
coveries will be barred.3 6
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court had the opportunity to
determine the "finality" of a New York award.37 The employee had
been injured in New Jersey and applied to New York, which granted
a final (judgment) award. He then sought a second recovery in New
Jersey. The New Jersey Court denied a second award; pointing to the
Magnolia Petrolem Co. case, it stated that the "clear purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause . . . [is] that a litigation once pursued to
judgment shall be conclusive of the rights of the parties.... , (Em-
phasis added.) It seems that the New Jersey-Court recognized the
Magnolia case as standing for judgment-type finality in addition to statu-
tory finality which it had not found in the New York act.39
Apparently the New Jersey Court realized the harsh effect which
would be produced by its interpretation of the Magnolia case. Its deci-
sion went on to say that full faith and credit need not be given in those
cases where the prior award made in the other state "is so much less
" RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 403 (Supp. 1949) reads: "Award already
had under the Workmen's Compensation Act of another state will not bar a pro-
ceeding under an applicable Act, unless the Act where the award was made was
designed to preclude the recovery of an award under any other Act, but the amount
paid on a prior award in another state will be credited on the second award."(Emphasis added.) The italicized phrase was inserted after the Supreme Court
decided Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt and Industrial Commission of Wisconsin
v. iMfcCartin.. It interprets the Magnolia case as requiring statutory finality to bar
a second award. See also Donaldson, Conflict of Compensation Laws, 23 INsuR-
ANcE CoUNsEL JOURNAL 110 (1956). On the other hand, at least two courts seem
to have interpreted the Magiwlia Petroleum Co. case as standing for finality ofjudgment. Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 37 N. W. 2d 630 (1949) ; Baduski
v. Gumpert Co., 277 App. Div. 591, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 297 (1951).
'
7 Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 N. J. 594, 118 A. 2d 21 (1955).
"Id. at 604, 118 A. 2d at 27.
"The New Jersey Supreme Court referred to "statutory finality" as "exclusive-
ness"; it may thereby have left the impression that the New York workmen's
compensation act to which it had reference is "not exclusive." 19 N. J. at 604, 118
A. 2d at 27.
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than an award that could be allowed here that it can be reasonably said
that such an award is in conflict with the policy of our act... ."40 (Em-
phasis added.) While this limitation on full faith and credit may be
ineffective between states which provide similar awards, it may be of
value where great differences exist.4 '
Under the United States Supreme Court decisions the employee's
rights to a second award is now uncertain. If the Magnolia case and
the discussion of finality in the Lanza case may be relied on as requiring
judgment-type finality, the injured applicant will be barred from a second
award unless payments made by his employer were of a voluntary nature,
the state court permits the exception indicated by the New Jersey Court.
On the other hand, if Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt and Industrial
Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin may be relied onas requiring full
faith and credit to be given a prior award only where it is final according
to the express wording of the statute, a second recovery may be had in
most cases.
42
The enactment of workmen's compensation statutes provided for
allocation of costs to the employer for the compelling social reason that
accidents are an inevitable hazard of industry. Their main objectives
are adequate benefits, elimination of wasteful litigation, and 'certainty
of payment.48  Prompt indemnity for wages lost4 4 as a result of injury
should be the employer's immediate concern. He should not permit an
"unholy race between uninformed workers and compensation wise car-
• 19 N. J. at 605, 118 A. 2d at 28.
,' The plaintiff had received $25.60 for time lost under the New York statute
which does not provide for compensation after the injured returns to work if his
earning power has not been diminished. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW,
§ 15, s. 3v (1946). The State of New Jersey,. however, awards compensation
based upon the extent of the disability regardless of diminution of earning capacity.
N. J. REv. STAT. 34: 15-12c (1940). To how much more compensation would the
plaintiff have to prove himself entitled in the second state in this and similar situa-
tions to come within the exception announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court?
The New Jersey Supreme Court will have an opportunity to review his de-
cision. The instant case is pending on a petition for rehearing. Letter from Robert
Scherling, Newark, N. J., Attorney for the plaintiff, to the writer, May 1, 1956.
"' The writer believes that an exception would be encountered only if the injured
employee received his first award in Maryland. Gasch v. Britton, 202 F. 2d 356
(C. C. A. D. C. 1953).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1950) provides that "if an employee shall receive
compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same injury
greater than is provided for in this article." Therefore, an injured employee who
received an award in State X and meets the jurisdictional requirements of the
North Carolina act may recover an additional amount in North Carolina, but not
more than the difference between the maximum amount provided by its statutes and
the amount he received in the former state.
SO-ERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 27 (1954).
"Cash benefits replace little more than one third of the wage-loss in the average
case. Bogusch, Reports and Motes from Everywhere, 16 NACCA L. J. 460 (1955).
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riers to see who creates an award first"44 if the employee is eligible for
compensation in more than one state. Rather, employers and courts
should provide protection45 within the framework of the laws when deal-
ing with redress for industrial injuries. Any other attitude would not
be consonant with the spirit in which the compensation statutes were
enacted.46
PETER H. GERNS.
Constitutional Law-Contempt-Court's Jurisdiction over the Re-
ligious Upbringing of Children
The recent Iowa case of Lynch v. Uhlenhopp1 presents a situation
which probably has never arisen before. A divorce decree had been
entered in a previous suit under which the wife had obtained custody of
the six-year-old child of the marriage. The parents had agreed by stipu-
lation, written and signed, that the "child shall be reared in the Roman
Catholic religion," and the court's decree embodied the exact terms of
this stipulation. Several months after the decree was entered, the peti-
tioner (wife) began taking the child to Protestant Sunday school and
since that time has been rearing the child in the Protestant faith. It
seems that the father protested to the mother about this matter shortly
after he learned about it, and brought the present proceedings to enforce
the terms of the custody decree. In this proceeding the father did not
seek and the district court did not order a transfer of the child's custody
to him. The district court held that the decree was binding upon the
mother so long as it remained unvacated and unmodified, adjudged her in
contempt, but suspended passing sentence upon her in order to afford her
an opportunity to purge herself by filing an affidavit to the effect "that
she is rearing the child in the Catholic faith." Writ of certiorari was
granted and execution of the order has been stayed pending completion
of the hearing to review the order.
The main question presented on appeal will be whether the court
"In some cases the insurance carrier can create an award in the state whose
laws are more favorable to the employer before the employee takes steps to protect
himself. HoRovivz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 41 (1948); therefore, the result
of the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case may tempt an employer to shop for the state
with the smallest award. Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause-Magnolia Petroleum Co. z. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. R. 330, 345 (1944) ...
"5 An award of compensation by the Arkansas commission to a Texas employee
for injuries sustained in Arkansas, on petition filed by the employer wfithout the
knowledge of the employee, did not bar a second award under the Texas act.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Skidmore, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 222 S. W. 2d 344 (1949).
" "Under our statute the workman is the soldier of organized industry, accept-
ing a kind of pension in exchange for absolute insurance on his master's premises."
Bausman, J., in Stertz v. Ind. Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 606, 158 Pac. 256, 363
(1916).
'- Iowa -, - N. W. 2d - (1956). Now on appeal from the District Court
of Wright County, Iowa.
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awarding custody of the child had jurisdiction to enter into its decree
provision respecting the child's religion. The fact of the court's juris-
diction will determine whether the court's decree can be collaterally
attacked.2 As no cases in which the jurisdictional question is raised have
been found, a review of some of the cases in which the religious upbring-
ing of children has been considered should be helpful in predicting the
outcome of this case on appeal.
In attacking the validity of decrees, violation of which has been pun-
ished by contempt, courts classify decrees as (1) erroneous or irregular
and (2) void. As to the first type, erroneous or irregular decrees, where
the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties the rule
is stated as follows:
"[T]he fact that such order or decree, violation or disobedience
of which is made the basis of the contempt charge, is erroneous or
irregular or improvidently rendered, does not justify the defend-
ant in failing to abide by its terms, and his conduct in failing to do
so may be punished as for contempt despite the error or irregu-
larity. It is almost unanimously agreed that if the defendant
desires to attack the order or the decree as erroneous, he must
do so, not by disregarding or violating it and then setting the error
up as a defense to a charge of contempt, but by a direct attack
thereon by appeal or a motion to set it aside. He must obey it so
long as it is in effect and until it is dissolved by the court issuing
it, or reversed on appeal by the appellate court."8
Under the second type, where the mandate, order, judgment, or
decree is void or issued by a court without jurisdiction, disobedience of
such order or decree is not contempt. Further, if the court has no juris-
diction to make the order, no waiver can cut off the rights of the party
to attack its validity.4
In view of these general rules, it seems that if the court awarding
custody of the child had jurisdiction to incorporate into its decree pro-
vision as to the religious training of the child the present appeal is a
collateral attack on the decree and therefore invalid. This would be true
even though the appellate court should find the decree irregular or erro-
neous. On the other hand, if the appellate court should find that the
' A brief filed by the American Jewish Congress as amicus curiae raises the
question of whether the action of the district court is in violation of the freedom of
religion clauses in the Iowa Constitution and the Federal Constitution. IowA
CoN ST. art. I, § 3; U. S. CoNsT. amend. I. Each provides that the General Assem-
bly and Congress, respectively, "shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ..."
Annot., 12 A. L. R. 2d 1059, 1107 (1950) ; Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 202
N. W. 542 (1925) ; 17 C. J. S., Contempt § 14 (1939).'




district court-had no jurisdiction to make provision in the decree fixing
the child's religious training, then the decree, or at least that part of the
decree, is void and subject to collateral attack upon an appeal from the
judgment of contempt.
The recent case of Martin v. Martin5 presents facts somewhat similar
to the facts in the Lynch case. Involved was an antenuptial agreement
between the father and mother that all children of their union were to be
brought up in the Roman Catholic faith. The wife, contrary to her
agreement and her husband's desires, sent the child, who had been bap-
tized a Catholic, to a Christian Science Sunday school at an early age.
Several years later the father brought an annulment action, and the wife
prevailed on her counterclaim for a separation. The wife got custody
of the child, and the judgment provided that the child be brought up in
the Roman Catholic religion in accordance with the antenuptial agree-
ment of the parties. Later, the wife asked that the judgment be modified
so that the boy might be permitted to attend the public schools and re-
ceive instruction in the Christian Science religion. The Supreme Court
of Kings County ordered the modification of the judgment, and this was
affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.6 On appeal
the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion held that the modification
was justified.7 The majority found that the evidence supported the
conclusion that the modification was for the child's best interests and
welfare. The dissent took the position that "this sort of antenuptial
agreement is enforceable like any other, unless and until its enforcement
is shown to be harmful to the child. 'Agreements between parents for
a particular sort of religious upbringing have in general been held valid
in this country.' Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 298, 183
N. E. 429, 431 (1932). Particularly must this be so when the agree-
ment has been confirmed by, and written into a judgment."'8
A similar situation arose in the case of Goldman v. Hicks,9 in which
a separation agreement was incorporated into and made a part of a sub-
sequent divorce decree. The decree provided that the custody of the
daughter was to be in the mother for six months and the father for six
months of each year. Subsequently the mother married a man whose
religion differed from that of the father, and the father filed a bill in
equity in which he sought the exclusive custody and control of his daugh-
ter. He contended that the subsequent marriage of the mother to a man
of the Jewish religion* created a condition which rendered her unfit or
unsuitable for the care and custody of her child. The lower court granted
-308 N. Y. 136, 123 N. E. 2d 812 (1954).
'283 App. Div. 721, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 851 (2d Dep't 1954).
308 N. Y. 136, 123 N. E. 2d 812 (1954).
'Ibid.
'241 Ala. 80, 1 So. 2d 18 (1941).
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the relief prayed for, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed. The
court was of the opinion that the agreement of the parties with reference
to the custody of the daughter would best preserve the interest and wel-
fare of the child. However, the court said that "in custody proceedings
it is a well established rule in Alabama that the best interest and welfare
of the child or children be the controlling and paramount inquiry....
Any agreement in reference thereto is not controlling."' 0
In Donahue v. Donahue" the custody of minor children was awarded
to the mother following divorce, and the mother decided to rear the chil-
dren in accordance with her religious faith, which differed from that of
their father. The father applied to the court for an order requiring that
the boy be reared in the Christian Science religion and the girl in
Catholicism, or at least that they be reared in some Christian faith. The
court declined to interfere with the religious training of the children,
saying, "no end of difficulties would arise if judges sought to proscribe
the selection of a religious faith made by a parent having custody....
Intervention in matters of religion is a perilous adventure upon which
the judiciary should be loathe to embark."'12
Brewer v. Cary:3 was an action for specific performance of an ante-
nuptial contract pertaining to the religious training of infant children.
The court held that the agreement was not binding and could not be
specifically enforced in equity.
"[T] he right of custody as guardian, whether natural or by ap-
pointment of law, carries with it, as one of the incidents involved,
the right as well as the duty to direct its [the child's] training, its
education, religious and secular... these are of the very essence
of the appointment of guardians, and lie at the foundation of the
right of custody itself; . . . no court will interfere directly in
directing such matters, save when convinced that the welfare of
the child demands it; ... when the question of its welfare turns
on the direction of its training and upbringing in one belief or an-
other, our courts, save as controlled by statute, have no power;
... to do so would be a determination by the courts as to differ-
20 Ibid.
" 142 N. J. Eq. 701, 61 A. 2d 243 (1948).
"Id. at 703, 61 A. 2d at 245. Accord, it re Flynn, 87 N. J. Eq. 413 423, 100
AtI. 861, 864 (Ch. 1917) ; People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N. Y. 283, 2 N. E.2d 660 (1936) ; Ex parte Kananack, 272 App. Div. 783, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (2d
Dep't 1947), in which the court held that it would not take the question of the child's
religious traning into its own hands, short of circumstances amounting to unfitness
on the part of the custodian. The reluctance of the courts to inject themselves into
so personal and controversial an area is understandable. Contra, Commonwealth
ex rel. Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa. Super. 147, 15 A. 2d 76 (1940).
" 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S. W. 685 (1910).
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ences in religious belief, which is incompatible with religious
freedom."'' 4
It should be noted that the cases discussed above are not appeals from
contempt proceedings. Each case is of a different type from the Lynch
case. However, from these cases and others one can get an idea of how
courts feel about making any decisions as to the religious training of
children. Writers on this subject seem to agree that, generally speaking,
the questions respecting the child's religion will be settled by the award
of the right of custody.' 5
It seems clear that the general opinion of the authorities is that the
court should not take over the religious training of the children, except
in cases where it is for the children's interest and welfare to do so. 16 In
none of the cases discussed above has a court explicitly stated that courts
have no constitutional jurisdiction to enter into its decree an agreement
of the parents as to the religious training of the children of the marriage.
True, some cases have denied enforcement of these agreements and modi-
fied some of the provisions of the agreements, but not on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction to enforce such agreements.
In the Lynch case the court did not of its own accord make the de-
cision as to what religion was best for the child. The parties themselves
did that by an agreement made at the time they were married. The court
merely entered into its decree the apparent wishes of the parents. No
doubt it appeared to the court that such an arrangement as to the child's
religion was in the best interest and welfare of the child at that time.
It is submitted that if the wife, at some date after the decree was en-
tered, had made a motion to modify such decree so that she be permitted
", 148 Mo. App. 193, -. 127 S. W. 685, 692 (1910) ; Hernandez v. Thomas,
51 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641 (1905), where the court held such agreements against public
policy, unenforceable and not binding upon the parties; Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill.
App. 636, 92 N. E. 2d 358 (1950). But see Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193
Pac. 307 (1920) which involved the surviving non-Catholic parent who had signed
an antenuptial promise. While the court declined to take the child from the custody
of a paternal grandmother to whom the surviving father had entrusted it, it referred
to the antenuptial promise as a "commendable compromise between two natural
guardians, who, under the statutes of the state, had equal authority." The agree-
ment was held merely persuasive upon the father, not binding. Contra, Weinberger
v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E. 429 (1932) ; Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N. Y. S.
2d 100 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
" Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 721, 732 (1944) ; Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious
Education of a Child, 29 HARv. L. REv. 469, 499 (1916). In Boerger v. Boerger,
26 N. J. Super. 90, 97 A. 2d 419 (1953) the court said "there is much to be said for
the view that all other things being equal, the determining factor should be custody.
The parent to whom custody is awarded must logically and naturally be the one
who lawfully exercises the greater control and influence over the child. To create
a basic religious conflict in the mind of the child, and between it and its custodian,
would be detrimental to its welfare."
"o See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 167 (1943) and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534 (1925) in which cases the state intervened to protect
the child's interest and welfare.
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to rear the child in the Protestant religion on the ground that she found
it difficult to rear him in a religion different from her own, and that this
would be in the best interest and welfare of the child, this court might
possibly have done what the court did in the Martin case. The fact of
the mother's custody makes this result even more likely. On the other
hand, the court could do what was done in the Goldman case and con-
tinue to enforce the agreement of the parties on the ground that it is in
the best interest of the child to continue rearing him as a Catholic. If the
mother had taken the action suggested above, whichever way the court
held, its decision would necessarily be based upon what it found to be in
the best interest and welfare of the child, and not upon the fact that the
parents had previously reached a particular agreement in the matter.
It seems that Mrs. Lynch has taken the wrong step in openly violat-
ing the decree of the court without first seeking a modification. Under
the cases discussed the courts have taken jurisdiction to enter decrees
regarding the religious upbringing of children where the best interest of
the child required it. As the court in the principal case has exercised
jurisdiction under similar circumstances, Mrs. Lynch's appeal amounts
to no more than an attempted collateral attack on the decree. 17
MAITLAND Guy FREED.
Constitutional Law-Estoppel to Raise the Constitutional Question
In Convent of the Sisters of Saint Joseph v. Winston-Salem' the
North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine that a party may
be estopped to assert a statute's unconstitutionality through some prior
conduct on his part. In that case the Convent of Saint Joseph sought a
declaration of rights under the zoning ordinances of Winston-Salem and
"' Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181 (1921) in which the Court said at page 189:
"An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers
upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made parties
therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however erroneous the
action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of
a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first
instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision
is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its
orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt
of its lawful authority, to be punished." See also State v. Baldwin, 57 Iowa 266(1881) which held that in injunction proceedings the order of a court having juris-
diction of the matter and of the parties, even if erroneous, is not void, and until
reversed must be obeyed.
'243 N. C. 316, 90 S. E. 2d 879 (1956). The plaintiff acquired a large private
estate in a residential area of Winston-Salem zoned against all but residences,
churches, and public schools. Through a special-use permit, permission was obtained
by plaintiff from the city, over objections from residents, to create a private Catholic
school on the estate. After the school was established, the plaintiff applied to the
zoning board for modification of the permit to allow for the conversion of a garage
into a chemistry laboratory, which conversion necessitated structural alterations.
The modification was denied and plaintiff was held estopped to assert the uncon-
stitutionality of the zoning ordinances under which the original permit was granted.
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a special-use permit issued pursuant to the ordinances. Because the
plaintiff had applied for and had been granted a special-use permit to
convert a private estate into a church elementary school, it had employed
the statute and enjoyed its benefits. The plaintiff was therefore estopped
later to attack the ordinance's constitutionality when subsequently re-
fused a modification of the permit to structurally change the exterior of
the buildings.
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the unconstitutionality of laws and
legal proceedings has long been recognized by American courts;2 it
operates upon the basis of waiver, either express or implied, of the right
to challenge constitutionality. Such waiver of a statutory or constitu-
tional right is permissible where no public policy or morals are involved.3
In view of these principles, an examination of the application of the
estoppel doctrine to situations where the right to challenge constitu-
tionality has been waived would be useful. This also necessarily implies
an examination of what constitutes waiver.
The two most generally recognized criteria giving rise to the estoppel
are the invocation or employment of a statute and the receipt of benefits
under a statute. One who employs a statute to his own use may later
be estopped to assert its unconstitutionality because the courts will not
allow one both to utilize and assail a statute at the same time.4 Invoking
the statute impliedly waives a defect in its constitutionality. 5 Similarly,
the acceptance of or participation in benefits from a statute may also
create the estoppel. 6 In the leading case, Daniels v. Tearney,7 the United
- Notes, 34 COL. L. REv. 1495 (1934) ; 48 HAgv. L. REv. 988 (1935).
In Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 569, 570 (M.D. Ala.
1934) the court stated, "A party may waive a rule of law or statute or even a con-
stitutional provision enacted for his benefit or protection, where it is conclusively a
matter of private right, and no consideration of public policy or morals is involved,
and, having once done so, he cannot subsequently invoke its protection."
'Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 271 U. S. 208
(1926); Hurley v. Commission of Fisheries of Virginia, 257 U. S. 223 (1921);
Nuckolls v. United States, 76 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1935) ; Slick v. Hamaker, 28
F. 2d 103 (8th Cir. 1928).
In Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553 (1903), after the plaintiffs had inaugurated
proceedings under an Ohio statute providing for local improvements, presented a
petition for improvements, allowed a contract to be let, changed the plans as the
work progressed, periodically recognized the justice of assessments, and signed a
statement to induce the purchase of the county improvement bonds, they were
estopped from asserting the act's unconstitutionality even though it had been so
declared in another proceeding.
But cf. O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. 450 (1901), where the construction of
a levee along the Mississippi River was not within the authority of the Illinois
statute. Some, including the plaintiff, petitioned for the levee and helped organize
the assessment district. There was no estoppel to contest the statute's authorization
of assessment. The statute had been held unconstituional in a previous litigation.
' There will be no waiver of a constitutional right when a statute is void ab
initio. St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank v. American Clearing Co., 291 Fed. 212,
229 (S. D. Fla. 1923).
'Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 (1880) ; Rowekamp v. Mercantile-Commerce
Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 2d 852 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Federal Savings & Loan Cor-
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States Supreme Court held: "It is well settled as a general proposition
*.. that where a party has availed himself for his benefit of an unconsti-
tutional law, he cannot, in a subsequent litigation... aver its unconsti-
tutionality...."
One method of utilization of a statute which will erect the estoppel is
found when a legislative enactment provides a remedy and procedure for
ajudicating a right, which if violated, would create a distinct cause of
action in itself. Employing the statutory remedy and procedure rather
than the non-statutory common law remedy is held to concede the validity
of the statute.8 ,The one estopped has the privilege of ignoring or assum-
ing the invalidity of the statute and proceeding at law as if the statutory
remedy were non-existant. In Electric Company v. Dow,9 a New Hamp-
shire statute created a procedure for land owners to recover damages
suffered due to the flooding of property by mill dams. When the de-
fendant proceeded under the terms of the statute, he was estopped later
to assert that the statutory method of assessing damages was unconstitu-
tional. The court held that the "act confers a privilege which the plain-
tiff in error was at liberty to exercise or not as it thought fit."
Some difficulty in determining a course of conduct is experienced
when a party finds that if he chooses to proceed upon the assumption
that the statute is unconstitutional he courts a heavy penalty or loss of
rights granted by the statute, and if he invokes the statute he will be
estopped later to contest it. Here the risk rests upon the litigant.10
However, certain exceptions to the operation of the estoppel doctrine
exist.
Where the penalty established by the statute for non-compliance is
so great that the statute is invoked through duress, the United States
poration v. Grand Forks Building & Loan Ass'n, 85 F. Supp. 248 (N. E. D. N. D,
1949) ; United States v. McIntosh, 2 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. Vir. 1932), cert. denied,
293 U. S. 586 (1934).
102 U. S. 415 (1880) supra note 6. The convention of Virginia enacted an
ordinance providing that no sale be made under a deed of trust without the consent
of the parties if the debtor put up a bond and security for payment of the debt.
The ordinance was passed in 1861 to protect debtors against whom there was an
execution in the hands of an officer. The defendants made their bond and otherwise
complied with the statute; the debt remaining unpaid when the ordinance expired,
suit on the bond was brought. Defendants claimed the bond was void and the
statute unconstitutional. Held, defendants were estopped to plead unconstitutionality.
' Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U. S. 581 (1887). Plaintiff
utilized an Act of Congress to recover the value of land taken by the United States.
The court, in answer to the plaintiff's later assault on the statute's constitutionality,
said: "The plaintiff, by adopting that mode, has assented to the taking of its prop-
erty by the Government for public use, and has agreed to submit the determination
of compensation to the tribunal named by Congress." Id. at 599.
166 U. S. 489 (1897). The statute provided that if either party elected, the
court would direct the issue to a jury to assess damages and judgment would be
rendered on the verdict of the jury with 50% added to the damages to make a
final judgment. The plaintiff in error contended that the method of assessing dam-
ages was repugnant to the federal Constitution.
"o Wall v. Parrott Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407 (1917); Great Falls
Manufacturing Company v. The Attorney General, 134 U. S. 581 (1888).
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Supreme Court has waived the invocation. This occurred in Union
Pacific Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,"
where the state exacted an exorbitant fee for a certificate of authority to
issue bonds pursuant to a statute which threatened heavy penalties and
blacklisting if the certificate were not obtained. The court held that
application for a certificate and payment of the fee under protest were
made under duress and did not waive the right to challenge the statute's
constitutionality. The same result has been reached in regard to federal
acts.12 This brings out the well-established rule that to create the estoppel
the invocation of the statute must be voluntary.13
Another area of exception from the operation of the estoppel doctrine
appears in the field of foreign corporations. A foreign corporation, by
seeking and obtaining permission to do business in a state, does not
thereby become estopped from objecting to any provision in the state
statutes which is in conflict with the United States Constitution.1 4 Ac-
cepting a license does not impose an obligation to respect any provision
of the statute granting it that is repugnant to the Constitution.15 A desire
to maintain freedom of interstate commerce as well as a recognition that
citizens of one state have a constitutional right to engage in business in
another state give support to this rule.' 6
A less frequent exception to the operation of the estoppel doctrine is
seen when only one section of a statute which has been invoked is at-
tacked. When that section can be severed from the rest of the act with-
out invalidating the entire statute a party may attack it, although estopped
as to other portions of the statute.1T This is particularly true in cases
of statutory amendment.' 8
11 248 U. S. 67 (1918).
" Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. Ky. 1934). Coal com-
panies acquiescing in and operating under the Bituminous Coal Code, formulated
under the National Industrial Recovery Act, were not estopped to contest its con-
stitutionality; the companies operated under threat of dire penalties, blacklisting,
and boycotts for noncompliance.
" Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931); Booth Fisheries Co. v.
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 271 U. S. 208 (1926), in regard to attacks
upon Workmen's Compensation Acts by employers who previously elected to obtain
the benefits of such acts.
" Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 (1927) ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Carr, 272 U. S. 494 (1926).
" Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 (1927) ; W. W. Cargill
Co. v. Minnesota cx tel Railroad & W. Com., 180 U. S. 452 (1901).
But cf. Pierce Oil Corporation v. Phoenix Refining Co., 259 U. S. 125 (1922);
In re Standard Oak Veneer Co., 173 Fed. 103 (E. D. Tenn. 1909).
When the United States places conditions upon its consent to be sued, a party
may not, in suit brought on that consent, contest the constitutionality of the condi-
tions; the bar of estoppel will operate in such a case. Upchurch Packing Co. v.
United States, 151 F. 2d 983 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 803 (1946).
16 Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 180 (W. D. Ky. 1902).
1? Where the act itself carries a separability provision, an attack upon one sec-
tion will not invalidate the entire act. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Torr,
15 F. Supp. 315 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Mojave River Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court of
California, 202 Cal. 717, 262 Pac. 724 (1928).
"- Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation, 300 U. S. 55 (1937).
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Although courts are in conflict as to whether a prior invocation of a
statute raises a permanent estoppel,' 9 it has been held in at least one case
that when changed circumstances reveal that the estoppel, although
validly invoked in a previous situation, would be violative of due process
in the present instance, the estoppel is erased.20
The estoppel operates even when there has been a prior, separate
adjudication that the statute assailed is unconstitutional. As a general
rule such a prior adjudication will not relieve the party estopped.21
The early view in this country was that a state court's adjudication
of the estoppel question was not reviewable by a federal court; this was
true in every case where there were two grounds upon which to base the
state court decision, one federal, and one non-federal. 22  Because the vast
majority of estoppel cases fit this description, there was almost no federal
review. The early cases held that the estoppel was not a federal question
and relied upon the non-federal ground as sufficient basis for the state
court determination. 23 This attitude of the United States Supreme Court
gave the state court decisions a peculiar strength. But, as state courts
abused this power of final decision, the federal courts gradually changed
" For cases holding that the bar by estoppel is permanent see Wall v. Parrott
Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407 (1917), and Great Falls Manufacturing Com-
pany v. The Attorney General, 124 U. S. 581 (1888).
For a case holding that the bar may not be a permanent one see Buck v. Kuyen-
dall, 267 U. S. 307 (1924).
2 Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 776 (1931). State banks, after
failing to have the state bank guaranty law declared unconstitutional, endeavored to
conduct business pursuant to the law; they were not precluded for all time to assert
the law's unconstitutionality. The operation of the law was vastly different from
what was expected upon its enactment.
2" In Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 (188), the court had this to say: "It is
well settled as a general proposition ...that where a party has availed himself
for his benefit of an unconstitutional law, he cannot ... aver its unconstitutionality
as a defense, although such unconstitutionality may have been pronounced by a
competent judicial tribunal in another suit. In such cases the principal of estoppel
applies with full force and effect."
See Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553 (1903), supra note 4, and St. Louis
Malleable Casting Co. v. Pendergast Construction Co., 260 U. S. 469, 472 (1923).
22Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361 (1893). The court held that accepting a
dividend on a negotiable note in composition proceedings under state insolvency
laws waived the right to enforce a debt after the debtor's discharge. The court
then cited Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 307 (1890), wherein that court said:
"... where, in action pending in a state court, two grounds of defense are inter-
posed, each broad enough to defeat a recovery, and only one of them involves a
federal question, and judgment passes for the defendant, the record must show, in
order to justify a writ of error from this court, that the judgment was rested upon
the disposition of the federal question; and if this does not affirmatively appear the
writ of error will be dismissed, unless the defense which does not involve a federal
question is so palpably unfounded that it cannot be presumed to have been enter-
tained by the state court."
2 Pierce v. Somerset Railway, 171 U. S. 641, 648 (1898). "A person may by
his acts or omission to act waive a right which he might otherwise have under the
Constitution of the United States as well as under a statute, and the question
whether he has or has not lost such right by his failure to act or by his action, is




their attitude24 until today they feel a duty to review state court decisions
invoking the estoppel.
25
Although the maxim that one must exhaust his administrative reme-
dies before being heard at law will estop many actions, there will be no
estoppel when the unconstitutionality of the statute under which an
administrative commission or agency operates is asserted. There are
two reasons for allowing a party to proceed directly in court; the inade-
quacy of administrative relief26 and the inability of the administrative
board to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute which created it.27
Two situations exist wherein the estoppel takes the form of res
judicata: (1) when a party acquiesces in a court order; an order, though
not a final decree, has the effect of res judicata when the parties, by in-
activity and acquiescence, have accepted it as disposing of the contro-
versy. The leading case is City of Trinidad et al. v. Madrid et al.2 s
wherein the court denied the plaintiff's bill to enjoin the city's creating
a paving district and levying a special assessment, but continued the case
for the sole purpose of allowing plaintiffs to object to the sufficiency of
any hearing on assessment. After two years, during which time the im-
provements were completed and the city let contracts and issued bonds,
the plaintiffs attacked the validity of the ordinance; their acquiescence in
the court's decision was held to estop such an attack.29  (2) A failure to
appeal from an adverse ruling of an administrative body, thus inducing
4 Apparently the change in attitude came with state court abuse of the estoppel.
In Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 248 U. S.
67 (1918), the court, declaring its policy to review the state court's decision, said:
"Were it otherwise, as conduct under duress involves a choice, it always would be
possible for a State to impose an unconstitutional burden by the threat of penalties
worse than it in the case of failure to accept it, and then to declare the acceptance
voluntary... "
Also, possible confiscatory legislation being validly construed by state courts
via the estoppel doctrine helped bring this change in attitude about. Abie State
Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931).
" Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, stpra
note 24; Enterprise Irrig. Dist. v. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157 (1917).
" Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 773 (1947). The United
States Supreme Court, in a case involving the Renegotiation Acts, held that: "It
is true that the presence of constitutional questions, coupled with a sufficient showing
of inadequacy of prescribed administrative relief and of threatened or impending
irreparable injury flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure,
has been held sufficient to dispense with exhausting the administrative process be-
fore instituting judicial intervention."
- An administrative board to which a complaint might appeal has no authority
to pass on constitutional questions. Hillsborough Tp. v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620,
625 (1946).
'880 Colo. App. 210, 250 Pac. 158 (1926).
2" Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 165 S. W. 2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942). The court, while finding that suit was not barred, held ".... that unreason-
able delay in appealing which causes the opposite party to act, to his injury, might
give rise to a question of estoppel." This would intimate that failure to appeal
would raise the estoppel to contest constitutionality only when such failure causes
the opposite party to act to his injury. City of Huntsville v. Mayes, 271 S. W. 162
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Vesser v. Nashville, 190 N. C. 265, 126 S. E. 593 (1925).
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action in the other party, creates an estoppel by res judicata to a later
attack upon the constitutionality of the statute under which the disputed
ruling was promulgated.30
A major cause for utilization of the estoppel doctrine is laches, or the
failure to act at a necessary time.3 1 Failure to object while another acts
under a statute, with your knowledge, to his detriment will estop one to
assert the unconstitutionality of that statute.8 2 Laches on the part of
one's predecessors may also create the estoppel.3 3 Only a few cases re-
quire a party to change his position as a requisite to pleading the
estoppel. 34
The failure to assert a constitutional right at the proper time may
estop a later attack upon the constitutionality of court proceedings.35
Ordinarily, the failure to raise a constitutional right during trial amounts
to a waiver thereof, unless due to ignorance or duress, and an appeal
" White v. Glenn, 138 S. W. "2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); In re Pierce's
Estate, 28 Cal. App. 2d 8, 81 P. 2d 1037 (1938). Petitioners, as trustees of a
missing heir, waited two and one half years to object to the making of a court
order; they were estopped to attack the order. Grant v. Birmingham, 210 Ala.
App. 239, 97 So. 731 (1923). Statutory estoppel precluded collateral attack on an
assessment proceeding.
"' Failure to appear at an administrative hearing afforded pursuant to statute
will estop one later to assert the unconstitutionality of matters relevant to that
hearing. Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U. S. 710 (1923).
In Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477 (1913), parties failing to appear to be
heard on classification given by an ordinance providing for licensing occupations
cannot claim he has been unjustly discriminated against because he was so classified
as to subject his business to a higher license tax than that required of others in
the same business.
Failure to contest proposed legislation within the time expressly afforded by
statute waives the right to later assert its unconstitutionality when adopted. City
of Enid ex rel Versluis v. Robinson, 39 F. Supp. 923 (W. D. Okla. 1941).
"2 Pierce v. Somerset Ry.. 171 U. S. 641 (1898). The defendant company de-
faulted on its bonds and the majority of bondholders, under statute, reorganized,
completed the railway line and issued more bonds; two years later the trustees
holding a mortgage securing the original bond issue sued to foreclose and the court
held: "Their long acquiescence, without objection, coupled with the changed condi-
tions and the relations resulting from the possession and management of the prop-
erty by the Somerset Railway, estops them from now questioning the legality of the
organization of the new corporation." Id. at 647.
" Bostwick v. Baldwin Drainage Dist., 152 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1945).
"Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558 (1900). In a
dispute over water rates the court said that ". . . there was no misleading, no
injury, no change of condition, no circumstance which could invoke the doctrine of
estoppel . . ." thus intimating that perhaps such change of position might be a
prerequisite for invoking the estoppel.
In Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F. 2d 593, 606
(8th Cir. 1932), the plaintiff was not estopped to plead unconstitutionality because
it had received no benefit from the contested statute, "and, secondly, there has been
no change whatever in the position of the city because of the plaintiff's action."
. Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 128 F. Supp. 637 (E. D. Mo. 1955). Land-
owners had brought seven suits in the state courts involving the same dispute and
never raised the constitutional objection that the city had denied them equal pro-
tection of the laws; the right to raise the constitutional question on appeal in a
federal court was waived.
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based upon abrogation of constitutional rights may be permanently
estopped ;36 this is true of criminal as well as civil actions.
37
From this review of the operation of the doctrine of estoppel to assert
unconstitutionality it is apparent that it is an equitable instrument, the
importance of which can best be expressed by a realization that a consti-
tutionally guaranteed right may be permanently lost through a failure to
act or by imprudent action at a critical time.
DUNCAN IAN MAcCALMAN.
Constitutional Law-Rule of Exclusion-Federal Injunction against
Federal Officer from Testifying in State Criminal Prosecution
In what will undoubtedly prove to be a landmark decision in the law
of search and seizure, the United States Supreme Court in a recent case,
Rea v. United States,' held by a five to four margin, that the equitable
power of the federal courts should extend to give relief under the fol-
lowing circumstances: Petitioner had been indicted in a federal district
court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in violation of federal
law.2 A federal agent had obtained the evidence under a search warrant
invalid under Rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-
this rule states the necessary requisites for a valid federal search warrant.
Petitioner made a motion to suppress the evidence. The motion was
granted and the indictment was dismissed. Thereafter, the agent insti-
gated a state criminal action charging the petitioner with possesion of
marihuana in violation of New Mexico law.3 While awaiting trial in the
state court the petitioner filed a motion in the same federal court to enjoin
the federal agent from testifying in the state action with respect to the
narcotics obtained by him as a result of the invalid search warrant. The
district court denied the relief and the court of appeals affirmed. 4 On
writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed.
"' Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944) ; Sanderlin v. Smyth, 138 F. 2d
729 (4th Cir. 1943).
The constitutional right to move for the return of property illegally seized and
to object to evidence obtained may be impaired, if not lost, when not seasonably
asserted. United States v. Napela, 28 F. 2d 898 (N. D. N. Y. 1928).
The court has discretionary power and authority over the waiver. United States
ex rel Athanosopoulos v. Reid, 110 F. Supp. 200 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
In Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 497 (1940), the court said,
"A defendant may waive a constitutional as well as a statutory right, and this may
be done by express consent, by failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct in-
consistent with a purpose to insist upon it." State v. Dunn, 159 N. C. 470, 74 S. E.
1014 (1912).
" Carruthers v. Reed. 102 F. 2d 933 (8th Cir. 1939).
1350 U. S. 214 (1956).2 Marihuana Tax Act, 50 STAT. 554 (1937), 26 U. S. C. § 2593 (a) (1952).3 N. M. STAT. ANN. § 71-636 (1941).
*Rea v. United States, 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir., 1954), cert. granted, 348 U. S.
958 (1955).
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The court of appeals held that the prohibition against the use of such
evidence is limited to federal trials and is applicable there only when it
was unlawfully obtained by federal officers. The court assumed, without
deciding, that the district court under its general equity power had the
authority to render the injunction, but as there was no abuse of discre-
tion, it should refuse to intervene and disrupt the delicate relationship
between the federal equitable power and the state judiciary in state crimi-
nal proceedings.
The Supreme Court, however, considered the problem from a dif-
ferent approach. The majority,5 speaking through Douglas, J., stated
that it was simply a case concerning "our supervisory powers over
federal law enforcement agencies," 6 and that the district court was "not
asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to interfere with state
agencies in enforcement of state law." 7 The Supreme Court stated fur-
ther: "A federal agent has violated the federal Rules governing searches
and seizures-Rules prescribed by this Court and made effective after
submission to the Congress.... The power of the federal courts extends
to policing those requirements and making certain that they are ob-
served. . . . To enjoin the federal agent from testifying is merely to
enforce the federal Rules against those owing obedience to them."
Although the court stated that "we put all the constitutional ques-
tions to one side," reference to the constitutional background of the law
of search and seizure will provide a setting into which to place the prin-
cipal case.
The Fourth Amendment 0 to the Federal Constitution commands that
the right of the people to be secure in their homes, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.
However, as is true of most constitutional provisions on individual rights,
there is no suggestion in the Constitution itself as to the method of
enforcement of this abstract right." So, although the Constitution pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not expressly bar the
admissibility of such unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceed-
ings.' 2 Even though a search is unquestionably "unreasonable" and
Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, Black, Reed and Clark.6 Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 217 (1956).
7 Id. at 216. 8 Id. at 217.0 Id. at 216.
"0 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U. S. CoNsT. Amend. IV.
'x "Bills of Rights may be replete with promise of public beneficence, but they
remain curiously silent about how such promises are to be fulfilled." ZuRcIFE,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II. 5 (1951).
"2 Shinyu Nero v. United States, 148 F. 2d 696, 699 (5th Cir., 1945), ccrt. denied,
326 U. S. 720 (1945) (dictum) ; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
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therefore prohibited by the Constitution, nothing in the Constitution says
what the consequences shall be. And just as the matter of what consti-
tutes "unreasonable" search is left to judicial decision,'3 so the conse-
quences of such search when it does occur are left to judicial decision,
in the absence of legislative enactment.
In the federal courts, however, this evidence is excluded by virtue of
the now famous "exclusionary rule" which had its birth in 1914 in the
case of Weeks v. United States.14 The essence of the rule is that evi-
dence obtained by federal officers in contravention of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment right is inadmissible in federal criminal proceedings.
And Justice Black has said ". . . the federal exclusionary rule is not a
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate. . . ."-15 The soundness of the
position that the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure is not a command of the Constitution is confirmed by
the number of state courts which do not exclude the evidence despite the
similarity of the state and federal constitutions. 16
" "What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
... and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready lit mus-paper test. The
recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the
facts and circumstances of each case." Minton, J., United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56, 63 (1950), citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S.
344, 357 (1930).
"The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms."
Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 160 (1947).
" 232 U. S. 383 (1941). However, in an earlier case, Boyd v. United States,
116 U. S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court held that compulsory production of pri-
vate books and papers is "compelling [the accused] to be a witness against him-
self, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the
equivalent of a search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 634-635. Then eighteen years later, the Supreme Court returned to the old
rule, when it held in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), that private
papers were not rendered inadmissible though seized illegally. Ten years after the
Adams decision came Weeks which reaffirmed the doctrine in Boyd, by holding,
in a federal prosecution, where federal officers have obtained private documents by
illegal search and seizure, that it is a violation of the constitutional rights of the
defendants to introduce them into evidence.
Thus, it is more accurate to say that the rule of exclusion did not become
finalized until the Weeks decision.
"0 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (concurring opinion). This
led the late Justice Rutledge to say in the dissenting opinion in the same case that
the Amendment without the exclusionary mandate "reduces the Fourth Amendment
to a form of words." He cites Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920).
10 Every state has in its constitution a provision similar to the Fourth Amend-
ment. For a complete list of the states and their respective constitutional provisions,
see, Note 35 CORNELL L. Q. 625, n. 9 (1950).
However, language similar to that found in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24,
150 N. E. 585, 588 (1926) can be found in decisions of many state courts: "We
may not subject society to these dangers until the legislature has spoken with a
clearer voice."
On the other hand, some state decisions do speak of the exclusion as though
forced on them by their constitutions, e.g. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N. W.
788 (1933).
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Note that the rule is only applicable to federal officers as the recipi-
ents of the illegally seized evidence. Such evidence procured by state
officers acting independently of federal authorities is admissible in federal
courts 1 Also, state courts have held that evidence unlawfully seized by
federal officers may be admitted in state prosecutions if not contrary to
state law.' s
The constitutional provision is broad enough in terms to cover searches
and seizures by any person whomsoever. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has declined to apply its exclusionary rule to obviously unlawful
searches by private persons.10
Furthermore, in Wolf v. Colorado,20 a six to three decision, the exact
holding was that in a prosecution in "a state court for a state crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure."'21 However, the Four-
teenth Amendment 22 does subject the power of a state over life, liberty,
and property to the requirements of due process of law. In 1937 Justice
Cardoza, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Palko v.
Connecticut,23 held that this requirement of due process made applicable
to the states only such guarantees of the Bill of Rights as are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." And Justice Frankfurter concluded
in the Wolf case that the freedom protected by the Fourth Amendment
17In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921), it was stated that "The
Fourth Amendment's origin and history . . . show that it was intended as a re-
straint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies. . . ." So, it follows that (state)
police officers became mere private individuals under the Burdeau v. McDowell
notion and evidence they seized illegally became usable in federal courts. "The
restrictions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution apply
only to Federal officers. The like restrictions in the State Constitutions apply only
to State officers." State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 347, 267 S. W. 858, 861 (1924).
However, in Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927) it was held that
evidence obtained through wrongful search and seizure by state officers who are
co-operating with federal officials must be excluded in prosecutions before the
federal courts. Hence, there arose the necessity of proving lack of co-operation
among the state and federal officials before such evidence could be introduced in
federal courts.
1" Commonwealth v. Colpo (1930), 98 Pa. Super 460, cert. denied, 282 U. S.
863 (1930).
10 See, Note, Admissibility in Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained Illegally by
State Authorities, 51 COL. L. Rv. 128 (1951). Also, for a complete collection of
state and federal cases, see 8 WIGoRE, EvIDENCE §§ 2183 and 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
20338 U. S. 25 (1949). Defendant, a doctor, was convicted of conspiring with
others to commit abortions. Police officers illegally searched defendant's office
and procured appointment books. Interrogation of patients followed and objection
was made to the introduction of the evidence as in violation of defendant's rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon writ of certiorari to the state court, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the state court's conviction.
21 Id. at 33.
22 ... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. U. S. CoNST. Amend. XIV § I.2 302 U. S. 319, 324 (1937).
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
falls within the above definition of Justice Cardoza. He states that "the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is,
therefore, implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such en-
forceable against the state through the Due Process Clause." 24  Thus,
the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on state as well as federal action.
However, the decision in the Wolf case was not implemented by the
rule of exclusion as enunciated in the Weeks case and employed by the
federal courts. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter stated that ex-
cluding the evidence is not the only means of protecting the right em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment, and that the "ways of enforcing such
a basic right raised questions of a different order."25 Exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence is only one of several means of protecting the
right.2 6 By the Wolf case the Supreme Court demonstrated its unwill-
ingness to condemn states' reliance on other means as falling below mini-
mal standards of "due process of law" in order to protect the right.
Therefore, Justice Frankfurter concluded that "due process of law" does
not command the court or the states to exclude illegally obtained evidence
in state prosecutions for state crimes.
Justice Frankfurter seemed to imply in the Wolf case that legislation
by Congress might possibly negate the Weeks doctrine. Congress has
not as yet undertaken such legislation. Until this is done, or until the
Weeks case is overruled, neither of which appears to be likely, the exclu-
sionary rule will continue to be what some writers refer to as "judicial
legislation" because the question as to whether the Fourth Amendment
is a command to the courts to exclude the illegally seized evidence will
never be directly in issue.
In the appendix to the Wolf case, sixteen states are listed as follow-
ing the federal rule of exclusion. In a recent law review article it is
stated that subsequent to the Wolf decision two more states have adopted
the rule.27 North Carolina is one of a few states which has made the
rule statutory. 28
2 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949).2iId. at 28.
"For example, the state may dismiss the offending officer or prosecute him in
a criminal proceeding, and the federal government may prosecute the offending
officer under the Civil Rights Section of the United States Criminal Code. The
victim of an illegal search may, also, have an action for damages in tort against
the searching officer. Recently, a large verdict was sustained in a suit based in
part on illegal searches by state officers in Bucher v. Krause, 200 F. 2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 997 (1953) (Jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship).
See in this connection, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 30-32, n. 1 (1949), 18
U. S. C. §§ 241 and 242 (1952).27 Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MicH. L. REv. 169 (1955)-Dela-
ware, see Richards v. Delaware, 45 Del. 573, 77 A. 2d 199 (1950), and California,
see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955).
" Prior to 1937 North Carolina was not a proponent of the exclusionary rule.
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The next case to be considered in this complicated and confused area
of the law is Stefenelli v. Minard.29 This case was decided in 1951. The
plaintiffs, who were about to be convicted of bookmaking with the aid of
certain incriminating evidence which the state of New Jersey had ad-
mittedly obtained through unlawful search and seizure, relied on the
dictum of justice Frankfurter in the Wolf case to the effect that were
a state affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it
would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
petitioned the federal district court in equity for suppression of this evi-
dence under the Civil Rights Act.30 By New Jersey law such evidence
is admissible.3 ' The petition was dismissed, the court of appeals affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered an opinion with-
out deciding whether the complaint stated a cause of action.3 2  The
-Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter delivering the opinion, stated that
federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to
suppress the use of evidence when claimed to have been secured by un-
lawful search and seizure. And, although the Court adhered to the dictum
An unsuccessful attempt in that year to change the then existing law was made by
the legislature. That statute had to do with the method of issuing search warrants
and had a clause to the effect that no facts obtained by reason of a search warrant
failing to meet the statutory standard could be used as evidence in a trial of any
action. The court in State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938), ruled
that the statute did not mention evidence seized with no warrant at all. Therefore,
such evidence was admissible. However, in 1951 an amendment was passed which
states that no facts discovered as evidence obtained without a legal search warrant
in the course of any search under conditions requiring the issuance of such warrant
shall be competent as evidence. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). For a discus-
sion of this provision see, Note, 32 N. C. L. Rv. 114 (1953) ; Note, 30 N. C. L.
REv. 421 (1952) ; A Surveyof Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29
N. C. L. REv. 396 (1951). It should be noted that in the Appendix to Wolf v.
Colorado, note 22 stipra, North Carolina is listed as rejecting the rule. That was,
however, prior to the above mentioned amendment.
Two other states have legislation excluding evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §§ 5, 5A (1951) ; TEX. CODE Caum. Paoc. art.
727a (1941).2
- 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
'0 "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen
of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." R. S. § 1979 (1875), 42 U. S. C. § 1983
(1948).
3 State v. Black, 5 N. J. Misc. 48, 135 A. 685 (1926).
3 "This act has given rise to differences of application here. Such differences
inhere in the attempt to construe the remaining fragments of a comprehensive en-
actment, dismembered by partial repeal and invalidity, loosely and blindly drafted
in the first instance, and drawing on the whole Constitution itself for its scope and
meaning.., however, the Court's 'lodestar of adjudication has been that the statute'
should be construed so as to respect the proper balance between the States and the
federal goveinment in law enforcement. . . . Discretionary refusal to exercise
equitable power under the Act to interfere with State criminial proscution is one
of the devices we have sanctioned for preserving this balance." Stefenelli v. Minard,
342 U. S. 117, 121-122 (1951).
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of the Wolf case, upon which the petitioners based their case, they again
refused to extend the remedy of exclusion to the states. "At worst, the
evidence sought to be suppressed may provide the basis for conviction of
the petitioners in the New Jersey Courts. Such a conviction, we have
held would not deprive them of due process of law." (Citing the Wolf
case.) 33
So stood the law until the Rea decision. The constitutional necessity
of excluding unreasonably seized evidence from the trial of one whose
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated continues to be one of the
major areas of dispute in this important segment of the law. The argu-
ments upholding the rule and those attacking it have become clearly
defined. A chief reason usually set forth in favor of excluding illegally
obtained evidence is that such an exclusion, by removing the effect of the
evidence in court, deters the law enforcement officers from future illegal
searches and seizures.3 4 The proponents of the rule also assert that any
other method of upholding the constitutional right is inadequate.35 Still
another reason used in support of the rule is that to use the product of
the illegally seized evidence would be to lower the dignity of the courts
which are sworn to uphold the law.3 6
Some opponents of the exclusionary rule refer to it as "judicial sup-
pression of the truth.13 7 They pbint to the fact that its effect is to sup-
press incriminating evidence, which allows the guilty to go free. Taking
issue with the proponents of the rule, they argue that there are other
effective sanctions to protect the right of those illegally searched.38 It
is often asserted that it is the function of the legislature, rather than the
courts, to provide sanctions against illegal seizure.3 9
Thus far, the United States Supreme Court has refused to force the
exclusionary rule upon the states by interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to require the exclusion of evidence seized in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment. This is true although there seem to be implications
3Id. at 122.
"58 YALE L. J. 144, 152 (1948).
For example, in considering a tort action against the offending official as one
means of enforcing the right, Mr. Justice Murphy in a dissenting opinion in Wolf
v. Colorado, supra note 22 at 43, said: "A trespass action for damages is a venerable
means of securing reparation for unauthorized invasion of the home.., the measure
of damages is simply the extent of the injury to physical property. If the officer
searches with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages-a penny, or a dollar."
"See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928).
See generally: Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Micia. L. REy. 169(1955). The author is a strong opponent of the rule of exclusion. He places the
blame in part on the judges. "They deliberately restrict police efficiency in the
discovery of criminals. They exempt from punishment many criminals who are
discovered and whose guilt is evident." Id. at 169.
" See People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N. E. 585, 589 (1926) ; Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 30 (1949).
" Roberts v. People, 78 Colo. 555, 559-560, 243 Pac. 544, 545 (1926).
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to the contrary in the recent case of Irvine v. California.4 ° But, whatever
its implications, that case still leaves the adoption of the rule to the dis-
cretion of the states as does the principal case under consideration.
The problem which disturbs the dissent in the principal case, however,
is the majority's proposition that the court has "supervisory powers over
federal law enforcement agencies"' and that it rests its holding upon that
basis. At first blush this seems to be a dangerous encroachment by the
judiciary upon the executive branch of the government, which violates
our traditional concepts of a division of power among the three govern-
mental branches. Justice Harlan, writing the dissenting opinion,42 sees
no abuse of discretion in withholding the relief requested, and feels that,
in accommodating state and federal interests in criminal law enforcement,
the Supreme Court's past policy of allowing the state to be left free to
follow the federal exclusionary rule should not be disturbed. The dissent
found no basis on which to reconcile the Wolf and Stefenelli decisions
with the majority holding.
It is submitted, however, that there is both a sound legal and logical
basis for the majority decision. There is more fact than illusion to the
holding that the court is not disturbing the "delicate balance between
federal and state judicial systems" in this particular case. Although the
effect of the injunction, as the dissent notes, 43 is to stultify the proceed-
ings in the state court, there is, in fact, no injunction against either the
state officials or the state proceedings. If the state is able to procure
other evidence it is still left free to make its case out against the petitioner
by means of its own process. It is still free to invoke its rule which per-
mits the introduction of its evidence obtained in contravention of the
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. 44 The Wolf case allows this.
To withhold the injunction in the principal case would be to hark back
to the quaint little game played between state and federal officials during
the prohibition days, wherein federal officers got their convictions in
" 347 U. S. 128 (1954). This case was decided by a divided court, also. The
majority, Justices Jackson, Warren, Reed and Minton, state that now that the
Wolf doctrine is known to the states, they may wish to reconsider their rules of
evidence, but, that it would be an unwarranted use of federal power to upset state
convictions before the states have had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the
exclusionary rule. Then Justice Clark, in a concurring opinion in the Irvine case
states that had he been on the court when the Wolf case was decided, he would
have applied the federal exclusionary rule; but he concurs simply because the Wolf
case is now the law. He also states: "Perhaps strict adherence to the tenor of that
decision [Wolf v. Colorado] may produce needed converts for its extinction." Id.
at 138.
" Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 217 (1956).
, Concurred in by Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton.
, ,... the state's case against petitioner appears to depend wholly on the evi-
dence in question; the injunction will operate quite as effectively, albeit indirectly,
to stultify the state prosecution as if it had been issued directly against New Mexico
or its officials." Rea v. United States at 219.
" State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 P. 474 (1929).
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state courts for state crimes because the evidence they had seized illegally
was inadmissible in the federal courts by reason of the exclusionary rule.
To deny the injunction in the principal case and allow the federal
officer to testify as to the illegally seized evidence would be to hold that
the act of an officer is lawful, not on account of the character of the act,
but on account of the particular court in which it is called in question.
Should the federal officer be able to bring his defendant to a state court,
and there have his lawless disregard of his official duty appraised as a
meritorious performance? The United States Supreme Court answers
this question in the negative.
The rationale of McNabb v. United States45 can support the court's
alleged "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. '46
Although that decision was based on a prosecution in the federal courts,
the gravamen of the holding was that the federal court should not con-
done any flagrant disregard of Acts of Congress which set forth the
duties of the federal law enforcement officers. The obligation of the
federal agent is to obey the rule. And in the words of the majority in
the principal case: "That policy is defeated if the federal agent can flout
them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or state
proceedings."
'47
This interesting question presents itself. What would be the result
if the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a case similar in all respects
to the principal one--except that no action is brought to enjoin the fed-
eral officer from testifying in a state court as to evidence procured as a
result of an unreasonable search and seizure? Upon authority of the
Wolf decision it seems that there could be an affirmance, since in the
Wolf case the narrow holding was that in a "state court for a state crime
the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."' 48 -No distinction is
made there between state or federal officers. Yet, according to the result
of the case under consideration the federal court will enjoin a federal
officer from testifying in a state prosecution as to evidence obtained in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, the outcome
of future litigation concerning the admission in a state criminal proceed-
ing of evidence illegally obtained by federal officers would seem to de-
pend upon whether the state criminal prosecution was concluded before
'-318 U. S. 332 (1943). Here, conviction of the defendants for the murder of
a federal internal revenue officer, upheld by the court of appeals, was reversed by
the Supreme Court. The basis for reversal was that evidence was obtained by
subjecting defendants to questioning while being held in custody without a hearing
before a United States Commissioner or judicial officer, as required by law. No
constitutional question was involved.
"' See note 6 supra.
"Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 218 (1956).
,' Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 33 (1949).
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the federal injunction could be issued. The dissent in the principal case
questions the wisdom of a decision which might present such a dilemma.
There appears to be merit to this argument.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court could conceivably depart from
its holding in the Wolf and Stefenelli cases and say that the requirements
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment can only be met by
excluding the illegally seized evidence in a state prosecution. Of course,
in order to do so, the Supreme Court must first decide that excluding
the evidence is not simply a federal rule of evidence, but a command of
the Fourth Amendment to be enforced through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Essentially, of course, the problem in the case under consideration
remains the same. It is the exclusionary rule. The United States Su-
preme Court contrived the rule. By way of dictum, the majority of the
court consider it simply a federal rule of evidence.49 The minority, on
the other band, deem it to be a command of the Fourth Amendment. 0
However, the court is unanimous in its desire to exclude the illegally
seized evidence in federal prosecutions. By enjoining the federal agent
in the principal case from testifying, they were able in an indirect manner
to force the rule upon the state of New Mexico as it appears that the
state's case cannot be made out without the evidence and testimony en-
joined. Therefore, the rule of exclusion lies in the background in the
principal case just as conspicuously as it lay in the foreground in the
Wolf and Stefenelli decisions. The dissent conceded the power of the
court to issue the injunction. Undoubtedly they possessed it.
Those who think it more important that criminals be convicted than
that persons be secure in their privacy will look with disapproval upon
the principal decision; those who think that already we suffer too much
invasion of privacy will look with favor upon the granting of this injunc-
tion. It is hoped that the influence of the latter group will prevail.
JULIUS J. WADE, JR.
"' "And though we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the admis-
sion of such evidence, a different question would be presented if Congress under
its legislative powers were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doc-
trine. We would then be faced with the problem of the respect to be accorded the
legislative judgment on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have
been forced to depend upon our own." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 33 (1949).
"0 I also reject any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation
permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment ... Congress and this Court are, in my judgment, powerless
to permit the admission in federal courts of evidence seized in defiance of the Fourth
Amendment ....." Dissenting opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 48 (1949).
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Corporations-Corporate Entity-Solely Owned Corporations
The concept of the corporate "entity" is accepted generally as the
rationale for keeping the corporate rights and liabilities separate from the
rights and liabilities of the shareholders.' There is authority to the effect
that this "separateness" exists even where the corporation has met the
statutory requirement for incorporators and directors by the use of
"dummy" shareholders.2  Further, except in Kentucky3 (at least in this
century), it has been held consistently that the acquisition of all the stock
by a single shareholder does not per se destroy, suspend or impair the
corporate entity.4
1BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS, § 118 (1946); Cataldo, -Limited Liability with
One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEmS 473 (1953) ; Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Prob-
lems, 34 MICH. L. REv. 597 (1936) ; Machen, -Corporate Personality, 24 HARv. L.
Rxv. 347 (1911).
See also: Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14
CALIF. L. REV. 12 (1925); Ballantine, Disregarding the Corporate Entity as a
Regulatory Process, 31 CALn. L. REv. 426 (1942) ; Canfield, Scope of Corporate
Entity Theory, 17 COL. L. REv. 128 (1917) ; Radin, The Endless Problem of Cor-
porate Personality, 32 COL. L. Rv. 643 (1932); Wormser, Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Entity, 12 COL. L. Rv. 496 (1912); Note, Disregarding Corporate
Entity in One-Man Company, 13 CALIF. L. REv. 235 (1925).
2 Irving Co. v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849, 852 (1896) ; Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.,
L. R. (1897) A. C. 22; cf. Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342
(1899) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910).
However, the presumption is that the single shares outstanding in directors are
beneficially owned by the principal stockholder or their existence is disregarded as
immaterial. This "beneficial ownership" is then used as the basis for the disregard
of the corporate entity where equity requires. Meizlisch v. San Francisco Wool
Sorting Co., 213 Cal. 668, 3 P. 2d 310 (1931) ; Montgomery v. Central Nat. Bank
& Trust Co., 267 Mich. 142, 255 N. W. 274 (1934) ; Hanson Sheep Co. v. Farmers'
and Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 163 Pac. 1115 (1917) ; Stony Brook Lum-
ber Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133 At. 556 (1926) ; Marchman v. McCoy Hotel
Operating Co., 21 S. W. 2d 552 (Texas Civ. App. 1929); Western Securities Co.
v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856 (1923) ; Newton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co.,
88 Utah 547, 40 P. 2d 204 (1935) ; Roberts v. Hinton Land Co., 45 Wash. 464, 88
Pac. 946 (1907).
See also: Fuller, The Incorporated Individual; A Study of the One-Mal
Corporation, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1938) ; Masten, "One Man Companies"
and Their Controlling Shareholders, 14 CANADIAN BAR REV. 663 (1936) ; ROHR-
LICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, § 4.06 (1949).
'Ownership of all the stock by one person results in "suspension" (but not
dissolution) of the corporation until the incoming of new members, Russell Lumber
& Supply Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Russell, 262 Ky. 388, 90 S. W. 2d 272 (1936).
See also: Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, -67 S. W. 2d 703 (1934)
Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531 (1893).
Cases in accord with the "suspension" or "abeyance" concept, but not in this
century are: Bank of Gadsen v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898) ; Swift
v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534 (1886). Cf. Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 70
(Mass. 1833).
See further: WoRmsER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORrpRATE FICTION AND ALLIE
CORPORATE PROBLEMS, at 78 (1927).
'Hollywood Cleaning & Pressing Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service, Inc., 217
Cal. 124, 17 P. 2d 709 (1932); Dunham v. Natural Bridge Ranch Co., 115 Mont.
579, 147 P. 2d 902 (1944) ; Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903) ;
Tilley v. Coykendall, 172 N. Y. 587, 65 N. E. 574 (1902); Commonwealth v. Sun-
bury Converting Works, 286 Pa. 545, 134 Atl. 438 (1926); Button v. Hoffman, 61
Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 667 (1884).
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However, since the existence of the separate entity is a statutory
privilege, it has been confined judicially to legitimate uses. For example,
the corporate entity cannot be used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.5 Further, corporateness will be
set aside whenever it is asserted for a purpose inconsistent with the policy
of the law for which the concept of corporate entity was developed.0 ,
This power to "disregard the corporate entity" is, therefore, a discre-
tionary or equitable power, used to obtain a just result according to the
circumstances of the case and the conflicting rights and liabilities of the
parties. 7
It is true that corporations owned by a single shareholder have been
In the last case, the sole shareholder was not permitted to pass title to property
held in the corporate name, since "the shareholders are not the private and joint
owners of its [the corporation's] property." The court also said: ". . . the owner
of all the capital stock of a corporation does not own its property, or any of it, and
does not himself become the corporation as a natural person, to own its property
and do business in his own name."
The fact that one corporation owns all the capital stock of another corporation
and that members of the board of directors of both companies are the same is not
sufficient to render parent corporation liable for contracts of its subsidiary, in
absence of additional circumstances showing fraud, actual or constructive, or agency.
Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable Service, 224 N. C. 628, 32 S. E. 2d 34
(1944). (Judgment for plaintiff was upheld on the agency theory.)
Sole shareholder cannot sue individually for a wrong to the corporation, Green
v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F. 2d 378, cert. denied 278 U. S. 602 (1928).
' Mosher v. Salt River Valley Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P. 2d 1077 (1932) (corpora-
tion held the "alter ego of the defendant") ; Mosher v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac.
35 (1927) (incorporated partners) ; Rice v. Sanger Bros., 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397
(1924) (to defraud creditors by illegal act) ; Security Bank & Trust Co. v. War-
ren Light & Water Co., 170 Ark. 50, 278 S. W. 643 (1925) ; Donovan v. Purtell,
216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334 (1905) (fraud) ; Noble v. Burnett Co., 208 Mass. 75, 94
N. E. 289 (1911); Brassman, Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215 N. Y. S. 766
(1926) (president issued corporate check) ; Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F. 2d 497 (5th
Cir. 1941) cert. denied 313 U. S. 583 (1941) (inadequate capital) ; U. S. v. Mil-
waukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (1905) ; In re Muncie Pulp
Co., 139 Fed. 546 (1905) (to defraud creditors) ; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295
(1939); Linn and Lane Timber Co. v. U. S., 236 U. S. 574 (1915) (fraud in
obtaining government land).
'Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114, 117 (1925) (dominant company held for
injuries due to negligence of subsidiary company) ; United States v. Reading Co.,
253 U. S. 26 (1919); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Com-
merce Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490 (1917) (for purpose of rate regulation) ; U. S. v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 220 U. S. 257 (1911).
Cardozo, J., in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926),
stated the surrender of limited liability would be made "when the sacrifice is essen-
tial to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld." (How-
ever, there the dominant shareholder was held not liable for torts of subsidiary.)
See also: WORMSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATE PROBLEMS, at 83, 84 (1927) : "Corporate entity will not be ignored at
law or equity simply because the number of shareholders is few or even one, unless
the circumstances are such as would warrant the same disregard of the entity were
there ten thousand shareholders."
See further: Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary
Corporations, 18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 473, 475 (1953).
For a thorough development of this fluid concept, see Cataldo, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 480.
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brought under close scrutiny by the courts,8 ever ready to apply the above
equitable criteria. But it is rare that such corporations have been
deemed automatically invalid on the ground that the number of share-
holders has fallen below a certain prescribed minimum number.9 How-
ever, that the North Carolina Supreme Court will apply this automatic
criterion was made clear in the recent case of Park Terrace, Inc. v.
Phoenix Indemnity Company,10 which was before the court on a rehear-
ing of the same case reported two years prior."
In the first Terrace case, the facts were set out as follows: Terrace,
Inc., all the common stock of which was owned by A, B, C, and D, con-
tracted for the construction of an apartment house with Builders, Inc.,
some of the stock of which was owned also by A, B, C, and D. Subse-
quently, these four shareholders sold all the shares of common stock of
Terrace, Inc., to McLean, an individual. As part of the consideration
for the transaction, McLean signed a contract releasing A, B, C, D and
Builders, Inc., from liability for defective construction. Two years and
ten months later, Terrace, Inc., brought an action for damages for breach
of construction contract by Builders, Inc., against the surety on the per-
formance bond. Builders, Inc. was made a party defendant. The de-
fendants alleged: (1) that the construction was in accordance with speci-
fications; (2) that the release, signed by McLean, was a bar to recovery
by Terrace, Inc.; and (3) that when McLean signed the agreement, he
was acting as agent for Terrace, Inc., and in its behalf, therefore Terrace,
Inc., was bound by his contract.
The Supreme Court affirmed an order to strike allegations (2) and
(3) from the answer and to deny making McLean a party defendant.
BARNHILL, C. J., said: ".... the refusal of the court to make McLean a
party defendant was well advised. The purchase of outstanding common
stock from the then owners thereof was by McLean as an individual.
He signed the so-called release as an individual. Hence, these defend-
ants may not be permitted to try any action they may have against
McLean in this suit.' 2 The majority decision then rested on the issue
of agency, holding that the contract signed by McLean was not the con-
tract of the corporation. 13 Thus, the corporate entity was regarded as a
'Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 313 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1920) ; Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S.
587, 590 (1875).
In Pepper v. Litton, the District Court said: "... In all the experience of law,
there has never been a more prolific breeder of fraud than the one-man corporation."
"See note 3 supra.
10243 N. C. 595, 91 S. E. 2d 584 (1956).
'
1 Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N. C. 473, 85 S. E. 2d 677
(1955).12 Id. at 477. 85 S. E. 2d at 679.
13 Id. at 478. 85 S. E. 2d at 679. The modern weight of authority supports thle
holding that contracts of a sole shareholder will bind the corporation, although made
without the authority of a board of directors. The reason for this rule is that the
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legal fact even though the majority opinion was dosed with the query:
"Since McLean has acquired all the stock of the plaintiff, is it now a cor-
poration? This question is not presented by the record."'14
A well reasoned dissent by BOBBITT, J., however, indicated that the
substance of the action was not the agency issue, but ". . . whether
McLean can maintain under the guise of a corporation suit an action for
his benefit as sole owner of the plaintiff's common stock."'u The dissent
went on to say: "... courts and textwriters have been in entire agree-
ment that equity will look behind the corporate entity, and consider who
are the real and substantial parties in interest, whenever it becomes
necessary to do so to promote justice or obviate inequitable results."'"
The import of this dissent was adopted in the second Terrace case.
BARNHILL, C. J., again writing for the majority of the court, held that
McLean was, in fact, the necessary party plaintiff.17 In so holding, the
court stated the rule that when one person acquires all the stock of a
corporation, automatically the corporation becomes dormant or inactive
and can no longer act as a corporation.' 8 Thus, the court has adopted
the view that a one-man 19 corporation is invalid per se for all purposes
except to hold legal title of the property for the use and benefit of the
single stockholder who becomes seized of the beneficial title to the prop-
erty. Spelled out further, the import of the decision is that the court
will apply the equitable criteria when the corporation has met the requi-
site number of three shareholders; and will apply the automatic criterion
below that number.
The ramifications of such a holding are apparent. For example: (1)
Is the income of the corporation to be considered the income of the share-
holder, thereby making the shareholder taxable on the income without
the benefit of corporate deductions or the corporate rates? (2) If the
corporation can hold title to the property for the use and benefit of the
shareholder, could it transfer the same property. And what would be
the present status of property already transferred by a wholly-owned
corporation? (3) Are all the debts of the corporation to be considered
sole shareholder is the only person beneficially interested aside from corporate
creditors. See 5 FLETcHER, CYc. OF CORPORATIONS, § 2099, at 442 (perm. ed. 1952).
See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, § 126, at 296 (1946).
21 Ibid.
'Id. at 479-80. 85 S. E. 2d at 681.
"1d. at 481. 85 S. E. 2d at 682. By so stating this proposition, Justice Bobbitt
placed before the court the very crux of the equitable criteria.
" Note that Bobbitt, J., and Johnson, J., concur in the result of the case.
18 243 N. C. 595, 597, 91 S. E. 2d 586, 587 (1956). The reason for this rule of
form was stated to be: ".. . the concept that a corporation is a combination of three
or more persons who may operate as a legal entity when chartered so to do threads
its way through the cited and practically every other section of our law on corpora-
tions. General Statutes, ch. 55. No lesser number will stff ce." (Emphasis added.)
" Ibid. This statement indicates clearly that the same result would obtain in
a two-man corporation since this, also, is below the "statutory" minimum.
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as debts of the single shareholder? If so, what are the rights of corporate
creditors against the individual?
In the light of these complexities, it would seem the proper response
of a single shareholder to take immediate curative action by transferring
shares to nominal shareholders in order to comply with the requisite for
three shareholders. However, for past transactions, this course of action
is dubious, at most, in view of dictum in the principal case, to the effect
that ".... it must be understood that if McLean became the sole beneficial
owmer of the assets of the corporation by virtue of the fact he acquired
all the stock, he could not later, and cannot now, evade the consequences
of his act by merely transferring some of the stock to third parties so as
to comply with the statute. '20 (Emphasis added.)
Read literally, this dictum would cause legitimate concern for every
corporation now beneficially owned by a single shareholder, in that cura-
tive action would be impossible once the status had been attained. How-
ever, if the language used can be construed to apply to the specific act
of McLean and to the circumstances of this case, it will be possible to
effect remedial transfer of shares in other situations and avoid trouble-
some future problems. Of course, even the latter interpretation does not
indicate a solution to transactions already having occurred. At best, the
language used by the court leaves this retroactive aspect very unsettled
and in need of clarification and immediate remedy.
Apparently, the assembly, in passing the new Business Corporation
Act,2 ' contemplated the situation presented by the principal case. Sec-
tion 55-8 of this Act states: "Corporate existence is not impaired by the
acquisition of all the shares by one person. '22 Further, in section 55-
53(e), the Act states: "Except in the case of watered shares, share-
holders shall be subject to no assessment or liability thereon other than
that arising from the unpaid balance, if any, of the agreed consideration,
even if all the shares are owned by one person." However, this Act, if
allowed to stand as passed by the 1955 legislature, will not become effec-
tive until 1 July, 1957. Accordingly, the need is still urgent for present
judicial or legislative remedy.
As to the equitable power of the court to meet situations of this
nature, this also has been embodied in the new Business Corporation Act
in section 55-53(h), which states: "Nothing in this section shall limit
any liability that a shareholder may incur on general principles of law
or equity arising from the creation or maintenance of an inadequately
20 243 N. C. 595, 599, 91 S. E. 2d 586, 588 (1956).
2N . C. GEN. STAT., Cia. 55 (Supp. 1955).
"The theory of permitting a corporate existence to remain unimpaired when
owned by a single shareholder is inconsistent with a requirement for three incor-
porators. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-6 (Supp. 1955). If the law has the former policy
there is no need for the latter.
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capitalized incorporated enterprise or other abuse of the privilege of
achieving limited liability by incorporation."
The equitable criteria has been an adequate test for the existence or
non-existence of the corporate entity in any conceivable combination of
rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, it seems illogical that the
court would feel the need of establishing a rule of automatic invalidity.
Because of this implication, however, it is clear that the Terrace case will
have a disturbing impact on the law of this area until a judicial or legis-
lative remedy is presented.
FRANKLiN A. SNYDER.
Criminal Law-Entrapment in North Carolina
It has been said' that the first reported instance of a defense of en-
trapment is to be found in the decision by the Great Lawgiver, overruling
that ancient plea tendered by Eve in Paradise, "The serpent beguiled me
and I did eat.' 2
The earliest reported pleas in North Carolina of temptation by others,
appear in the cases of Dodd v. Hamilton3 and State v. Jernagan4 in
1817, and since that time the defense has often been interposed in the
North Carolina courts. Perhaps the most enlightening approach to a
presentation of the position of the North Carolina court on the doctrine
of entrapment is an examination of the cases against a background of
the subject generally.
The classic, and most frequently cited definition of entrapment is that
of Mr. Justice Roberts, in Sorrells v. United States.5 "Entrapment is
the conception and planning of an offense by an officer and his procure-
ment of its commission by one who would not have done so except for
the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer."0
The basis for the doctrine of entrapment seems to be ethical rather
than legal considerations.7 The judicial approach to the problem does
not lay stress upon any feeling of solicitude for the accused or try to
strike a balance between the equities of the government and those of the
accused. Rather, it seems to stem from a realization by the courts that
the law is mechanistic in that it does not consider the ability of the of-
fender to resist temptation. As Professor Sayre declared: "Historically,
our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the
vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between
'Bernstein, In Re Eve. 65 N. J. L. J. 273 (1942).2 Genesis 3:13.
24 N. C. 31 (1817).
'4 N. C. 44 (1817).
287 U. S. 435 (1932).Id. at 440.
'Anderson, Some Aspects of Entrapment, 13 BROoKLYN L. RLv. 187, 188
(1942) ; Note, 2 So. CALIn. L. REv. 283 (1929).
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doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong." S Thus
the dictates of justice oppose conviction or punishment where the guilty
intention is synthetically created by the government for the purpose of
obtaining a conviction. The authorities agree that the true foundation
of the doctrine is public policy.9 However, the courts, by traditional
modes of thinking, have attempted to place the doctrine in the category
of a recognized principle of law, with a resulting diversity of theories as
to why it excuses the criminal act.10 These theories lend little assistance
in determining the applicability of the doctrine in a given situation.
Under the federal view of entrapment, as defined in the Sorrells case
and subsequent cases, the defense consists of two elements: (1) the
origin of the criminal intent in the mind of the officer and (2) the in-
ducement of the defendant by the officer." These elements are closely
related. The fact that no inducement was used by the officer is evidence
that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the defendant, and the
fact that such inducement was used is evidence that the criminal intent
originated in the mind of the officer.' 2 The scope of the activities by law
enforcement officers which will constitute inducement, seems to vary
with different crimes.' 3 The distinction which is drawn by the courts
in determining what constitutes improper conduct by the law officer is
that between furnishing inducement and furnishing opportunity. The
fact that the officer merely furnished the defendant an opportunity to
commit the crime;14 that is, did nothing to overcome the defendant's
shrinking reluctance,' 5 resorted to normal coaxing of a liquor pur-
chaser,'0 displayed the common symptoms of a drug addict,' 7 or sub-
'SAYEm, INTRODUcTION TO CASES ON CRImINAL LAW. (2 ed. 1937).
' Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 (1932); People v. Barkoll, 36 Cal.
App. 25, 171 Pac. 440 (1918) ; Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 187 S. E. 329(1936) ; Anderson, op. cit. supra note 7.
10 Sorrels v. United States, supra note 5 presents a marked example of this. The
majority decision held that the element vitiating criminal liability was an implied
exception in the statute creating the offense, based upon the premise that the legis-
lature intended that the statute should apply to a person acting on his own volition.
Three of the Justices, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, denied this rationale,
saying, "The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of
its own temple belongs only to the court." 287 U. S. 435, 443 (1932).
"* Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th cir. 1921) ; Peterson v. United States,
255 Fed. 433 (9th cir. 1919) ; "The doctrine is that an otherwise innocent defendant
who has been persuaded by government agents to break the law cannot be con-
victed." See Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 848 (1932).
1" Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th cir. 1924) ; "The present tendency
is to look to the conduct of the officer as the criterion to determine where the design
originated." 20 Ky. L. Rrv. 246 (1930).
" United States v. Washington, 20 F. 2d 160 (D. C. Neb.) (1927). "The scope
of activities permitted an officer differs in different crimes, due consideration being
given to the repugnancy of the offense and the difficulty of procuring evidence.";
note 28, COLUm. L. Rav. 1067 (1928) ; See also 44 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1930).
1' State v. Litosy, 52 Wash. 87, 100 Pac. 170. (1909) ; Robinson v. United States,
32 F. 2d 505 (8th Cir. 1928; note 2, So. CALIF. L. REv. 283 (1929).
15 Scriber v. United States, 4 F. 2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925).
United States v. Wray, 9 F. 2d 429. (N. D. Ga.) (1925).
1 Ibid.
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jected the defendant to no more than ordinary temptation to which he
was likely to be subjected in the discharge of his duties' 8 is not enough.
On the other hand, the defense has been held available where the officer
had resorted to pleas of desperate illness,10 or persistent coaxing, 20 or
threats,21 or any conduct of enticement, beguilment, suggestion, procure-
ment, or aiding that goes beyond the mere offering of opportunity.22 The
inquiry is confined for the most part, to the conduct of the officer.23
Some courts have made the validity of the defense of entrapment turn
upon the existence of a reasonable belief on the part of the officer that
the accused was, or was about to be, engaged in the commission of a
crime.24 Although this criterion would seem highly significant in deter-
mining the reprehensibility of the officer's conduct, it seems incorrect as
a test for entrapment. It has been pointed out 25 that, if the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the defendant, he should not be excused
because the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect him, and if the
criminal intent originated in the mind of the officer and he induced the
defendant to commit the crime, the defendant should be excused even
though the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect him. Some cases
have rejected this reasonable belief test.2 6 In Sorrells v. United States,27
however, it is held that the evidence showing reasonable suspicion, while
not serving to rebut the defense of entrapment, is admissible upon the
question of criminal intent, thus opening the door to prior offenses upon
a plea of entrapment. Some courts assert that the degree of persuasion
permitted depends upon the degree of reasonableness of the officer's
suspicion.28 Whatever the stated rule may be, the offender's predisposi-
tion to commit the same or similar offenses would seem to be an impor-
tant factor in answering the ultimate question: In whose mind did the
offense originate?
Most jurisdictions announce the same standards for determining
when the defense of entrapment is available to a defendant as the federal
courts do; that is, an inquiry into the conduct of the officer to determine
18 Scriber v. United States, sapra note 15.
10 Echols v. United States, 235 Fed. 862 (S. D. Tex.) (1918) ; United States v.
Wray, supra note 16.
0 Peterson v. United States, 255 Fed. 443 (9th Cir. 1919).
- Capuano v. United States, 9 F. 2d (1st Cir. 1925) ; United States v. Lynch, 25
6 Fed. 983. (S. D. N. Y.) (1918).
22 United States v. Washington, supra note 13.
2. Ibid.
24 Goldman v. United States, 220 Fed. 57 (6th Cir. 1915) ; United States v. Elnan
Mfg. Co., 271 Fed. 353 (D. C. Colo.) (1920); See note, 46 HARV. L. REv. 848
(1932).
20 Hitchler, Entrapment as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 42 DIcK. L. REv. 195,
201 (1937).
2' Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1924); United States v.
Washington, supra note 13.27287 U. S. 435. (1932)
28 Scriber v. United States, 4 F. 2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925).
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in whose mind the offense originated.29  Since public policy is the true
foundation of the doctrine, which is a variable quantity depending on
the magnitude of the offense, and the difficulty of detecting offenders,
among other considerations, it is not surprising that courts reach different
results while announcing the same standards. The decision in each case,
it has been said, depends on its own circumstances, 80 and "must be de-
termined by the scope of the law considered in the light of what may
fairly be demed to be its object.131
The North Carolina Supreme Court states its position as in accord
with this majority rule.3 2  The first reported case in which the defense
of entrapment by law enforcement officers was interposed, appears to be
State v. Smith.3 3 The defendant, convicted of retailing whiskey contrary
to the statute, contended that because his conviction had been obtained
from evidence obtained by police officers furnishing money and employing
one to buy it from defendant, that he. was a victim of "connivance."
There was no suggestion of inducement. The court, in rejecting the de-
fense, stated that the wrongful acts of officers will not be imputed to the
state so as to excuse the defendant from criminal liability for what he
does. .The court stated,34 "It is not the motive of the buyer, but the con-
duct of the seller which is to be considered." The court characterized the
defendant as a "live tiger," who for all his cunning, has bolted the officer's
trap and now complains that the law of the jungle has been violated.3 5
Because of the use of such meaningless generalities, North Carolina has
been cited36 as being in accord with Tennessee and New York, which re-
ject the defense altogether.3 7
Although there is language in two earlier cases indicating that the
North Carolina Supreme Court would recognize the defense in an appro-
priate case,38 it remained for State v. Love 39 to enunciate North Caro-
21 See Annots. 18 A. L. R. 146 (1922) ; 66 A. L. R. 473 (1930) ; 86 A. L. R. 263
(1933).
20 United States v. Washington, 20 F. 2d 160 (D. C. Neb.) (1927).
"1 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 440 (1932).
22 State v. Love, 229 N. C. 99, 47 S. E. 2d 712. (1948) ; State v. Jackson, 243
N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1956).
23152 N. C. 798, 67 S. E. 508 (1910).
34Id. at 800, 67 S. E. 509 (1910).
2 The defense counsel, in reply to this, contended that his client was a donkey,
not a tiger.
0 Heywood, Defense of Entrapment, 21 BAR Ass. KAN. JOURNAL 28 (1932).
" See also State v. Hopkins, 154 N. C. 622, 624, 70 S. E. 394, 394 (1911) in
which the court appeared to reject the doctrine entirely, saying:
"The methods adopted by the policeman to catch the defendant have been criti-
cized; but it must be remembered that the ways of "blockaders" are devious and
their trade is generally plied underground." However much the defendant, when
caught, may criticize the methods used to catch him, it has been held that the
transaction is, so far as defendant is concerned, a violation of the law... !'
"0 In State v. Salisbury Ice Co., 166 N. C. 366, rehearing, 166 N. C. 403 81 S.E.
737 (1914), the court, on entertaining a petition for newly discovered evidence,
recognized that there is a difference between cases in which the offender does not
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lina's position on entrapment. In that case, a State Bureau of Investiga-
tion agent attempted to purchase whiskey from defendant, a person sus-
pected of liquor violations. Without further inducement, defendant sold
the officer whiskey and later was convicted on the officer's testimony. In
rejecting the defendant's plea of entrapment the court recognized that
trickery, persuasion or fraud, which induces the defendant to violate the
law, would be a valid defense, but that mere initiation, instigation, invita-
tion, or exposure to temptation by the enforcement officers is not enough,
quoting the definition of entrapment given by Mr. Justice Roberts in the
Sorrell case. The court then rendered a backhand slap at the law en-
forcement officers by saying :40
"The State questions whether the appellant's approach to this
position does not more properly challenge the wisdom and fairness
of the proceeding rather than its validity; presenting a moral
rather than a judicial problem, which, albeit debatable, must yield
to judicially approved practice ......
". considerations of the purity and fairness of the courts and
the agencies created for the administration of justice gravely chal-
lenge the propriety of a procedure wherein officers of the state
envisage, plan and instigate the commission of a crime on the
theory that a facile compliance with the officer's invitation con-
firms the accuracy of the suspicion of an unproved criminal prac-
tice, for which the defendant is in reality punished."
The court felt the contentions of the defense are judicially out voted,
though not out argued. This case is cited with approval in two recent
North Carolina cases 41 and seems to be the present North Carolina
attitude.
When it is considered that the very heart of the doctrine of entrap-
ment is public policy, a preservation of the purity and fairness of the
court's processes, it is difficult to reconcile the court's severe rebuke of
act under his own volition and those in which a trap is set to catch one contem-
plating crime, but found the defense inapplicable here because the alleged "entrap-
ment" was not by a government agent. The defendant had contended that the
victim in a false pretense prosecution was not deceived, since he bought the goods
in an effort to entrap the defendant. The court felt that the necessary element of
deception of the victim was satisfied when the "victim" exchanged his money for
the goods.
In State v. Godwin, 227 N. C. 449, 41 S. E. 2d 74 (1946), the court, in reversing
what was tantamount to a directed verdict for the State in a prosecution for illegal
sale of whiskey, observed that the prosecution's case depended upon a "broken
reed" because of the "persistent entreaty and duplicity" of the expectant purchaser,
saying that under such circumstances the defendant deserved the benefit of a reason-
able doubt as to the credibility of such witnesses.
so 229 N. C. 99, 47 S. E. 2d 712 (1948).
'OId. at 103, 47 S. E. 2d 715 (1948).
"' State v. Burnette, 242 N. C. 164, 87 S. E. 2d 191 (1955) ; State v. Jackson, 243
N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1956).
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the fairness of the methods used in this case, feeling they present a moral
rather than a judicial problem. The standards set for defining the de-
fense are products of moral considerations entirely. If the officer's con-
duct exceeded the bounds of propriety by doing more than merely offer-
ing an opportunity to one predisposed to commit crime, then the defense
is available, as the court recognizes. On the other hand, if the officer
trapped a suspected law violator by the violator's own facile compliance,
unaided by abnormal temptation, it is difficult to see legal or ethical
objections unless it is felt that law officers should be hard working and
intelligent, but not clever.42
The defense as defined by Justice Roberts, and the problems hereto-
fore discussed relate to what probably may be called the Simon-pure
doctrine of entrapment. While this somewhat narrow definition of the de-
fense is probably entirely accurate,43 the cases dealing with the doctrine
have labeled as "entrapment" a variety of pleas which are unrelated to
charges of enticement or procurement by officers of the law.44
It is generally recognized that a person, suspecting that a crime is
contemplated against his person or property may wait passively and
allow matters to go on, and even furnish the most complete opportunity
for its commission in order to apprehend the criminal.45 If, however, he
takes any affirmative action to aid or encourage the would-be criminal,
if his conduct is active rather than passive, it is said that the victim has
given his consent.46 The cases often state that the defense of entrapment
is available to the defendant. 47 Authorities have held that "entrapment"
is a defense where (1) action by an officer has eliminated a physical con-
dition which is an essential element of the crime charged,48 or (2) where
the victim in company with an officer, has consented to a crime to be
42 Contra, note, 16 Mo. L. REv. 165 (1933), in which it is suggested that such
action by officers should incriminate them to the extent of the person thus entrapped.
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 231 (9th ed. 1948) explains that the essential element
of dolus, or malicious determination to violate the law, is wanting in their cases
and thus the crime cannot be imputed to them.
See note, 2 So. CALIF. L. RFv. 283 (1929).
"Coe, The Doctrine of Entrapment, 23 OKLA. BAR JOURNAL 2275 (1952). The
author suggests that the term "entrapment" is a misnomer, for it is not the entrap-
ping of criminals which the law frowns on, but rather the seduction of the innocent
by its officers.
" State v. Hughes, 208 N. C. 542, 181 S. E. 737 (1935) ; State v. Salisbury Ice
Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737 (1914) ; People v. Smith, 25, Ill. 185, 95 N. E.
1041 (1911) ; 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law, § 42. (1940).
"State v. Adams, 115 N. C. 775, 20 S. E. 722 (1894). The victim, having
knowledge of an intended theft by defendant, allowed his servant to approach de-
fendant and advise defendant now was the time for the theft; State v. Goffney, 157
N. C. 624 73 S. E. 162 (1911) : State v. Nelson, 232 N. C. 602, 61 S. E. 2d 626
(1950) ; Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N. W. 1037 (1915).
"Cases cited notes 45 and 46 supra.
State v. Shouquette, 250 Okla. Cr. 169, 219 Pac. 727 (1923) ; E.g.: in burg-
lary when the breaking is done -by the officer, Love v. People, 160 Ili. 501, 43 N. E.
710 (1896).
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committed against his person or property, when lack of consent is an
essential element of the offense charged,49 and even where the conduct
of the victim, or his authorized agent, acting alone, can be said to amount
to a consent, and lack of consent is an essential of the offense."0 Logi-
cally, it seems these situations would require no affirmative plea of
entrapment, 5' since the essence of the defendant's contention is: "I did
not commit the substantive offense. The prosecution cannot satisfy all
the elements of the crime." Some writers have dogmatically asserted this
class of cases to be distinguishable from entrapment, and declare courts
which do not recognize this are confused.52  Other writers have at-
tempted to distinguish between consent which vitiates criminal liability
when lack of consent is an element and consent which constitutes the
defense of entrapment. 53 When it is realized, however, that consent
given only for purposes of trapping the criminal is, nevertheless, suffi-
cient consent to vitiate criminal liability,54 nice distinctions vanish. How-
ever, to state blandly that these cases in which the victim plans to trap
the criminal, raising the issue of the victim's consent, are unrelated to
entrapment is to ignore the cases. Rather, it seems that the "entrap-
ping" methods used by the victim serve to answer the question: was
consent given?
A recent North Carolina case, State v. Burnette 5 dealt with the
question of consent of the victim in entrapment pleas, and reviewed the
North Carolina cases. The defendant was convicted of an assault with
intent to commit rape. The evidence disclosed that the prosecutrix re-
ceived repeated calls from an unidentified man who threatened to satisfy
his passion on her person at all events. She reluctantly agreed to a
proposal by law enforcement officers to meet the defendant with officers
concealed in the back of her car. On the third attempt to keep a pre-
arranged rendezvous with the defendant, the prosecutrix admitted him
to her car in response to his request. When the defendant was admitted
to the car he "lunged" at the prosecutrix, who screamed, and the con-
cealed law enforcement officer arrested the defendant. The court held
"9 State v. Nelson, 232 N. C. 602, 61 S. E. 2d 626 (1950) ; Connor v. People, 18
Colo. 273, 33 Pac. 159, (1893) ; Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th cir.
1915).
" People v. Mills, 178 N. Y. 274, 70 N. E. 786 (1904).
"There is a conflict of authority as to whether the defense must be (1) intro-
duced under a plea of not guilty and determined as a question of fact by the jury,
or (2) is a matter for determination by the court at any time in whatever manner
the question may be raised. The first rule is based on the theory that defendant is
not guilty; the second rule is based on the theory that although defendant is guilty,
public policy requires his acquittal. Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir.
1921) ; United States v. Healey, 202 Fed. 349 (D. C. Mont. 1920).
"-' Anderson, op. cit. supra note 7.
' Heywood, op. cit. supra, note 36.
' State v. Goffney, 157 N. C. 624, 73 S. E. 162 (1911) ; State v. Adams, supra
note 45.
-242 N. C. 164, 85 S. E. 2d 744 (1955).
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
that the prosecutrix did not consent to an assault, and that the defense
of entrapment need not have been submitted to the jury.
In a somewhat similar case, State v. Nelson,5" the court had reached
an opposite result. In that case, the prosecutrix received a call from
the defendant in response to an advertisement for work she had inserted
in the newspaper. Prosecutrix communicated with officers who advised
her to meet the defendant, promising to follow in another car. The
reasons for these precautions do not appear. At the meeting the defend-
ant proceeded to continually place his hand upon prosecutrix's leg, over
her protests, and was arrested by law officers when he stopped his car.
In reversing defendant's conviction of assault, the court stated that the
acts of the prosecutrix amounted to a consent to an assault for purposes
of prosecution.
In the Burnette case, the court distinguished this case by stating,57
"in the Nelson case there was no evidence that the prosecutrix knew
that a crime was contemplated against her person. . . ." At first blush,
it appears anomalous that one who knows of a contemplated crime
against her person, goes to meet the defendant and is held not to have
consented to the assault, whereas one who, has no reason to suspect an
assault, meets the defendant and is assaulted, is said to have consented to
the act. Moreover, since the offense in both cases involved assault in
which the appearance of consent is relevant in determining the defend-
ant's intent, it might be contended that there was more of an appearance
of consent when the prosecutrix made three efforts to meet the defendant
at an isolated place at night after being advised of defendant's purpose,
than in the Nelson case in which the prosecutrix met defendant in broad
daylight with the avowed puropse of discussing a job. In the Burnette
case there can be little doubt as to defendant's intent to commit rape, at
the time of the telephone call. Nevertheless, it seems that an objective
test of consent, viewing prosecutrix's acts as they must have looked to
the defendant, could raise doubts as to whether such intent existed at the
time of his meeting with prosecutrix.
Considered on an over-all basis, the fact situations in the two cases
seem to justify their results. Thus although the court speaks of entrap-
ment in a case in which the issue is consent of the victim, the distinction
drawn by the court serves to emphasize the nature of the consent test
and its relation to the defense of entrapment. The court looks to the
reasonableness and propriety of the victim's conduct in determining if
consent was given in a manner analogous to the true entrapment cases,
which inquire into the conduct of the officer in determining in whose
mind the offense originated. Thus in the Burnette case, the prosecutrix's
"o 232 N. C. 602, 61 S. E. 2d 626 (1950).
1'242 N. C. 164, 167, 87 S. E. 2d 191, 193 (1955).
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justification in wanting the defendant identified weighed heavily in the
court's determination of the consent issue, whereas in the Nelson case
the prosecutrix appeared to be a volunteer in the plan to apprehend the
defendant.
An unfortunate by-product of treating the issue of consent of the
victim as an entrapment defense is illustrated by the charge of the trial
judge in the Burnette case. The judge charged the jury, on the defense
of entrapment, in substance, that if the prosecutrix aided, encouraged or
consented to an assault upon her by defendant for the purpose of appre-
hending defendant in the commission of the assault, pursuant to an intent
not originating with defendant, defendant would not be guilty. The court
found the charge to be without error. This seems incorrect. While the
origin of the criminal intent in the mind of the victim should be decisive
of the issue of whether consent was given, the converse of that proposi-
tion is not necessarily true. As the court recognized in an earlier case,58
if the act of the victim amounts to a consent, it is immaterial whether
the criminal intent originated in the mind of the accused. . Other cases
have recognized this.59 Construing the charge as a whole, it does not
seem that the defendant was prejudiced; but the difficulty experienced
by the trial court from entwining two separate defenses seems inevitable
because of our Supreme Court's view of "entrapment" as involving im-
proper conduct of officers of the law and consent of the victim in offenses
in which lack of consent is an element.
In another recent case, State v. Jackson,0° the defendant, convicted
of uttering a worthless check in violation of GS 14-107, contended that
the payee, by trickery, persuasion and fraud had induced him to write
the check. The defendant contended that the payee promised not to
present the check for payment, and that his purpose was to prosecute
the defendant. The court rejected this defense, quoting from Polski v.
United States :"' "The very heart of the doctrine of entrapment is that
the government itself has brought about the crime."06 2 The court adopted
the federal view of entrapment in cases in which the offense charged is a
crime regardless of the consent of any one, stating that, since uttering
a worthless check is a crime regardles of the consent of anyone, the de-
fense of entrapment must be predicated upon acts of officers of the gov-
ernment. The court, however, perpetuated the entwining of separate
defenses by reiterating its statement in the Love case: "The Federal
conception of entrapment is not necessarily binding upon us, for the
" State v. Adams, supra note 46.
" Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. App. 156 (1921) ; Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244,
109 N. W. 1037 (1923).
-0243 N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1956).
o33 F. 2d 686 (8th Cir. 1929).
62243 N. C. 216, 219, 90 S. E. 2d 507, 509 (1956).
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question is much broader than the cited application in the Sorrells
case."
63
It seems desirable that the North Carolina court distinguish between
the doctrine of entrapment as defined in the federal courts, and the de-
fense of consent of the victim in prosecutions involving offenses to which
such consent is a defense. While the two defenses tend naturally to
overlap in factual settings, it should be remembered that they are en-
tirely distinct defenses: the one, admiting commission of the offense but
pleading entrapment by officers of the government, a plea whose founda-
tion is public policy; and the other, a plea of not guilty by virtue of the
fact that the conduct of the victim robbed the act of an essential element
of criminality.
JACK T. HAMILTON.
Eminent Domain-Just Compensation-Rydro-Electric Dam Sites
In the past when the government has taken private property for pub-
lic purposes or allowed one of its agencies to do so, the "just compensa-
tion" guaranteed to the private owner by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution1 has meant that the owner would receive the
full and perfect equivalent of the property in money or money's worth.2
Theoretically, the owner is to be put in as good a position pecuniarily
as he would have been had his property not been taken.3 In arriving at
this "equivalent" the courts have sought to determine the full and perfect
market value of the property at the time it was taken.4 This has involved
a consideration of the best and most profitable use to which the property
was adaptable and likely to be used in the reasonably near future,5 not
03 Ibid.
' U. S. CoxisT. amend. V, "... nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."
2 Olsen v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1946) ; Jacobs v. United States,
290 U. S. 13, 17 (1933) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S.
299, 304 (1923) ; North Carolina v. Sunrest Lumber Co., 199 N. C. 199, 154 S. E. 2d
123 (1930).
' Olson v. United States, supra note 2; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,
373 (1924) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, sipra note 2.
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 275 (1943) ; United
States v. Miller, supra note 3, at 374; Carolina & Yadkin R. R. v. Armfield, 167
N. C. 464, 83 S. E. 809 (1914) ; Creighton v. Water Commissioner, 143 N. C. 171,
55 S. E. 511 (1906).
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra note 4, at 276; McCandless
v. United States, 298 U. S. 347 (1935) ; Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246,
255 (1933) ; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106 (1924) ; United
States v. Seufert Bros. Co., 78 Fed. 520 (C. C. D. Ore. 1897) ; Young v. Harrison,
17 Ga. 30 (1855) ; Alloway v. Nashville, 78 Tenn. 510 (1890) ; Sargent v. Merri-
mac, 196 Mass. 171 (1907) ; Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick,
201 Minn. 442, 277 N. W. 394 (1937) ; Raymond v. The King, 16 Can. Exch. 1, 29
D. L. R. 574 (1916), aff'd, 59 Can. S. C. 682, 49 D. L. R. 689 (1918) ; ln re Gough
& The Asportia, Silloth, & District Water Board, L. R. 1904, 1 K. B. 417; Note,
34 IowA L. REv. 695 (1949) ; 18 Amt. JuR., Eminent Domain, §§ 244, 245 (1938).
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just at the time of the taking.6 This is, however, just an element and not
the measure of damages and is to be considered as it would affect value
in a transaction between private parties,7 i.e., as in a transaction between
a well informed and willing seller and an equally well informed and
willing buyer.8 The fact that the property could be so used only in coml
bination with other property does not exclude this element from con-
sideration provided there be a reasonable possibility of such combination.9
In the case of hydro-electric sites, the latter factor has been applied some-
what more strictly than in other cases, and it has been necessary that
there be a reasonable possibility of combination without the use of emi-
nent domain. 10
However, since the United States Supreme Court decided Grand
River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro Corp.," there has been some
doubt as to whether this general rule would apply in eminent domain
proceedings instituted by the federal government under act of Congress
or by an agency or licensee of the federal government under the Federal
Power Act. 12  There, Grand Hydro, a private corporation, had been
granted a franchise by the State of Oklahoma for the development of
water power on the Grand River and had acquired considerable property
which it planned to incorporate into the project. Subsequently the state
legislature created the Grand River Dam Authority, a governmental
corporate agency having the power of eminent domain, to develop and
sell water power and electric energy in the Grand River Basin. The
Authority then received a license from the Federal Power Commission
' Olson v. United States, supra note 5, at 258; San Diego Land & Town Co. v.
Neal, 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 372 (1898); see generally, JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN-
VALUATION AND PROCEDURE, § 78 (1953).
" Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 257 (1933) ; New York v. Sage, 239
U. S. 57 (1915) ; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189 (1910) ;
Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 (1884) ; In Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, supra, at 195, Mr. Justice Holmes said, ". . . [A]nd the
question is, what has the owner lost? Not, What has the taker gained?"
8 Olson v. United States, supra note 7, at 257; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S.
369, 374 (1942); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 205, 17
S. E. 2d 10, 13 (1941) ; 18 Am. JUR., Eminent Domain, § 242 (1938).
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 275 (1943);
McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342, 348 (1935) ; Olson v. United States,
292 U. S. 246, 256 (1935) ; New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 (1915) ; Boston
Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195 (1909).
" United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, sipra note 11, at 276; See also,
Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1933) ; North Kansas Development Co. v.
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 147 F. 2d 161 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 867(1945) ; Boetger v. United States, 143 F. 2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 772 (1944) ; United States v. Boston C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co., 271 Fed. 877(1st Cir. 1921) ; ANoT., 124 A. L. R. 955 (1937) ; Notes, 35 HARV. L. REv. 76(1921) ; 44 YALE L. J. 1095 (1935).
1335 U. S. 359 (1948), affirming, 200 Okl. 157, 201 P. 2d 225 (1947).
1249 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 791 (1935). For history see Wheeler, The Federal
Power Commission As An Agency of Congress, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1945) ;
Lea, The Federal Power Commission as an Agency of Congress, 14 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 5 (1945) ; Pinchot, The Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legis-
lation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 9 (1945).
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granting to it the sole right to develop water power on the Grand River.
Thereafter, Grand Hydro assigned its property to the Authority with a
stipulation that the value should be determined as though the assignment
had not been made. The parties were unable to agree on the value of
the property and the Authority filed action to condemn the property.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, with two dissents, held that even
though the Authority had been licensed by the Federal Power Commis-
sion and had been granted an exclusive right to build the project by the
State of Oklahoma, it could not take private property without just com-
pensation, and the court felt that just compensation included the special
adaptability of the property for development as a hydro-electric dam
site.13  On appeal the United States Supreme Court in a five to four
decision affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and
held that the Federal Power Act had not so far affected the value of
property as a prospective site for hydro-electric development as to ex-
clude the state law of damages in a state proceeding. The court expressly
pointed out, however, that (1) no reference was made in the petition for
condemnation to possible rights under the Federal Power Act and (2)
the Federal Power Act merely attached certain conditions tb the use of
the land as a power site.14 Finally, the court stated that it would "...
express no opinion upon what would be the appropriate measure of value
in a condemnation action brought by the United States or by one of its
licensees in reliance upon rights derived under the Federal Power Act."' 5
Writers commenting on Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand
Hydro Corp.16 and two decisions from the ninth circuit, Continental
Land Co. v. United States17 and Washington Water Power Co. v. United
States,'8 have indicated that the special adaptability of property for
hydro-electric dam site construction would not and should not be con-
sidered as an element of "just compensation" where the taking happened
to be by the federal government or its licensee. In each of the above men-
tioned cases the federal government took private property with the in-
tention of using it for hydro-electric development, and compensation on
the basis of its special adaptability was denied. In neither of these cases,
however, was there a reasonable possibility that private power interests
would have been able to combine the necessary land without using the
power of eminent domain,' 9 and the circuit court employed this factor
23200 Okl. 157, 201 P. 2d 225 (1947).
Note, 27 N. C. L. Rv. 359 (1949).
15335 U. S. at 373.
10Notes, 62 HARV. L. REv. 694 (1949) ; 34 IowA L. Rav. 695 (1949) ; 27 N. C.
L. REv. 359 (1949).1788 F. 2d 104 (9th Cir. 1937).
18135 F. 2d 541 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 747 (1943).
In Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104 (9th Cir.
1937), any private power project would have flooded lands belonging to the federal
government.
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to exclude the element of special adaptability from consideration. But,
in addition, the court stated in each of these cases that a private owner
has no compensable interest in the prospective use of water power where
the federal government has exercised its superior right.
The issue was presented to the United States Supreme Court re-
cently in United States v. Twin City Power Company.2 0 The Twin
City Power Companies 21 between 1901 and 1911 had acquired substan-
tially all the property along the Savannah River necessary for the con-
struction of a hydro-electric project with a dam at Price's Island which
was very suitable for that purpose.22 Congress, upon the recommenda-
tion of the Secretary of War, granted its approval in six acts passed
between 1901 and 1919. In 1926 the Federal Power Commission granted
Twin City Power Co. a preliminary permit for the development. From
1928 until 1932 the Savannah Electric Co. held a federal license to build
at Clark's Island and to incorporate the Twin City property into the
larger project. During this period other private companies showed in-
terest in the property. Finally Congress, in the Flood Contral Act of
1944,23 authorized the construction of the project by the federal govern-
ment using public funds, and the Savannah Electric Co. was denied a
license by the Federal Power Commission.2
4
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a majority of five,25 elaborated upon
his dissenting opinion in Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro
Co. and determined that the adaptability of this property for such de-
velopment would not be allowed as an element in determining compen-
sation.2 6 In doing so he overturned two circuit court decisions which
20 350 U. S. 222 (1956).
21 Twin City Power Co., a South Carolina corporation, and Twin City Power
Co. of Georgia, a wholly owned subsidiary of the former.
2 "Twin City's 4,700 acres would include all except about 170 acres of land
and rights necessary for the location of a dam, plant, and reservoir basin with a
60-foot head of water at Price's Island. A 60-foot head at that point with a 5-foot
surcharge would require about 400 additional acres instead of 170, a 70-foot head
with a 5-foot surcharge, 1,250 acres, and an 80-foot head with a 5-foot surcharge,
2,800 acres. The Twin City land was not only available but essential for such
development in the vicinity of Price's Island." 350 U. S. 222, 231 n. 2.
3 Flood Control Act of 1944, c. 665, § 10, 58 STAT. 887, 894 (approving the
Savannah River Basin Project for flood control and other purposes as recommended
by the Chief of Engineers in H. R. Doc. No. 657, 78th Cong., and the construction
of the Clark Hill Reservoir on the Savannah River at an estimated cost of
$35,300,000.00).
24 See Savannah River Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 164 F. 2d 408
(4th Cir. 1947), affirming the refusal of the license on the ground that Congress
had declared its intent to exclude private development.
2 Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Minton, and Harlan,
dissented.
20335 U. S. 359, 375 (1948). By passing the Federal Power Act, Congress
asserted the exclusive dominion and control of the public over this water power and
intended to defeat the claims of private parties. It was felt that the majority opinion




had determined that Twin City Power Co. should be allowed to recover
this element of value.
2 T
Seemingly, the line of reasoning adopted by the majority in the prin-
cipal case is that the federal government, under the commerce power
granted Congress in the Constitution,2 has a dominant interest" in the
flow of a navigable stream which may, in the discretion of Congress, be
exerted to the exclusion of any conflicting or competing riparian in-
terests, state or private.3 0  By passing the Flood Control Act of 1944,31
reasoned the court, Congress expressly exercised this dominant power
and thereby deprived riparian owners of any interest in the power
potential of the stream. This claim of the owners, further states the
court, is a claim for a special value inherent in their land due to its
proximity to a navigable stream and compensation is, in effect, sought
for an interest in the flow of the stream which they could not own and
from which they had been expressly excluded by Congress.
In this opinion Mr. Justice Douglas cites Chandler-Dunbar Co. v.
United States32 as the controlling case and quotes extensively from a
portion of that decision relating to a claim for compensation for certain
dams, dykes, and forbrays which had been used in the claimant's lock-
canal system and incidentally to produce electricity, and which the Sec-
retary of War had determined to constitute hindrances to the develop-
ment of the navigation potential of the Niagara River by the federal
government. Also, there is a reference to a portion of the decision relat-
ing to certain riparian property which had possible value as factory sites
with the factories to be supplied with electricity from the excess water
power.
However, the majority in the principal case ignored another portion
of Chandler-Dunbar Co. v. United States which was relied upon by the
two circuit courts and by the dissenters, and which is perhaps more
27 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F. 2d 592 (14th Cir. 1954) and
United States v. Twin City Power Co. of Georgia, 221 F. 2d 299 (5th Cir. 1955).
_' U. S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8, "The Congress shall have the power . . . (3) To
regulate commerce. . . ."; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311
U. S. 377 (1940), (The power of the United States over its waters which are
capable of interstate commerce arises from the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion. The power to regulate commerce necessarily includes the power to regulate
navigation. United States v. Applachian Electric Power Co., supra, at 405.)
2" Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co., 347 U. S. 239,
249 (1954) ; United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U. S. 386, 391 (1945),(dominant servitude) ; United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 239 U. S. 725, 736
(1950), (superior navigation easement): Accord, United States v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592 (1941); United States v.
Cress, 343 U. S. 316 (1916) ; United States v. Willow River Power Co., 329 U. S.
499 (1913); and St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commis-
sion, 168 U. S. 349 (1897).
"0 See note 28 supra. 21 See note 23 srupra.
22229 U. S. 53 (1913). "Ownership in a private stream wholly upon the lands
of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable
stream is capable of ownership is inconceivable." Id. at 69.
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directly analogous. Chandler-Dunbar Co. also owned certain fast land
which it had set aside for further canal and lock development and which
was the only property in the vicinity suitable for that purpose. The
court affirmed the decision of the lower court allowing compensation
based upon this element of special adaptability, basing the decision upon
the general rule of damages in spite of the fact that the special value of
the property necessarily arose from and involved a use of waters from
the river.33
Although there is undoubtedly a logical basis for the theory pro-
pounded by Justice Douglas, there is a basis in justice as well as logic
for the contrary argument expressed by Mr. Justice Burton in the dis-
senting opinion and by Chief Judges Parker and Hutchenson of the
fourth and fifth circuits respectively. This argument is, in essence, that
the dominant interest of the government is limited to the bed of the
stream as defined by the high water mark. The adjacent landowner, it
is true, does not own the water power value in the current of the stream,
but neither does the government have any servitude over the adjacent
fast land. The Supreme Court itself has pointed out that the Federal
Power Act does not abolish private riparian rights vested under state
laws34 and that these rights remain unimpaired until the federal govern-
ment elects to exercise its rights.35 The land is as necessary as the
water for any such development and, until Congress passed the Flood
Control Act of 1944, the necessity and adaptability of the property for the
project would have been a determinative factor as to value in any nego-
tiations between private parties. Thus, when the federal government
takes property which, as here, has been privately combined expressly for
the purpose for which it was taken and is specially adaptable and abso-
lutely necessary for that purpose, this special value must be allowed as
an element of compensation.36 Otherwise the government is extending
its navigation servitude above the high water mark and fastening it upon
the fast land and is violating the constitutional mandate that the com-
pensation be just.
SOLOMON G. CHERRY.
Accord, United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 U. S. 799
(1949) ; -McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U. S. 363 (1913) ; Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1892) ; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878)
Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30 (1855) ; Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510 (1890)
Sargent v. Inhabitants of Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 81 N. E. 970 (1907) ; Gearhart
v. Clear Spring Water Co., 202 Pa. St. 292, 51 Atl. 891 (1902) ; In re Gough &
Asportia, Silloth, and District Water Board, L. R. 1904, 1 K. B. 417.
"' Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Power Corp. 347 U. S. 239 (1954);
cf. Henry Ford and Sons, Inc. v. Little Falls Fiber Co., 280 U. S. 369 (1929),
(Where a licensee of the Federal Power Commission impaired private riparian
rights, the court said that even though these rights are not immune from destruction,
the present legislation does not purport to authorize the Federal Power Commission
to impair such rights, recognized by state law, without just compensation.).
" See note 34 supra. Compare Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U. S. 312, 330 (1892).
" See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1892).
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Equity-Specific Performance of Chattel Contracts
Historically, courts of equity refused to grant specific performance
of contracts for the sale of personal property on the theory that money
damages would enable the plaintiff to purchase other property of like
kind and quality.' This approach did not arise from any difference be-
tween personal and real property, but from the theory that equity will
not interfere where there is an adequate remedy at law for damages.2
But, upon a showing that the particular chattel had some special value
to the owner over and above any pecuniary estimate, such as a pretium
affectionis,3 that the chattel was unique, rare, and incapable of being
reproduced by damages, 4 or that it was not readily purchasable in the
market,5 these courts granted specific performance on the ground that
the remedy at law was inadequate. 6
Certainly, this inflexible approach was the most characteristic feature
of the early equity courts in this area, and many think it still exists
today.7 The attitude of the Virginia court8 in a recent case, however,
stands in sharp contrast to this view. That court in granting specific
performance stated:'
"Indeed, the modern disposition is to be less technical in the
application of this principle, and where a special need on the part
of the plaintiff, and at least a temporary monopoly on the part of
the defendant, justify its application, the remedy is allowed for
breach of contracts for the sale of personal property for which
damages might otherwise be adequate." 9
12 POMEROY, EQUITABLE REmEDIES § 748 (2nd ed. 1919).
'Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 166 Kan. 11, 13, 199 P. 2d 481, 483 (1948).
'Lewman & Co. v. Ogden Bros., 143 Ala. 351, 42 So. 102 (1904); Omaha
Lumber Co. v. Co-operative Inv. Co., 55 Colo. 271, 133 Pac. 1112 (1913) ; Steinway
& Sons v. Massey, 198 Ky. 265, 248 S. W. 884 (1923) ; Kacurek v. Matychowiak,
185 S. W. 740 (Mo. 1916) ; Chabert v. Robert & Co., Inc., 273 App. Div. 237, 76
N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1948); McMartin v. McMartin, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 449 (1946);
Titus v. Empire Mink Corp., 17 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (1939) ; Butler v. Wright, 186
N. Y. 259, 261-62, 78 N. E. 1002, 1003 (1906) ; Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252
Wis. 766, 31 N. W. 2d 170 (1948). 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402
(4th ed. 1919).
' Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Vaughan, 201 Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918);
Koeling v. Bank of Sullivan, 220 S. W. 2d 794 (Mo. App. 1949) ; Spoor-Thompson
Mach. Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories, 105 N. J. Eq. 108, 147 Atl. 202 (1929).
SEmirzian v. Asato, 23 Cal. App. 251, 137 Pac. 1072 (1913) aff'd 177 Cal. 493,
171 Pac. 90 (1918) ; Carolee v. Handelis, 103 Ga. 299, 29 S. E. 935 (1898) ; Coch-
rane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A. 2d 692 (1946) ; Strause v. Berger, 220 Pa.
267, 270, 69 AtI. 818, 819 (1908); Shunney v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 80 R. I.
370, 96 A. 2d 828 (1953) ; Behnke v. Bede Shipping Co., 1927 1 K. B. 649.4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1401 (4th ed. 1919).
SHeidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 166 Kan. 11, 199 P. 2d 481 (1948) ; Koelling
v. Bank of Sullivan, 220 S. W. 2d 794 (Mo. 1949) ; Chabert v. Robert & Co., 273
App. Div. 237, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1948) ; Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357,
49 A. 2d 692 (1946) ; Shunney v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 80 R. I. 370, 96 A. 2d
828 (1953) ; Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 766, 31 N. W. 2d 170 (1948).
8 Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
1 Id. at -, 89 S. E. 2d at 67.
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Against this background an examination of some of the cases to dis-
cover whether courts have maintained their early inflexible approach, or
have grown in flexibility so as to adjust the remedy of specific perform-
ance to the needs of the particular facts of each case seems worthwhile.
Machinery
Spoor-Thompson Machine Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories,'0 a New
Jersey case, demonstrates that the view denying specific performance of
chattel contracts is yet very much alive. Plaintiff sought, under a con-
tract with the defendant, to compel the delivery of certain film-develop-
ing machines. A preliminary injunction to prevent sale to others was
denied; the court said that specific performance could not be granted
except in cases where damages at law would be inadequate, as in the
case of heirlooms and other articles 1 which are incapable of being re-
placed and are prized for their associations rather than their intrinsic
value. The fact, important in industry, that the machines could not be
secured from others except after a long period of time, and at consider-
able expense, was not regarded as justification for the action of a court
of equity.
Other cases, however, show that some courts have responded to the
needs of businesses. 12 In a recent Virginia case,'3 the state entered into
a contract with defendant for the construction and delivery of two spare
voting recorder units and two vote counters. The defendant failed to
deliver them, and the state instituted proceedings for specific perform-
ance of the contract, alleging that the machines could not be obtained
from anyone other than the defendant. The court awarded the relief
sought, saying that specific performance, while not the usual remedy,
will be granted where necessary to do complete justice between the
parties. Even though there was evidence that the machines could be
built by a first-class mechanic, the court said that the burden of securing
such construction should be on the defendant rather than on the plain-
tiff.14
An earlier case from Massachusetts' 5 was cited with approval by
the Virginia court.1 6 There, defendant refused to furnish the plaintiff
"0 105 N. J. Eq. 108, 147 Atl. 202 (1929).
11 This class includes articles of such great rarity and value as paintings, statues,
antiques, furniture, and jewelry. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th
ed. 1941).1 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 163 U. S.
564 (1896) ; Board of Comm rs of Mattamuskeet Drainage District v. A. V. Wills
& Sons, 236 Fed. 362 (E. D. N. C. 1916) ; Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337 (1883),
followed in Reo Stores v. Kent Stores, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (1952).
"8 Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
2 Id. at -, 89 S. E. 2d at 68.
5 Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888).




with certain injectors for steam boilers, as agreed. The court granted
specific performance saying:
"Although the party aggrieved might have obtained damages
which would have been sufficient to have enabled him to pay for
constructing them, and although the work to be done necessarily
involved engineering skill as well as labor, he was not bound to
assume the responsibility of the labor of doing that which the
defendant agreed to do."'17
To reflect the true attitude of these courts it is not enough to observe
that factors other than the peculiar nature of the chattel itself are con-
sidered in determining the appropriateness of specific performance as a
remedy. It should also be noted that in both cases in carrying out the
decree, possible supervision by the court of personal services involving
skill, labor, and judgment would be required. Further, in the Virginia
case,18 it seems significant that the court might have granted relief on the
theory that the product was unique and unavailable in the market.
Commodities
The realistic approach taken by the Virginia and Massachusetts
courts'9 is not confined to the area of machinery. For example, where
plaintiff sought equitable aid in enforcing defendant's contract to sell and
deliver all his lead-silver ores, concentrates, or slimes to the plaintiff,
the Federal District Court of Oregon2" said:
"It can no longer be maintained that a suit will not lie for spe-
cific preformance of a contract respecting personalty. The under-
lying thought touching such a suit is whether the suitor has a
plain, speedy, adequate and complete remedy at law. If he has, he
cannot have specific performance." 21
This result does not rest on the uniqueness of the chattel, but enables
the court to recognize plaintiff's business needs. However, many courts
still adhere to the proposition that specific performance will not be
granted unless the commodity concerned has some peculiar, unique, or
special character which cannot be measured in damages. 22
' Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 189, 17 N. E. 491, 495 (1888).
18 Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
"Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888); Thompson v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
_oAmerican Smelting & Refining Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Con-
centrating Co., 248 Fed. 172 (Ore. 1918).21Id. at 182.
-- Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Vaughan, 201 Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918)
(iron rails); Fraser v. Cohen, 159 Fla. 253, 31 So. 2d 463 (1947) (bananas);
Steinway & Sons v. Massey, 198 Ky. 265, 248 S. W. 884 (1923) (piano) ; Chabert
v. Robert & Co., Inc., 273 App. Div. 237, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1948) (containers
for oil); Titus v. Empire Mink Corp., 17 N. Y. S. 2d (1939) (mink).
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Denial of relief because the product is not unique but is obtainable
in the open market does not consider the delay or risk which may be
incurred in obtaining such goods. It, in effect, forces the plaintiff to sell
his contract rights for money damages, while enabling the defendant
wrongdoer, at his option, to perform or pay money damages.23 These
factors are important and the policy requiring consideration of them
seems sounder.
Stocks and Bonds
The settled rule in this country and in England seems to be that
contracts for public securities such as government stocks and bonds, will
not be specifically enforced, because they can usually be obtained in the
market.24 But in England, contracts for the sale of railway and other
business corporation shares will be specifically enforced,25 while in this
country, the weight of authority denies such relief unless it is shown
that similar shares are not available in the open market.26 The reason
for this difference probably results from the difficulty experienced in the
transferring of stocks and bonds in England as contrasted with the rela-
tive ease of such transfer in this country.27
However, even in this country specific performance is granted where
there is a showing that the stock is of a peculiar or special value to the
plaintiff; that it is not of easily ascertainable value; that it is unavailable
in the market ;2s or that the stock is needed to enable the purchaser to
obtain control of the corporation.29
23 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 994 (14th ed. 1918).
' 4 POMEROY, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th ed. 1941).
2 Shaw v. Fisher, 2 De G. & S. 11, 64 Eng. Reprint 5 (1848). See generally
22 A. L. R. 1037, supplemented by 130 A. L. R. 923.
" General Securities Corp. v. Welton, 223 Ala. 299, 135 So. 329 (1931) ; Gil-
fallan v. Gilfallan, 168 Cal. 23, 141 Pac. 623 (1914) ; Rimes v. Rimes, 152 Ga. 721,
111 S. E. 34 (1922); Fitzgibbons v. White, 296 Mass. 468, 6 N. E. 429 (1937);
Richardson v. Lamb, 253 Mich. 659, 235 N. W. 817 (1931) ; Last Chance Ranch
Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2d 952 (1933).
-" This difficulty in transferring stocks in England is because the English com-
panies are usually joint-stock associations whose powers are derived from and
regulated by articles of association or deeds of settlement. These articles and
deeds often restrict or make the methods of transfer cumbersome. POMEROY, SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 18 (3rd ed. 1926).
" Gilfallan v. Gilfallan, 168 Cal. 23, 141 Pac. 623 (1914) ; Baruch v. W. B.
Haggerty, Inc., 137 Fla. 499, 188 So. 797 (1939) ; Rimes v. Rimes, 152 Ga. 721,
111 S. E. 34 (1922) ; Smurr v. Komer, 301 Ill. 179, 133 N. E. 715 (1921) ; Tala-
mini v. Rosa, 257 Ky. 228, 77 S. W. 2d 627 (1934) ; Goodhue v. State Street Trust
Co., 267 Mass. 28, 165 N. E. 701 (1929) ; Richardson v. Lamb, 253 Mich. 659, 235
N. W. 817 (1931) ; Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W.
957 (1920) ; In re Rosenthal's Estate, 335 Pa. 49, 6 A.2d 858 (1939) ; Florence
Printing Co. v. Parnell, 178 S. C. 119, 182 S. E. 313 (1935).
"' Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204 (N. D. Ala. 1910) ; Sherwood
v. Wallin, 1 Cal. App. 532, 82 Pac. 566 (1905) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 87 Colo. 207,
286 Pac. 109 (1930) ; Francis v. Medill, 16 Del. Ch. 129, 141 Atl. 697 (1928);
Schmidt v. Pritchard, 135 Iowa 240, 112 N. W. 801 (1907) ; Nason v. Barrett,
140 Minn. 366, 168 N. W. 581 (1918); Hirschman v. Casey, 121 Neb. 471, 237
N. W. 584 (1931) ; In re Rosenthal's Estate, 335 Pa. 49, 6 A. 2d 585 (1939);
Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 13 S. E. 67 (1891).
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Thus, it appears that equity courts in this country have almost uni-
versally adopted the "unique theory" in determining the inadequacy of
the remedy at law with respect to stocks and bonds. However, this seems
to result in no injustice between the parties in most cases. Whether the
courts would liberalize this view and hold the legal remedy inadequate
where changes in business conditions affect the availability and price of
the stock at the time of the action at law, or whether they have adopted
an inflexible rule in this area is not clear. The latter seems more prob-
able. But at least one case supports the first view. In a fairly late
California case,30 the court quoted with approval the following statement:
"Indeed, it has been thought, that on contracts for stock a bill
ought now to be maintainable generally in equity for a specific de-
livery thereof, upon the ground that a Court of Law cannot give
the property, but can only give a remedy in damages, the beneficial
effect of which depends upon the personal responsibility of the
party.'
Patents and Patent Rights
The availability of specific performance in this area is based on the
theory that the patent is of some peculiar and special value to the plain-
tiff and cannot be readily obtained in the market.3 2 As this class of chat-
tels is unique itself in that the vendor has a legal monopoly, the adoption
of a more liberal policy is not necessary for specific performance to be
obtained even in the most conservative courts. Even so, one court has
expressly based relief upon such a liberal policy.33
Licenses
This class of chattel can also be said to be unique in itself, as it is not
ordinarily obtainable in the market, but through the actions of third
persons, over whom the court has no control.3 4 The Indiana court in
Marion Trucking Co. v. Harwood Trucking, Inc.3 5 said:
"There is no question but that the right to operate a particular
part of an interstate transportation system is a unique property
" Karabek v. Weaver Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 32, 149 P. 2d 876 (1944).
311Id. at 39, 149 P. 2d at 880. The statement quoted is that of Justice Story in
2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 994 (14th ed. 1918).
" E. F. Drew & Co., Inc. v. Reinhard, 170 F. 2d 679 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio v. Miller, 22 F. 2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927) ; Missis-
sippi Glass Co. v. Franzer, 143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906) ; McFarland v. Stanton
Mfg. Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 649, 33 At. 962 (1896) ; Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 85 Vt.
76, 81 Atl. 97 (1911) ; Fuller & Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 31 N. W.
747 (1887). See also, 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 996 (14th ed. 1918).
" No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Chandlee, 289 Fed. 526 (D. C. Cir. 1923).
"Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Jaffa, 143 F. 2d 340 (8th Cir. 1944) ; McLean
v. Keith, 236 N. C. 59, 72 S. E. 2d 44 (1952) ; Lennon v. Habit, 216 N. C. 141,
4 S. E. 2d 339 (1939). See also, L. R. A. 1918E 597, 619-621.
"r- Ind. App. -, 116 N. E. 2d 636 (1954).
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interest which cannot be obtained or transferred without Inter-
state Commerce Commission approval. Also, by way of compari-
son, it is obvious and axiomatic that the right to transport com-
modities for hire over any particular land route is as unique in
character as the unique value which attaches to any particular
piece of real estate and cannot be duplicated."3
New Jersey37 disagrees with the granting of specific performance of
contracts relating to licenses. This is due partially to its view that spe-
cific performance is an extraordinary remedy of equity and partially to
the idea in that state that a license is in no sense property. 88
Although most courts would provide equitable relief in this area,
the existence of more sympathetic courts is evidenced by the fact that
specific performance has been granted even where it becomes necessary
for the court to supervise a business. A federal court in New York 0
specifically enforced a contract which provided for delivery to plaintiff
of certain licenses and leases which were preparatory to the installation
of certain machines. The court said:
"[P]rotracted supervision of a business should not be as-
sumed, but it is not true that it cannot be assumed. Everything
depends on how insistently the justice of the case demands the
court's assumption of difficult, unfamiliar, and contentious busi-
ness problems. The tendency of the times is to take on harder and
longer jobs."40
Businesses
Ordinarily specific performance will be granted for the sale of a busi-
ness4 ' unless the contract involved is for the sale of the "good-will" only,
in which case, equity will not award relief.42 The reason for the normal
result is that ordinarily a similar business and location is unavailable in
the market, and therefore, the plaintiff cannot be compensated in dam-
ages.43 It has been held, however, that the mere fact that the contract
involves a business does not, as a matter of right, permit the decree.44
"
0Id. at -, 116 N. E. 2d at 641.
"' Rawlins v. Trevethan, 139 N. J. Eq. 226, 50 A. 2d 852 (1947) ; Mannion v.
Greenbrook Hotel, Inc., 138 N. J. Eq. 518, 48 A. 2d 888 (1946) ; Navack v. Krauz,
138 N. J. Eq. 241, 47 A. 2d 586 (1946) ; Lachow v. Alper, 130 N. J. Eq. 588, 23
A. 2d 595 (1942) ; Walsh v. Bradley, 121 N. J. Eq. 359, 190 Atl. 88 (1937).
"s Voight v. Board of Excise Comm'rs of City of Newark, 59 N. J. L. 358, 36
Atl. 686 (1896).
" Kerns-Gorsuch Co. v. Hartford-Fairmont Co., 1 F. 2d 318 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
'Old. at 319-320.
"49 Am. JUR., Specific Performance § 128 (1943).
'
2 Zeigler v. Sentzer, 8 Gill & Johnson (Md.) 150, 29 Am. Dec. 534 (1836).
Chamber of Commerce v. Barton, 195 Ark. 274, 112 S. W. 2d 619 (1937);
Carolee v. Handelis, 103 Ga. 299, 29 S. E. 935 (1898) ; Brady v. Yost, 6 Idaho 273,
55 Pac. 542 (1898); Butler v. Wright, 186 N. Y. 259, 78 N. E. 1002 (1906);
Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A. 2d 692 (1946).
"Campbell v. Stetes, 300 Ky. 745, 190 S. W. 2d 347 (1945).
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For instance, one court seems to require, before specific performance
can be granted, that the contract must relate to that species of property
which has a sentimental, peculiar, or unique value, such as heirlooms,
portraits, furniture or antiques. 4 5 But opposed to this extreme position
is that adopted by a court in New York46 that the jurisdiction of equity
to grant specific performance is no longer to be doubted in cases where
compensation in damages will not furnish a complete and satisfactory
remedy.
Building and Construction Contracts
Generally, it has been thought that specific performance of these
contracts could not be decreed, because the decree would call for super-
vision by the court extending over a long period of time, or calling for a
knowledge of technical matters which neither the court nor its officers
could be expected to possess. 47 Also, it has been said that the remedy
at law is ordinarily adequate compensation for the refusal to perform,
because the plaintiff can have the work done by another and recover the
increased costs as damages from the defendant.48
The English courts have established four exceptions to this rule, and
in these cases specific performance will be granted; (1) where the agree-
ment to build is defined and certain; (2) where the defendant has con-
tracted to build on his own land and the plaintiff has a material interest
therein; (3) where the defendant has agreed to build on land acquired
by conveyance from the plaintiff; and (4) where there has been a part
performance, and the defendant is enjoying the benefits. 49
These exceptions have been recognized by some of the American
courts, where, by reason of such circumstances, the remedy at law would
be deemed to be inadequate. 50 Where public interest and convenience are
at stake, courts of equity will go much further in either granting or deny-
ing specific performance, if such is in furtherance of the public interest,
than they ordinarily would in cases of purely private interests.5 '
Id. at 748, 190 S. W. 2d at 349.
46Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337 (1883), followed in Reo Stores v. Kent
Stores, 118 N. Y. S. 2d (1952).4" Texas & P. R. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393 (1889) ; Leonard v. Board of
Directors of Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 79 Ark. 42, 94 S. W. 922 (1906) ; Stanton
v. Singleton, 126 Cal. 657, 59 Pac. 146 (1899) ; Bomer v. Canaday, 79 Miss. 222,
30 So. 638 (1901) ; Ward v. Newbold, 115 Md. 689, 81 Atl. 793 (1911) ; Edison
Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennsylvania Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98 Atl. 652
(1916). See also, 9 Am. JuR., Building and Constructiont Contracts § 124 (1943).
48 London Bucket Co., Inc. v. Stewart, 314 Ky. 832, 237 S. W. 2d 509 (1951).
"4 Pox!mEoy, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th ed. 1941).
ro Herzog v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 153 Cal. 496, 95 Pac. 898 (1908);
Taylor v. Florida East Coast R. R., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574 (1907); Jones v.
Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895) ; Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366, 15
Am. Rep. 430 (1874) ; McCarter v. Armstrong, 32 S. C. 203, 10 S. E. 953 (1890).
" Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees Department
of the American Federation of Labor, 300 U. S. 515 (1932) ; Wheeling Traction
Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Belmont County, Ohio, 248 Fed. 205 (6th Cir. 1918) ;
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The idea that the courts should not undertake supervision of con-
struction work has been dispelled somewhat by the decision in Board of
Commissioners of Mattamuiskeet Drainage District v. A. V. Wills &
Sons,52 where the court adopted the following statement made by Chief
Justice Fuller in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway Co.: 5 3
"But it is objected that equity will not decree specific perform-
ance of a contract requiring continuous acts, involving skill,
judgment, and technical knowledge.... We do not think so....
It must not be forgotten that, in the increasing complexities of
modem business relations, equitable remedies have necessarily
and steadily been expanded, and no inflexible rule has been per-
mitted to circumscribe them." 54
In this area a change in policy by the courts to respond to demands
for equitable relief is apparent. First, exceptions were made to a hard
and fast rule by which the courts refused to undertake supervisory
duties. Then, doubt was cast on the force of the rule itself by courts
who, realizing a need for expanding equitable remedies, undertook super-
vision of complicated transactions.
Uniform Sales Act
This act, which has been patterned after the English Sale of Goods
Act,55 has been adopted in about three-fourths of the jurisdictions in this
country.56 Section 68 of the Act reads as follows:
"Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or
ascertained goods, a court having the powers of a court of Equity
may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judg-
ment or decree, direct that the contract shall be performed speci-
fically, without giving the seller the option of retaining the goods
on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be uncon-
ditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to damages, pay-
ment of the price, and otherwise, as to the court may seem just."
The author of this section, Professor Williston, stated in his treatise
on Sales:
"Courts of Equity have very closely restricted their jurisdic-
tion in regard to contracts for the sale of personal property. It
would sometimes promote justice if the courts were somewhat
Edison Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennsylvania Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98 Atl.
652 (1916).f2236 Fed. 362 (E. D. N. C. 1916). 163 U. S. 564, 600 (1896)'.
Board of Comm'rs of Mattamuskeet Drainage District v. A. V. Wills & Sons,
236 Fed. 362, 380 (E. D. N. C. 1916).
"56 & 57 Vicr. 52 c. 71 (1893). 0Note, 27 GEo. L. J. 793 (1939).
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more ready to allow specific performance of contracts to sell goods
in cases where for any reason damages did not seem adequate.
This section of the act will perhaps dispose courts to enlarge
somewhat the number of cases where specific performance is
allowed."67
It appears that very few courts that have considered the Act have
shared the views of Professor Williston. The courts have treated the
section in three different ways :58 (1) by granting specific performance
in reliance upon the Act, even though it would have been granted without
the aid of the Act;59 (2) by granting specific performance under the Act,
where it would not have been granted had it not been for the Act;6O
(3) by treating the Act as having made no change in the existing law.61
Even though there are three different interpretations of the effect of the
Act, it is no longer an important factor, as few courts have even men-
tioned it when faced with the question of specific performance of con-
tracts in reference to personal property.0 2 This Act, if liberally inter-
preted, should have been construed as it was written, that being, to en-
large the scope of specific performance.
Conclusion
The adequacy test, for the most part, remains a stumbling block to
specific performance of chattel contracts. However, some courts have
developed a more flexible approach 63 which emphasizes the needs of the
parties rather than strictly adhering to the historical approach with its
few exceptions. Much of the necessity for such a test has been lost
through the fusion of law and equity under the codes, and today, the
needs of modem business relations call for a more flexible rule.
SPENCER L. BLAYLOCK, JR.
"3 WILLISToN, SALES § 601 (2d ed. 1924).
It is to be noted that Michigan appears in all three categories.
" Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 Atl. 378 (1929)
Krause v. Hoffman, 239 Mich. 348, 214 N. W. 146 (1927) ; Diamond Lumber Co.
v. Anderson, 216 Mich. 71, 184 N. W. 557 (1921).
"0 Michigan Sugar Co. v. Falkenhagen, 243 Mich. 698, 220 N. W. 760 (1928);
Hughbanks v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114 (1917); Pittenger Equipment Co. v.
Timber Structures, Inc., 189 Ore. 1, 217 P. 2d 770 (1950).
"2 G. C. Outten Grain Co. v. Grace, 239 Ill. App. 284 (1925) ; Tales v. Duplex
Power Co., 202 Mich. 224, 168 N. W. 495 (1918).
" Masterson, Specific Performance of Contracts to Deliver Specific and Ascer-
tained Goods Under the English Sale of Goods Act and the American Sales Act,
LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN Kip McMIURRAY, 793 (1939).
"Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 163 U. S.
564 (1896); No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Chandlee, 289 Fed. 526 (D. C. Cir.
1923) ; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining &
Concentrating Co., 248 Fed. 172 (Ore. 1918) ; Karabek v. Weaver Aircraft Corp.,
64 Cal. App. 2d 32, 149 P. 2d 876 (1944) ; Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185,
17 N. E. 491 (1888) ; Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89
S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
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Estate Taxation-The Doctrine of Recriprocal Trusts
The doctrine of reciprocal trusts in the federal tax field had its hum-
ble beginning in 1940 when Lehman v. Commissioner was decided
2
The doctrine rests upon the principle that "a person who furnishes the
consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor, even though in
form the trust was created by another." 3  Thus, A creates a trust for
the life benefit of B with remainders over and B creates a trust for the
life benefit of A with remainders over.4 These trusts would escape
estate tax burdens entirely but for the "reciprocal" or "crossed" trusts
doctrine, which looks to the substance of the transaction and thereby
regards A as the grantor of the trust of which B was the nominal
grantor.
Various provisions or powers may be crossed by the settlors: powers
to alter, amend, revoke or terminate;5 powers of appointment;O life
estates ;7 and reversionary interests.8 Crossing of any of these provisions
may give rise to estate taxation if the trust would be included in the
estate of a settlor who reserved those powers to himself9 and if, in fact,
the trusts are found to be reciprocal.
In order for the doctrine to apply, there must be an express finding
that the trusts were in "consideration" of each other, which means the
giving of a quid pro quo.10 The term "consideration" has given the
courts much difficuty. The predominant view seems to be that circum-
1 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U. S. 637 (1940).
'New Jersey had used the doctrine in 1932. In re Perry's Estate, 111 N. J. Eq.
176, 162 A. 146 (1932).
'Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310
U. S. 637 (1940). See Marks, The Switching of Settlors in Inter Vivos Trusts,
26 TAxEs 622 (1948) for a criticism of the doctrine.
' Reciprocity may exist in a series of trusts benefiting three or four settlors.
See In re Jones' Estate, 350 Pa. 120, 38 A. 2d 30 (1944) and Commissioner v.
Warner, 127 F. 2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
168A STAT. 383, 26 U. S. C. 2038 (1954). See Lehman v. Commissioner, 109
F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U. S. 636 (1940) ; Hanauer's Estate v.
Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 326 U. S. 770 (1945) ;
Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Commissioner
v. Dravo, 119 F. 2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Colonial Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 111 F. 2d 740 (2d Cir. 1940).
'68A STAT. 385, 26 U. S. C. 2041 (1954). See Fish v. Commissioner, 45
B. T. A. 120 (1941). See also Estate of Sinclaire v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 742
(1942).7 68A STAT. 382, 26 U. S. C. 2036 (1954). See Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F. 2d 537(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 810 (1951) ; Cole's Estate v. Commissioner,
140 F. 2d 635 (8th Cir. 1944); McLain v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621 (N. D. Ill.
1955) (contingent life estates) ; Eckhardt v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 673 (1945).
'68A STAT. 382, 26 U. S. C. 2037 (1954). See Estate of Hill v. Commissioner,
23 T. C. No. 77 (1954).
' See Tobin v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950) (income tax), where
H and W set up two trusts, the income of each was to be paid to the other spouse
as the advisory committee should direct. See also Commissioner v. Dravo, 119
F. 2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941), where the corpus was to be advanced.
'0 Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied
326 U. S. 770 (1945).
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stances showing concert of action or interdependence will support the
finding of consideration."' Opposed to this authority stands the Third
Circuit which insists that the powers be bargained for and exchanged. 12
Although the commissioner's determination that the trusts were in con-
sideration of each other is presumptively correct, the circuit courts have
disagreed as to what kind of and how much evidence is needed to rebut
this presumption.' 3
Various factors are weighed in making the necessary finding that
one trust was in "consideration" of the other. In Hanauer's Estate v.
Commissioner14 the Second Circuit held that the simultaneous execution
of the trust plus the wife's mental attitude of leaving investment matters
in the hands of her husband were sufficient to support the Tax Court's
finding that the trusts were made in consideration of each other. Estate
of Carrie S. Newberry'5 also upheld the commissioner's determination
where the trusts were created "after frequent consultations by decedent's
husband with his financial advisors, and by the decedent and her hus-
band with their attorney, and after discussions between themselves"
even though the technical provisions and the form were determined by
the lawyer.
It is particularly difficult to rebut the presumption of a tacit agree-
ment or concert of action when the res of each trust is similar in amount,
the beneficial interests are identical and the trusts are executed within
a short time of each other.16 In Orvis v. Higgins17 the evidence showed
that the trusts were created within six days of each other, that the two
settlors consulted the same attorney within thirteen days of each other,
but that neither settlor was present at the execution of the other's trust.
Although all the evidence tended to show in a negative manner that
neither trustor knew of the other's intention, the court held that it was
error for the Tax Court to find no reciprocity since the clear inference
from the facts was that there must have been a concert of action.
In those cases where the commissioner has been upheld, the courts
have indicated that the presence of other motives does not affect the
situation. For example, where the trusts expressed the motive of keep-
ing the stock within the family, the court found this to be unimportant
21 Ibid.
12 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 873 (3d Cir. 1953).
2 McLain v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621 (N. D. Ill. 1955).
24 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 326 U. S. 770 (1945).
1947 P-H T. C. Mem. Dec. 387, aff'd per curiam 172 F. 2d 220 (3d Cir. 1949).
10 Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T. C. 673 (1945). But see Estate of Lindsay
v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 174 (1943), where it was said that these factors were not
conclusive that the trusts were interdependent and in consideration of each other.
See also Wiebolt v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 946 (1945) (income tax).
" 180 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U. S. 810 (1950).
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as the grantors could have carried out this motive by giving the stock
to their children without reserving crossed income provisions.
18
Unfortunately all is not bread and gravy for the government, espe-
cially in the Third Circuit which has limited the Lehman doctrine to an
actual consideration test.1 9 Another court, following the position of the
Third Circuit, has said: "If a person other than the nominal settlor is
to be treated as the actual settlor for tax purposes he must have paid
something of value to the nominal settlor."20  When the court looks
for an actual bargain and exchange of powers, mutual love and affection
for the settlors' children is not regarded as legal consideration so as to
bring the trusts within the scope of the reciprocity doctrine.
21
Furthermore, when the actual consideration test is applied, the exist-
ence of other motives plays an important part in the determination of a
case. The Third Circuit said that W's motive of assuring H of inde-
pendent wealth had a bearing on intentions with respect to unity of pur-
pose, interdependence and consideration or lack of it and the court held
that such a motive was one of the factors showing that the trusts were
not reciprocal. 22 In Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner23 the motive
behind the creation of the trusts was to protect the children from im-
provident marriages. H's trust was suggested by his brother and after
making his decision, H discussed his trust with W as both handled the
family's affairs. W, in creating a similar trust, told the attorney that
if such an arrangement was good enough for H, it was good enough for
her. Although the trusts contained identical securities and were executed
at the same time, the court held that the reciprocal trust doctrine did not
apply even. though each time H added to his trust W did the same.
Great stress was laid on the testimony of H that he would have created
his trust regardless of whether W decided on a similar course.
1" Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F. 2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944). See also
Orvis v. Higgins, note 17 supra.
10 See In re Leuder's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947), which quotes with
approval REsTATEmENT, CoTrRACrs § 75 (1932): "Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forebearance, or (c) the creation, modi-
fication or destruction of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise bargained for
and given in exchange for the promise."
20 McLain v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621, 625 (N. D. Ill. 1955).
- See McLain v. Jarecki, note 20 supra and In re Lender's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128
(3d Cir. 1947).
2" See Estate of Ruxton, 20 T. C. 487 (1953), where H, fearing that he would
lose all of his property from a pending lawsuit, set up a trust which gave a life
estate to his daughter and a contingent life estate to his wife with remainders over.
On the same day W set up a trust giving H a life estate with remainders over.
The court found that the only concert of action between H and W occurred in the
final stages of the transaction. The court was further influenced by the fact that
there was no quid pro quo in that, according to the court, if the trusts were un-
crossed and each settlor-regarded as the grantor of the trust of which he was the
beneficiary, they would be placed in an untenable position in regard to the giving
of quid pro quo to induce the action of the other.
2 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Another important factor in the determination of a particular case
is illustrated in Estate of Lindsay v. Commissioner2 4 where W had told
her son, who prepared the trusts, not to tell H that she was creating a
trust similar to the one which he was creating. The court was satisfied
that there was no tacit agreement or understanding between the settlors.
The fact that the amounts were almost similar was explained by the
testimony of the son that he suggested the amount of the res for W's
trust.
Thus, where the actual consideration test is applied, the taxpayer
has more readily maintained the burden of proof that the trusts were not
in consideration of each other.
25
If the court holds that the trusts are reciprocal, the problem arises as
to the amount includible in the estates. When the trusts are of unequal
size, the general rule is that both trusts are taxable but only to the extent
of the smaller trust.26 When an addition is made to one of the trusts
which have been found reciprocal and the addition makes the amounts
of the two trusts equal, all is included even though the addition is made
years after the trust was originally created unless surrounding circum-
stances and evidence show that the addition was a separate gift.27
It is submitted that the actual consideration test is a poor one. If a
court has to find an act or promise bargained for and given in exchange
for another act or promise,28 many transfers of a testamentary nature
will escape taxation. It is obvious that motives should not be an escape
device because if the taxpayers want "to keep the stock in the family
29
or "to protect their children from improvident marriages"30 they could
accomplish the same resput by making a gift in trust to their children
without reserving crossed powers such as life estates which under 2036
of the Code are testamentary dispositions.
242 T. C. 174 (1943). See also Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d
874 (3d Cir. 1953) and Estate of Ruxton, note 22 mpra.
' See Estate of Arnold Resch v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. 171 (1953), where
two months before W set up a trust for the benefit of H, H had given her $100,000
worth of bonds which became the corpus. No conditions were attached to the
gift. W had requested a bank to help her invest the bonds and a trust was sug-
gested. W talked this over with H and secured his cooperation before creating
the trust that the bank had suggested. It was held that these facts did not warrant
a finding that she was acting in concert with H so as to make him the settlor.
See also Welch v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 1139 (1947) (income tax).
2 See e.g., Estate of Oliver, 1944 P-H T. C. Mem. Dec. 138; Estate of Frederick
S. Fish, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1941). See Estate of Carolyn Peck Boardman, 20 T. C.
871 (1953), where the settlor of the smaller trust died. Under Rule 50 his estate
was taxed by multiplying the value of the cross trust at his death by the following
fraction: the value of the property at the time transferred by the decedent over the
value of the property at the time transferred by the other settlor. See Note, 38
A. L. R. 2d 522, 527 (1954).
"Estate of Carolyn Peck Boardman, 20 T. C. 871 (1953) (four years).
0 This test was used in In re Leuder's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
0 See Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F. 2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
"0 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Unless the transactions are taxed in the donors' estates, the use of
reciprocal trusts allows a taxpayer to rid his estate of assets at gift
tax rates and at the same time receive valuable lifetime economic powers
in return.31 This coupled with the fact that he has, at the same time,
given identical economic benefits to a member of his family, who also
escapes estate taxation, should justify remedial legislation.3 2
The Third Circuit has recognized that the actual consideration test
applied in that court is substantially different from the so-called inferred
consideration test. It has suggested that the situation could be cured
by legislation which would treat these transfers as a single joint trans-
action and thereby regard each of the settlors as a pro tanto transferor
of the res over which he has control.33 It is submitted that this statu-
tory solution would be an equitable one in that the inherent nature of
the normal family relationship is one of interdependence and concert of
action.3 4
HERBERT S. FALK, JR.
Gift and Inheritance Taxation of Community Property by Common
Law States
Generally, when a transfer of property occurs by gift or upon the
death of an individual, its taxability depends upon the policy within the
taxing jurisdiction and upon the extent of the interest transferred.
Granting that the problem of determining the extent of the interest trans-
ferred is often a difficult one, it becomes more complex when community
property is transferred by a husband to his wife due to the prior interest
of the wife which must be taken into account. It is a novel situation
when this problem arises within a common law jurisdiction, and several
recent decisions merit analysis.
The problem, as it relates to gift taxation, recently confronted the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Terjen.1 A
" See Phillips v. Gnichtel, 27 F. 2d 662 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S.
636 (1929), where the taxpayer argued that reciprocal trusts which were in con-
templation of death should be treated as a bona fide sale. See also Estate of
Scholler v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 235 (1940).
" See Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 893 § 6 (1949), where Congress
impliedly approved the "judicial fiction" of the Lehmalp case by allowing, for a
limited time, a tax free rescission of reciprocal trusts.
" Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1953). It
would seem that the legislation would be more equitable if it established a con-
clusive presumption of consideration when the trusts with crossed powers are
created by members of one family within two years of each other. If the second
trust is established more than two years after the first, the commissioner should be
required to prove that each trust was in consideration of the other. Thus, the
taxpayers would have a certain amount of freedom in disposing of their property.
"' See in general Notes, 42 CALiF. L. REv. 151 (1954) and 38 A. L. R. 2d 522
(1954).
1 Va. -, 90 S. E. 2d 801 (1956).
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husband and wife, while domiciled in California, acquired a substantial
amount of community personal property under the laws of California.2
After moving to Virginia, they used a portion of the community funds
to pay for a home located in Virginia, title to which was taken in the
name of the wife. The Virginia Department of Taxation assessed the
husband with a gift tax based upon the full value of the property.3 The
husband contested this assessment on the theory that his wife had a one-
half vested interest in the community funds; that this interest was not
divested by their change of domicile; and that therefore he should be
assessed only for the transfer of his one-half interest in the property. It
was held that the husband was taxable for the full value of the property.
While the court agreed that the character of community property is not
affected by a change of domicile,4 it took the position that a wife does
not have a vested interest in community property under the laws of Cali-
fornia, and that this transfer of community funds from the husband to
his wife constituted a gift of the full value of the property.5
In contrast to this Virginia decision is a 1954 opinion of the Attorney
General of North Carolina, 6 in which an opposite conclusion was reached
upon identical facts. A husband and wife moved from California to
North Carolina, purchased a home in North Carolina with community
funds, and placed the title in the name of the wife. The Attorney Gen-
eral stated that the husband thereby made a gift of one-half of the pur-
chase price of the home and thus was liable for a gift tax7 only on that
one-half value. This result was founded on the theory that in California
the interests of the husband and wife in community property are "pres-
-Sections 162 and 163 of the California Civil Code define separate property of
each sponse as "All property owned by the [spouse] before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues, and
profits thereof. . . ." CAL. Cim. CODE ANN. (West 1954). Section 164 then de-
fines community property as "All other property acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife, or both, including real property situated in this State and per-
sonal property wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired while domiciled
elsewhere, which would not have been the separate property of either if acquired
while domiciled in this state. . . ." Ibid.
For applicable gift tax statutes, see VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 58-218, 58-219, and
58-223 (1950).
'The general rule is that "a change of domicile from a state where the com-
munity property law prevails to a common law state does not affect the community
character of property previously acquired. The law of the state to which the
parties remove will regulate their future conduct and acquisitions, but the removal
will not alter the rights of either to property then in possession, the title to which
had vested under the community property law." 11 Am. JuR., Comnunity Prop-
erty § 16 (1937). See also 92 A. L. R. 1352 (1934).
' See the discussion of the court, Commonwealth v. Terjen, - Va. -, 90 S. E.
2d 801, 802-804 (1956).
'Op. N. C. Atty. Gen., C C H INn., EsT. & GirFr TAX REP. 18,156 (Feb-
ruary 23, 1954).
For applicable gift tax statutes, see N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-188 through 105-
191 (1950).
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ent, existing and equal," 8 and that the wife's interest is a "present vested
right."9
As it relates to inheritance taxation, this problem was recently con-
sidered in an opinion of the Attorney General of Maryland 0 and in a
decision of the Supreme Court of Montana."
The Maryland opinion involved community property acquired by
the husband and wife while domiciled in Texas.12  They moved to
Maryland, where the husband later died leaving all his property (after
a few specific bequests) to his surviving wife. Based on the conclusion
that the wife has a present vested interest in one-half of Texas commu-
nity property,'3 the Attorney General was of the opinion that (1) com-
munity property acquired in Texas, the character of which had never
changed, should be taxed14 only on the one-half interest of the husband
passing to the wife; (2) property acquired in Maryland with community
funds, title to which was in the husband alone, should be taxed at its full
value;15 and (3) property acquired in Maryland, to which there is no
evidence of record title, should be taxed at one-half value if purchased
with community funds.16
In the Montana case, In re Hunter's Estate,'7 the husband and wife
acquired community property while domiciled in California. Although
they never left that state, the husband purchased in his name with com-
munity funds both personal and real property located in Montana. The
' Op. N. C. Atty. Gen., supra note 6, at 90,209.
Ibid. The Attorney General also states: "Had the title been taken in the
name of the hubsand the transaction would have been a gift of one-half the original
price by the wife to the husband, unless the circumstances were such as to give
rise to a presumption that the property was to be held in trust for the wife." Ibid.
As an example of such a resulting trust, see Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848),
where, after a divorce, the wife had the court impose a trust as to one-half of
property which had ben purchased in the husband's name with community funds.
20 Op. Md. Atty. Gen., C C H INN. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. 18,385 (May 27,
1955).
In re Hunter's Estate 125 Mont. 315, 236 P. 2d 94 (1951).
1_-Community property in Texas is defined as "All property acquired by either
the husband or wife during marriage, except that which is the separate property of
either .... TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4619, § 1 (Vernon 1951).
13 In Texas the rights of the husband and wife are considered equal, and each is
considered as having a vested beneficial interest in the community. When legal
title is in the husband, the wife's interest is equitable but vested. Davis v. Davis,
186 S. W. 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555,
195 S. W. 1139 (1917).
1 For the applicable inheritance tax statutes, see MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, §§ 148,
150 (1951).
"' The Attorney General thought that, as a practical matter, the Register of
Wills should not be required to look beyond record title to determine the owner-
ship of such property. Op. Md. Atty. Gen., C C H INN. EsT. & GIrT TAX REm.
18,385 at 90,728-90,729 (May 27, 1955).
"* "This conclusion is supported by those opinions in which an implied exemp-
tion from the inheritance tax was allowed by reason of the fact that an adequate
consideration was paid by the recipient of the property for his interest." Id. at
90,729.
" 125 Mont. 315, 236 P. 2d 94 (1951).
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husband died in California, leaving all the Montana property to his wife.
The Montana court imposed an inheritance tax'8 on the full value of the
property on the theory that the privileges of the wife in California com-
munity property were not yet those of ownership as to give the wife a
vested interest sufficient "to overcome the presumption that title is where
the record puts it."'3.
Thus, it is seen from a discussion of decisions in four states that
their determination of the extent of interest transferred depended pri-
marily upon whether the wife had a "vested interest" in one-half of the
community property. Each decision assumed that if the wife had such
an interest only the husband's half could be made the subject of a "trans-
fer," and in order to determine the nature of her interest each looked to
the laws of the state where the property was originally acquired. Fur-
thermore, each decision seems to have hinged its tax results on whether
the mere label of "vested" had been affixed, without analyzing the prop-
erty rights of the wife to determine whether, regardless of the label, a
sufficient interest nevertheless did pass beneficially to her as a result of
the transfer.20 And in determining whether or not such label had been
attached to the interest of the wife in California North Carolina differed
from Virginia and Montana.
The first question arises in connection with the dispute whether or
not the wife's interest in California has been labeled as "vested." To
determine which decision or decisions stated the correct view it will be
necessary to look at California law.
Prior to 1927, it was clearly established that the wife's interest had
never been regarded as a "vested" interest.2 1 Because of this, in 1926
" For the applicable inheritance tax statute, see MONT. REV. CODE § 91-4401
(1947).
"0 Iii re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 324, 236 P. 2d 94, 99 (1951).
"0 This is not to say that the decisions ignored the rights of the wife in their
discussions. Actually, the Virginia, Maryland and Montana decisions discussed
many aspects of the rights of the wife in community property. But due to their
concern over whether the community property state had merely designated the
wife's interest as "vested," the decisions left the impression that what was impor-
tant in determining the extent of the wife's interest was not the extent of her sub-
stantive rights but whether such rights had ever been labeled as "vested." From
the nature of their discussions, it is very likely that, even if the wife had no prop-
erty rights whatsoever in California community property, Virginia and Montana
would nevertheless have taxed the transfers only at one-half value, if they could
have determined that California courts had ever labeled the interest of the wife as
"vested."
"1 As early as 1860, it was established that the wife's interest in California com-
munity property was a "mere expectancy, like the interest which an heir may
possess in the property of his ancestor." Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 312(1860). In 1896, the Supreme Court of California said that the wife had no right
or title of any kind in the property, and had at most a "possible interest in what-
ever remains upon dissolution of the community otherwise than by her own death."
In re Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393, 44 Pac. 734, 735 (1896). Twelve years later, in
1908, the court held that since the wife, upon the death of the husband, takes a
one-half interest as heir, her interest is subject to inheritance taxes. Estate of
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the United States Supreme Court ruled that the husband and wife in
California could not submit separate returns in reporting income from
community property for federal income tax purposes. 22 At the next
session of the California legislature, in 1927, a statute was passed defin-
ing the interests of the husband and wife as "present, existing and equal
... under the management and control of the husband .... ," ;2 and in
1931, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this statute to indi-
cate that the wife now had a "vested" interest in the community property,
and could file a separate return for her interest in community income.
2 4
The fact remains, however, that the California legislature did not use
the label "vested" in defining the wife's interest in the 1927 statute. The
question of whether that result was intended by implication has never
been presented to the Supreme Court of California, though in 1941 that
court, by way of dictum, stated that "section 161a of the Civil Code does
not change the nature of the wife's interest to a vested one .... ,,2" And
Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 Pac. 653 (1908). This decision was overturned by the
legislature, however, in 1917, when a statute was passed exempting the wife's in-
terest from such taxation. CAL. STAT. 1917, p. 881. The statute today is CAL.
REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE ANN. § 13551(b) (Deering 1952). This latter
statute reads: "Upon the death of the husband: ... (b) The one-half of the com-
munity property which belongs and goes to the surviving wife pursuant to Section
201 of the Probate Code is not subject to this part." Interpreting this statute in
1926, the court stated that it did not operate to create a "vested" interest in the
wife, but that nevertheless she did now possess more interest than an ordinary heir.
Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 340, 342, 249 Pac. 197, 206, 207 (1926). Other
rights which the wife had acquired at the time of this decision were the right tojoin in conveyances of real property for periods longer than one year, the right to
secure a division of the community property without dissolving the marital relation
when she had cause for divorce, and the right to dispose of one-half of the com-
munity property by will. However, the California courts had not labeled her
bundle of rights as "vested." See Simmons, The Interest of a Wife in California
Community Property, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 404, 407, 409-410 (1934).
" United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315 (1926).
CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 161a (West 1954). This section further states:
"This section shall be construed as defining the respective interests and rights of
husband and wife in community property."
2 United States v. Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792 (1931). This privilege had already
been extended to the community property states of Washington, Arizona, Texas
and Louisiana. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930) ; Goodall v. Kock, 282 U. S.
118 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S.
127 (1930). It should be noted that the federal courts also recognized the wife's
interest as "vested" after the 1927 California statute in the field of estate taxation.
As to property acquired prior to 1927, the entire value of the community property
was includible in the estate of the decedent who acquired the property. Rule v.
United States, 63 F. Supp. 351 (Ct. Cl. 1945) ; Sampson v. Welch, 23 F. Supp. 271
(S. D. Cal. 1938). But as to property acquired after 1927, community property
was includible in the estate of the decedent only to the extent of one-half of its
value, if under the law of the state the wife had a vested interest in her half. Lang
v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264 (1938); Rickenberg v. Commissioner, 177 F. 2d
114 (9th Cir. 1949).
25 Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 686, 111 P. 2d 641, 644 (1941). This
statement was important to the decision, however, since the court actually held that




intermediate appellate courts in California have interpreted the statute
in the same manner.
26
Thus, it appears that the Virginia and Montana decisions arrived at
the correct conclusion as to the nature of the wife's interest in California,
as interpreted by the California legislature and courts.
27
Therefore, putting the North Carolina decision aside, the other deci-
sions (Virginia, Montana and Maryland) show this distinction: since
the wife's interest in California has not been labeled as "vested," the
full value of the property transferred to the wife was taxed by Virginia
and Montana, but since the wife's interest in Texas has been so labeled,28
only the value of the husband's one-half interest passing to the wife was
taxed by Maryland. In view of the differing tax consequences in those
decisions, the second and more important question arises: Is the label
"vested" a valid criterion for determining the extent of the interest
transferred? To answer this question it is necessary to compare the
substantive rights of the wife in each state involved in the decisions,
California and Texas.
For purposes of clarification, in comparing the substantive rights of
the wife in each state, it will be helpful to consider first their similarities.
In each state the wife has the right to dispose of her one-half interest by
will,29 the right to take one-half of the community property free of in-
heritance taxes when the husband predeceases her,3 0 and the right to a
distribution of the community property upon divorce.31  She does not
" The intermediate appellate court interpretations were made incident to holdings
that community property cannot be attached by a trustee in bankruptcy for the
benefit of the wife's judgment creditors, Smedberg v. Bevilockway, 10 Cal. App.
2d 578, 46 P. 2d 820 (1935), nor applied by a judgment of the court to satisfy a
married daughter's liability for support of her mother, Grace v. Carpenter, 42 Cal.
App. 2d 301, 108 P. 2d 701 (1941).
" There is a division of opinion among law review writers as to the intention
of the legislature in passing the 1927 statute. One has significantly pointed out that
her local rights and remedies remain the same, Cahn, Federal Taxation and Pri-
vate Law, 44 CoLum. L. Rav. 669, 676 (1944), and the most recent writer is of the
opinion that perhaps the legislature intended only to permit the husband and wife
to file separate federal income tax returns without overturning previous statements
of the courts as to the nature of her interest, Marsh, California Family Law-A
Review, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 368, 373-374 (1954). See also: Hooker, Nature of
Wife's Interest in Community Property in California, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 302 (1927) ;
Horne, Community Property-A Functiornl Approach, 24 So. CALIF. L. REV. 42
(1950) ; Kirkwood, The Ownership of Comnunity Property in. California, 7 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1933) ; Simmons, The Interest of a Wife in California Commu-
nity Property, 22 CALIF. L. Ray. 404 (1934) ; Recent Legislation, 16 CALIF. L. REV.
63, 68 (1927) ; 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 237 (1950).
"8 See note 13 supra.
2' CAL. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 201 (1956) ; Cook v. Spivey, 174 S. W. 2d 634
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
" CAL. REVENUE ANID TAXATION CODE ANN. § 15301 (Deering 1952) ; Jones v.
State, 5 S. W. 2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
" CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 146 (West 1954) ; TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4638
(Vernon 1951).
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have the right to alienate, to encumber, or to manage or control her in-
terest during coverture.3 2  Only the husband has these rights.
8
On the other hand, the interest of the wife in each state are slightly
dissimilar in several respects. In California the wife must join in con-
veyances of community property for a period of more than one year.
84
In Texas the wife is not required to join in conveyances, and the husband
may convey in fraud of her interest, but his separate estate may become
liable to the community for her loss. 35 In California the wife's interest is
not liable for tort judgments against the wife, whereas in Texas it has
been held to be so liable.36 In Texas if the husband disappears for more
than one year, the wife by petition to the courts can obtain all the rights
which her husband exercised over the community property.3 7 This privi-
lege does not seem to exist in California, though perhaps somewhat the
same result is reached in the latter state when the wife obtains a division
of the property upon legal separation from the husband.38 Lastly, by re-
cent constitutional amendment, the husband and wife in Texas may
voluntarily partition the community property and hold their interests
separately thereafter.39 There is no express constitutional or statutory
authority for such a partion in California, but the husband and wife may
contract between themselves to hold their property separately.40
Thus, it is seen that though Texas and California differ in labeling
the wife's interest, the rights of the wife in both states are substantially
the same, and that the variance in labeling could not be founded upon
any substantial differences between basic substantive rights of the wife in
each state. Furthermore, the reliance in the decisions upon the label of
"vested" does not seem to justify the differing consequences, and it
would therefore seem reasonable to conclude that the label is meaningless
32 CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. §§ 172 and 172a (West 1954) ; TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN.
arts. 4619 and 4621 (Vernon 1951). Under article 4619, it would seem that the
Texas wife cannot sell her interest, since only the husband is given a power of
disposal during coverture, and under article 4621 the community property is not
liable for debts or damage resulting from contracts of the wife; however, such
property is stated to be liable for necessaries furnished the wife or children. In
California, under section 174 of the Civil Code, the husband is liable for necessaries
furnished the wife or children.
Ibid.
, CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. §§ 172 and 172a (West 1954).
"
3 Graves v. Guaranty Bond State Bank, 161 S. W. 2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942): Rudasill v. Rudasill, 219 S. W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
"0 CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 167 (West 1954) ; Patterson v. Frazer, 93 S. W. 146
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
3 TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4619 (Vernon 1951).
CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 146 (West 1954).
TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 15 (Vernon 1955). See also TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN.
art. 4624a (Vernon 1951).
40 See CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 159 (West 1954) : "A husband and wife cannot,
by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property.
(Emphasis added.) See Essick v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 23 (S. D. Cal.




as a criterion for determining the extent of the interest transferred when
community property passes from a-husband to his wife by gift or upon
his death.
It is evident from the rights of the wife detailed above that when
a husband transfers community property to his wife, she then for the
first time receives certain important property rights in her one-half in-
terest. Whether the transfer of those rights is so insignificant as not to
warrant taxation of course depends largely upon individual state taxing
policy.41 However, before the tax consequences are resolved, the extent
of the interest transferred should be determined and brought into a
proper perspective with the taxing policy. It is submitted that common
law states, when confronted with the problem of taxing transfers of com-
munity property from a husband to his wife, can more realistically ac-
complish this determination by analyzing the actual substantive rights
possessed by the wife before and after the transfer-and not by relying
upon the sometimes vague and meaningless label of "vested."
J. THOMAS MANN.
Real Property-Conveyances between Spouses-Creation and Dissolu-
tion of Estates by the Entirety
In North Carolina, a married woman can make a valid conveyance
to her husband of her real property' only if the instrument of conveyance
contains a certificate by the certifying officer of his findings of facts and
conclusions as to whether the deed is unreasonable or injurious to her.2
The certificate is based on a private examination of the wife.3
" New York, for example, has a specific estate tax statute (similar to the federal
statute in effect from 1942 to 1948) in regard to community property. It states
that the gross estate of a decedent shall include property "held as community
property by the decedent and surviving spouse under the law of any state . . . or
any foreign country, except such part thereof as may be shown to have been re-
ceived as compensation for personal services rendered by the surviving spouse or
derived originally from such compensation or from the separate property of the
surviving spouse. In no case shall such interest included . . . be less than the
value of the community property as was subject to the decendent's power of testa-
mentary disposition." N. Y. TAx LAW § 249-r (5-a). Where all the community
property passes to the wife upon the husband's death, it has been held, under this
statute, that the entire amount of property was includible in the husband's gross
estate. In re Walk's Estate, 192 N. Y. Misc. 237, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 645 (Surr. Ct.
1948).
' N. C. CoNsT. art. X, § 6. "The real and personal property of any female in
this State . . . may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the written consent of
her husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried." See also Perry v. Stancil,
237 N. C. 442, 75 S. E. 2d 512 (1953) (The wife conveyed her separate estate to
her husband without his written consent. The court held that art. X, § 6 of the
Constitution did not apply to the conveyance to the husband. The provision applies
only to conveyances to third parties.)
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12(b) (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (a) (1955).
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In a recent case, 4 a wife owned two tracts of land in fee. By deed,
she and her husband conveyed the property to a third party. No certifi-
cate by the certifying officer that the instrument was not unreasonable
or injurious to her was annexed to the deed. Later the same day, both
tracts were conveyed by the third party to the wife and husband in form
sufficient to create a tenancy by the entirety. It was held that the deed
from the wife to the the third party was void for failure to comply with
the provisions of G. S. 52-12.5 The court said that the wife could not
do indirectly, by such non-compliance, what she could not do directly;
therefore, the attempt to create the tenancy by the entirety in the wife's
property was unsuccessful.
The requirements in North Carolina for the creation of tenancies by
the entirety by conveyance between the spouses are not clear. At com-
mon law, when a married man wanted to create a tenancy by the en-
tirety in himself and his wife with his solely owned property, it was
necessary for him to convey to an intermediate third party who imme-
diately conveyed the property to the husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety.0 This transaction was required to make present the five unities
of time, title, interest, possession and person necessary to create the
tenancy.7 The anachronism of conveying through a straw man to create
a tenancy by the entirety in property owned by one of the spouses has
not been repudiated in North Carolina.
The jurisdictions that recognize tenancy by the entirety8 are in sharp
disagreement as to the validity of such a tenancy created by a direct con-
veyance from one spouse to both. One line of authority follows the
common law precedent. In these jurisdictions a direct conveyance is
invalid because the common law unities of time and title necessary to
'Davis v. Vaughn, 243 N. C. 486, 91 S. E. 2d 165 (1956). Cf. McCullen v.
Durham, 229 N. C. 418, 50 S. E. 2d 511 (1948) (Wife's property was conveyed
by the wife, with her husband's joinder, to a third person. Seven months later the
property was conveyed by the third person to the husband. The deed from the
wife contained no certificate that it was not unreasonable or injurious to her. The
court held that the transaction was not void because it clearly appeared that the
first deed was not made "with any view to accomplishing an indirect conveyance
of the [wife's] property to her husband.")
'At the time the deed in question was executed, the statute did not provide for
a private examination of the wife. N. C. Sess. Laws 1945, c. 73, § 19, as amended
by N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 111 and N. C. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 1006, § 2.
'4 PowELL ON REAL PROParTY 659 (1954).7 Id. at 653.
' Tenancy by the entirety has importance in only twenty-one states. It has
been eliminated or is absent in the remainder of the states. Id. at 655.
'Edge v. Barrow, 316 Mass. 104, 55 N. E. 2d 5 (1944) ; Ames v. Chandler, 265
Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929) ; Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 130 N. W. 617
(1911) ; Stone v. Culver, 286 Mich. 263, 282 N. W. 142 (1938) (Tenancy by the
entirety was not created, but because the wife used her old name as grantor and
her new name as grantee, the court held that her heirs were estopped to assert that




create the tenancy by the entirety are lacking.' 0 Thus, it is held that the
very nature of the tenancy makes it necessary to convey through an
intermediary.
A growing minority, 1 led by New York,12 has taken a different and
more liberal approach to the problem. The theory that a direct con-
veyance is invalid because the unities of time and title are lacking has
been displaced by the theory that the spouse is not conveying the prop-
erty to himself, as such, and to his wife, but to a legal entity composed
of the husband and wife.' 3 Therefore, the conveyance to the intermediate
straw man is not necessary.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not directly faced this prob-
lem. However, there is a basis for the adoption of the New York rule,
at least if the property was originally owned by the husband. Our court
has long held that a tenancy by the entirety is vested in one person-the
"husband and wife."'" Since the objection to a direct conveyance is
that the husband, in a sense, is conveying the property to himself, the
separate entity concept of "husband and wife" would render nugatory
such an objection. The husband would not be conveying the property
to himself, but to a recognized separate entity-"husband and wife."
The same reasoning should apply if the property is originally owned
by the wife. The New York rule that a tenancy by the entirety may
be created by a direct conveyance by the husband or wife to themselves
of property owned by one of them is logical and reasonable. The refusal
by a court to give credence to such a transaction "would be a judicial
conveyance of the property contrary to the owner's expressed inten-
tion."' 5 The direct conveyance would require the execution and recorda-
tion of a single deed, while a conveyance through a straw man would
require the execution and recordation of two separate deeds.16 Never-
theless, there is considerable doubt that a conveyance by the wife to
herself and her husband would create a tenancy by the entirety in North
Carolina. Our court has not directly passed upon the problem, but it has
held that an attempted conveyance by a third party to the husband and
'o "In the attempt to create an estate by entirety, in the case under consideration,
neither the unity of time nor title was observed. The estate was not created by one
and the same act, neither did it vest in them at one and the same time." Pegg v.
Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 230, 130 N. W. 617, 618 (1911).
" Ebrite v. Brookhyser, 219 Ark. 676, 244 S. W. 2d 625 (1951) ; Herr v. Herr,
13 N. J. 79, 98 A. 2d 55 (1953) ; Boehringer v. Schmid, 254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E.
220 (1930) ; In re Klatzl's Estate, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915).1 The leading case is In re Klatzyl's Estate, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915),
explained in Boehringer v. Schmid, 254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. 220 (1930).
' Ibid.
"
4Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 204, 124 S. E. 566, 568 (1924). Stacy, J., in
listing some of the properties and incidents of tenancy by the entirety stated: "In
the eyes of the law an estate by the entirety is vested in one person-the husband
and wife."2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPE TY 225 (1939).6
. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1950).
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wife as tenants by the entirety will be considered a conveyance to the
wife alone when she has furnished all of the consideration. 17 Thus, an
estate by the entirety, with rights of survivorship, can be created only
if the husband is jointly entitled to the property as well as jointly named
in the deed.' 8 The basis for the distinction is that a married woman is
presumed to have acted under the coercion of her husband. 9
Another problem arises when a husband and wife own the property
as tenants by the entirety and one of them wants to convey his interest
to the other. Such a conveyance is valid in several jurisdictions.2 0 The
position of the North Carolina Supreme Court on this is at least partially
clear. If the conveyance is made by the husband of his interest in the
estate by the entirety, he will be estopped upon the death of his wife to
claim the property by survivorship and the property will go to the heirs
or devisees of the wife.21  By the use of the doctrine of estoppel, the
court has found it unnecessary to determine whether the deed is valid
as a conveyance. 22  No North Carolina authority concerning similar
conveyances by the wife has been found.
23
These problems could be solved most effectively by the passage of a
remedial statute. Such a statute is proposed as follows:
Conveyances between spouses; creation and dissolution of es-
tates by the entirety.
(1) A conveyance from a husband or wife to the other of an
undivided one-half interest in real property, by which the grantor
retains a like undivided one-half interest, vests the title to the real
property in the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, pro-
vided words are used indicating an intention to create an estate
by the entirety.
(2) A conveyance from a husband or wife to the other of the
17 Ingram v. Easley, 227 N. C. 442, 42 S. E. 2d 624 (1947) ; Carter v. Oxendine,
193 N. C. 478, 137 S. E. 424 (1927).
" Davis v. Vaughn, 243 N. C. 486, 91 S. E. 2d 165 (1956) ; Ingram v. Easley,
227 N. C. 442, 42 S. E. 2d 624 (1947) ; Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N. C. 223, 62
S. E. 910 (1908).
10 Carter v. Oxendine, 193 N. C. 478, 137 S. E. 424 (1927) ; Sprinkle v. Spain-
hour, 149 N. C. 223, 62 S. E. 910 (1908). If the husband conveys land to his wife,
it is presumed that it is a gift to the wife. Shue v. Shue, 241 N. C. 65, 84 S. E.
2d 302 (1954) ; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 225 N. C. 462, 35 S. E. 2d 418 (1945) (The
presumption is one of fact and is rebuttable.) ; Rudasill v. Cabaniss, 225 N. C. 87, 33
S. E. 2d 475 (1945).
°Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941) ; Enyeart v. Kepler, 118
Ind. 34, 20 N. E. 539 (1889).
21 Keel v. Bailey, 224 N. C. 447, 31 S. E. 2d 362 (1944) ; Willis v. Willis, 203
N. C. 517, 166 S. E. 398 (1932); Capps v. Massey, 199 N. C. 196, 154 S. E. 52
(1930).
22 Cases cited note 19 supra.
2' See Elson v. Elson, 245 Mich. 205, 222 N. W. 176 (1928), where a convey-
ance by a wife to her husband of her interest in property held by them as tenants
by the entirety was held a release of the wife's interest in the property.
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grantor's interest in real property held by them as tenants by the
entirety dissolves the estate and vests the complete title in the
grantee.2
4
FRANK J. HOLROYD, JR.
Torts--Carriers-Termination of the Carrier-Passenger Relationship
The high degree of care a common carrier owes to its passenger'
necessarily terminates when the carrier-passenger relationship ceases to
exist. Hence it has become incumbent upon courts to fashion standards
against which facts may be tested in order to ascertain the existence or
non-existence of a carrier-passenger relationship.
Journey's End
Whether a carrier-passenger relationship has terminated often de-
pends upon the type of common carrier involved and upon the physical
place of the journey's end. If the passenger is discharged at a railroad
carrier's station, the general rule is that the relation of carrier and pas-
senger continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time and op-
portunity to leave the carrier's premises.2 The same rule applies when
the passenger alights at a bus station3 or at an airline terminal.4  The
' Based on OR. REv. STAT. § 108.090 (1953).
1 For a note on the degree of care a common carrier owes to its passenger, see
Note, 17 Ni C. L. REV. 453 (1939).
2 Emerson v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 206 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Young v.
Baldwin, 82 F. 2d 841 (8th Cir. 1936) ; MacGregor v. Pacific Electric Ry., 6 Cal.
2d 596, 59 P. 2d 123 (1936) ; Georgia & F. Ry. v. Thigpen, 141 Ga. 90, 80 S. E.
626 (1913); Sink v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 227 Mich. 21, 198 N. W. 238(1924) ; Galehouse v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 22 N. D. 615, 135 N. W.
189 (1912) ; Wessman v. Boston & M. R. R., 22 N. H. 475, 152 Atl. 476 (1930) ;
Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 220 N. Y. 301, 115 N. E. 704 (1917) ; Layne
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 68 W. Va. 213 69 S. E. 700 (1910). See, Pinson v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 37 F. 2d 652 (5th Cir. 1930). Relation of passenger-
carrier continued until plaintiff leaving train had a reasonable opportunity to see
about baggage and find means of getting to destination. See also, Fulghum v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 158 N. C. 555, 74 S. E. 584 (1912). Train passenger
alighted in daylight at a flag station. A conductor helped her off and placed her
safely on the ground alongside the railroad track about 60 feet north of a railroad
crossing. Plaintiff, in making her way to the crossing, was injured when she
stepped on a wet crosstie. Carrier's motion to nonsuit was affirmed on the basis
of plaintiff's contributory negligence but Clark, C. J., dissenting, stated that the
plaintiff was still a passenger since she had not left the carrier's premises.
'Crown Coach Co. v. Whitaker, 208 Ark. 535, 186 S. W. 940 (1945) ; South-
eastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S. E. 2d 371 (1943).
"Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App., 334, 73 S. E. 2d 598 (1952);
Cf., Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 240 Ni C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954). Al-
though the airport was leased by the city of Charlotte to the air carrier (a com-
mon arrangement between municipalities and air carriers) the carrier was held
liable for injuries to one of its passengers who fell in a passageway furnished for
boarding the airplane of the carrier. Accord, Horelick v. Pennsylvania R. R., 13
N. J. 349, 99 A. 2d 652 (1953).
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rule is based on the fact that the carrier exercises complete control over
its premises. 5
In cases where common carriers discharge passengers upon ground
not under the control or supervision of the carrier there is a distinct
conflict of authority as to the obligation of the carrier after the passenger
has left the conveyance. The weight of authority supports the view that
the relation of carrier and passenger ordinarily ends when the passenger
safely steps from the carrier's conveyance to the street. 6 This theory
is grounded on the premise that the carrier, not having control over the
highway or street, is not responsible for safe passage from the street to
the sidewalk.' The minority view favors the rule that the relationship
of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has had a reason-
able opportunity to reach a place of safety.8
The North Carolina rule applicable to common carriers who dis-
charge passengers upon ground not under the carrier's control has had
an interesting judicial history. In a recent decision,9 the court stated
the rule thusly:
Emerson v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 206 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir. 1953) ; South-
eastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S. E. 2d 371 (1943).
cAlpine v. Los Angeles Ry., 67 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 911 (1945);
Denver City Tramway Co. v. Hills, 50 Colo. 328, 116 Pac. 125 (1911); Sims v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 4 Ill. 2d 60, 122 N. E. 2d 221 (1954) ; Ferguson v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 159 Kan. 520, 156 P. 2d 869 (1945) ; Oddy v.
West End Street Ry., 178 Mass. 341, 59 N. E. 1026 (1901); Mercier v. Union
Street Ry., 230 Mass. 397, 119 N. E. 764 (1918) ; Kieger v. St. Paul City Ry., 216
Minn. 38, 11 N. W. 2d 757 (1943) ; Smuzynski v. East St. Louis Ry., 230 Mo. App.
1095, 93 S. W. 2d 1058 (1936); Wilson v. Berlin Street Ry., 84 N. H. 285, 149
Atl. 602 (1930); Hudak v. Penn-Ohio Coach Lines Co., 73 Ohio App. 409, 57
N. E. 2d 93 (1943) ; Burke v. United Electric Ry., 79 R. I. 50, 83 A. 2d 88 (1951) ;
Street Ry. v. Boddy, 105 Tenn. 669 (1900); San Antonio Public Service Co. v.
Turpin, 153 S. W. 2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Wullbrant v. City of Seattle,
196 Wash. 645, 84 P. 2d 123 (1938) ; Welsh v. Spokane & I. E. R. R., 91 Wash.
260, 157 Pac. 679 (1916).
' Creamer v. West End Street Ry., 156 Mass. 321 (1892); Hudak v. Penn-
Ohio Coach Lines Co., 73 Ohio App. 409, 57 N. E. 2d 93 (1943); San Antonio
Public Service Co. v. Turpin, 153 S. W. 2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).8 Louisville Ry. v. Allen, 246 S. W. 2d 443 (Ky. App. 1951) ; Beahan v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 213 S. W. 2d 253 (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1948) ; Jacobson
v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry., 109 Neb. 356, 191 N. W. 327 (1922);
German v. Muskingum Valley Transit Co., 94 N. E. 2d 52 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951);
Trail v. Tulsa Street Ry., 97 Okla. 19, 222 Pac. 950 (1924) ; Houston Transit Co. v.
McQuade, 223 S. W. 2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Wittkower v. Dallas Ry. & Ter-
minal Co., 291 S. W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Stidham,
191 Va. 790, 62 S. E. 2d 894 (1951) ; Culpeper National Bank v. Tidewater Im-
provement Co., 119 Va. 136, 89 S. E. 118 (1916) ; Zalewski v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Light Co., 219 Wis. 541, 263 N. W. 577 (1936); Will v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Light Co., 169 Wis. 38, 171 N. W. 658 (1919). But cf. Cavazos v. Geronimo
Bus Lines, 56 N. M. 624, 247 P. 2d 865 (1952). Carrier-passenger relationship con-
tinues until the passenger is safely discharged from the conveyance in a place in
which he may safely remain.
'Harris v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 243 N. C. 346, 90 S. E. 2d 710 (1956).
The facts, as supported by a jury verdict for the plaintiff, showed that the place
where plaintiff attempted to alight from a bus at night was at or near the north
end of a parapet, not far from an intersection; and that, as he stepped off the bus
onto the shoulder of the highway, his foot struck something soft and he was pre-
cipitated some ten feet onto the rock bed of a stream and knocked unconscious.
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"The carrier's legal duty to its passenger continues until such
time as it affords its passenger an opportunity to alight safely
from its conveyance to a place of safety."'10 -
Three North Carolina cases were cited by the court in support of this
standard." All three were rendered by bare court majorities.' 2
The problem was first seriously considered by the North Carolina
court in Wood v. North Carolina Public Service Corp.,'3 where plaintiff,
a streetcar passenger, while alighting at a regular stopping place, "had
just stepped off the car and hadn't taken a single step" when she was
struck by an automobile. The majority opinion recognized that there
was a conflict of authority as to the obligation of the carrier after the
passenger has left the car, but chose to uphold a judgment for the plain-
tiff on the theory that the carrier breached its duty to protect its passen-
ger from and warn her of danger as well as to see that she alighted in
safety.' 4 It was not until four years later, when the court decided Log-
gins v. Southern Pacific Utilities Co.,15 that we find a determined effort
on the part of the court to fashion a local standard from the conflict of
authority it again recognized. The facts of the Loggins case disclose
that plaintiff's intestate, his nine-year-old son, left a streetcar with his
father to transfer to another car. As the father reached the sidewalk
he asked his son about their lunchbasket. The boy, who was still in the
street just a few feet from the curbing, instantly turned, reentered the
streetcar, got the basket and ".... just as he got off the car and got one
step," an automobile ran over him. On trial, defendant carrier's motion
to nonsuit was allowed. In sending the case back for a new trial the
court announced this rule for street car carriers:
"We think a fair statement of the rule would be to say that a
passenger, on alighting from a streetcar at the end of his journey,
loses his status as a passenger when he has stepped from the car to
10 Id. at 350, 90 S. E. 2d at 713.
" White v. Chappell, 219 N. C. 652, 14 S. E. 2d 843 (1941) ; Loggins v. South-
ern Pacific Utilities Co., 181 N. C. 221, 106 S. E. 822 (1921) ; Wood v. North
Carolina Public Service Corp., 174 N. C. 697, 94 S. E. 459 (1917).
12 The Wood case was a 3-2 decision with a dissenting opinion expressing the
view that the carrier-passenger relationship should be terminated when the passenger
on a street car alights upon the street from the car. The Loggins case was also a
3-2 split in which the dissenting justices recorded no opinion. In the White case
the court divided 4-3 with the dissenters taking the position that the carrier breached
its duty in failing to warn an alighting passenger (a young child) of the known
danger from an approaching automobile.13 174 N. C. 697, 94 S. E. 459 (1917).
z, The court seemed to base its decision on the fact that the carrier failed to
warn its passenger of the danger of impending traffic hazards more than on the
"landing in safety" theory. The North Carolina court later repudiated this idea as
a duty of the carrier in White v. Chappell, 219 N. C. 652, 14 S. E. 2d 843 (1941).
Accord, Beeson v. Tri-State Transit Co., 146 F. 2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Missis-
sippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34 (1943).
'"181 N. C. 221, 106 S. E. 822 (1921).
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a place of safety on a street or on a highway. The question should
not be made to depend entirely upon the number of steps which
the passenger may take on leaving the car, but rather upon the
circumstances and conditions under which he alights. He is en-
titled to be discharged in a proper manner and at a time and place
reasonably safe for that purpose."'"
It should also be noted that in the Loggins case the court was aided in
its decision by the fact that plaintiff's intestate was a transfer passenger.17
White v. Chappell's was the first North Carolina case on this point to
involve a bus carrier. There, plaintiff's intestate, an eight-year-old boy,
accompanied by his mother, got off the bus on the side of the road, went
around to the back of the bus and when he attempted to dart across the
highway was struck and killed by a passing automobile. In ruling that
defendant carrier's motion for a nonsuit should have been granted, the
court, referring to the Loggins case, stated that:
".. . the ruling there that the duty of the carrier to an alighting
passenger extends not only to 'a safe landing' but to 'a landing in
safety' is the limit to which any of the courts have carried the
principle,' 9 even where the passenger alights on the traveled por-
tion of the street or highway."'20
Thus it seems that the North Carolina rule is a modification of the
minority view in this respect: the minority rule allows the passenger
time to reach a safe place after alighting from the carrier before the rela-
tion is severed; the North Carolina rule calls for "a landing in safety," 21
defined as the condition in which the passenger finds himself immediately
after alighting. This, too, might involve an-element of time; but, ob-
taining an immediate place of safety is manifestly different from moving
to a place of safety. Hence it appears that the North Carolina rule will
not be extended to designate a person with the name of "passenger"
when, upon reaching his destination, he has passed through the "landing
in safety" phase. Furthermore, it is now quite clear that the "landing
'
8 Id. at 225, 106 S. E. at 823.
17 This factor was recognized in the majority opinion which quoted favorably
from an earlier transfer case, Clark v. Durham Traction Co., 138 N. C. 77, 50
S. E. 518 (1905). There the court said: "A person in transferring from one car
to the other is still a passenger, the transfer being but a part of the trip, for the
whole of which the company agrees to convey in safety."18219 N. C. 652, 14 S. E. 2d 843 (1941).
19 Obviously the court was not thinking of the prevailing minority view sup-
ported by cases cited in note 8 supra. See also, Birmingham Ry., Light & Power
Co. v. O'Brien, 185 Ala. 617, 64 So. 343 (1914).
20219 N. C. 652, 660, 14 S. E. 2d 843, 848 (1941).
21 In the Loggnhs case the court stressed the difference between a safe landing
and a landing in safety. The former has reference to the act of the passenger in
stepping from the car to the street; the latter to the condition in which he finds
himself immediately after accomplishing this act.
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in safety" rule, initially adopted for streetcar carriers, will likewise re-
ceive equal judicial sanction in cases involving bus carriers.22
There have been a few cases where the carrier-passenger relationship
has been considered when the carrier was a taxicab. As a rule, the
rider usually loses his status as passenger when he opens the door and
leaves the conveyance ;23 however, if the passenger has not paid his fare,
the carrier-passenger relationship may continue even after the rider walks
away from the cab.
24
If the passenger remains on the carrier after the carrier has reached
the passenger's destination, some cases hold that the passenger's status
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time to leave the con-
veyance.25 Thirty minute has been held not to be a reasonable time.26
Temporary Departures
From a review of the cases involving temporary departures from
the original carrier the general rule seems to be that a passenger does
not lose his character as such by merely temporarily alighting at an
intermediate station, with the express or implied consent of the carrier,
for any reasonable or lawful purpose2 7 such as eating breakfast,2 8 exer-
cising on the platform,29 talking with acquaintances,3" meeting someone
on business, 3 ' getting off the conveyance to let another passenger on,32
sending a telegram,3 3 visiting a rest room3 4 or even for the purpose of
satisfying an aroused curiosity.35 On the other hand the relationship has
been deemed to have been severed where the passenger left the carrier's
station temporarily to talk to a person on a country road 36 or where the
-"-The rule adopted by the North Carolina court was first announced in the
Loggins case (street car) and followed in the White (bus) and Harris (bus) cases.
"Barringer v. Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 62 So. 2d 173 (La.
App. 1952) ; White v. Alleghany Cab Co., 29 N. Y. S. 2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
.Tarman v. Southard, 205 F. 2d 705 (D. C. Cir. 1953); Dayton v. Yellow
Cab Co., 193 P. 2d 959 (Cal. App. 1948). Both of these cases were situations where
the cab driver assaulted the passenger as a result of a dispute over the price of
the fare.
2" Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S. E. 2d 598 (1952);
Valdosta Street Ry. v. Fenn, 11 Ga. App. 586, 75 S. E. 984 (1912); Turner v.
Wabash Ry., 211 S. W. 101 (Mo. App. 1919).
"Duval v. Inland Navigation Co., 90 Wash. 149, 155 Pac. 768 (1916).
2" Delta Air Corp. v. Porter, 70 Ga. App. 152, 27 S. E. 2d 758 (1943) ; Wallace
v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 174 N. C. 171, 93 S. E. 731 (1917).
"
8 Louisville & N. R. R. v. McCue, 216 Ala. 616, 114 So. 218 (1927).
"0 Sellers v. Southern Pacific Co., 33 Cal. App. 701, 166 Pac. 599 (1917).
"0 Arkansas C. R. R. v. Bennett, 82 Ark. 393, 102 S. W. 198 (1907).
Wallace v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 174 N. C. 171, 93 S. E. 731 (1917).
Ross v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 223 N. C. 239, 25 S. E. 2d 852 (1943).
"Alabama G. S. Ry. v. Coggins, 88 Fed. 455 (5th Cir. 1898).
" Murray v. Cedar Rapids City Lines, Inc., 48 N. W. 2d 256 (Iowa 1951);
Wilson v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 217 N. C. 586, 9 S. E. 2d 1 (1940);
Goodman v. Queen City Lines, Inc., 208 N. C. 323, 180 S. E. 661 (1935).
Chicago, M & St. P. Ry. v. Harrelson, 14 F. 2d 893 (8th Cir. 1926).
" Palmer v. Willamette Valley Southern Ry., 88 Ore. 322, 171 Pac. 1169 (1918).
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In the cases involving transfer passengers, that is, where the passen-
ger leaves the original carrier to board another carrier in order to com-
plete his journey, the courts are fairly evenly divided on the question of
whether a passenger retains his status as such while effectuating the
transfer.3 8
In the North Carolina case of Patterson v. Duke Power Co.,30 plain-
tiff, with a transfer ticket in his hand, knocked on the door of the urban
bus he was transferring to and as the bus moved off without letting the
plaintiff on, the plaintiff was thrown backwards and injured. Holding
that defendant carrier's motion for nonsuit should have been upheld, the
court concluded that:
".. . sound reason compels the conclusion that ordinarily a passen-
ger who has obtained a transfer and has safely alighted from one
bus with the intent to transfer to another is not a passenger while
traveling on the public street for the purpose of making the trans-
fer so as to impose upon the carrier the duty to protect him
against the hazards of the street."40
The court distinguished the Patterson case from Clark v. Durham Trac-
tion Co.41 on the ground that in the Clark case, plaintiff, having left the
original carrier, had put his foot on the step of the second carrier's con-
veyance-implying that the carrier-passenger relationship had been re-
stored. Whereas in the Patterson case the door of the conveyance closed
as the plaintiff approached, giving clear notice that the bus was taking
on no more passengers, and no actual effort was made to get aboard.42
Thus it appears that the North Carolina court will require, in transfer
cases, some act by the transferring party to reestablish his "passenger"
Tuder v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 135 Minn. 294, 160 N. W. 785 (1917).38 That he does: Damm v. East Penn Transportation Co., 120 Pa. Supp. 381,
182 AtI. 720 (1936) ; Keator v. Scranton Traction Co., 191 Pa. St. 102 (1899).
That he does not: McAlpine v. Los Angeles Ry., 67 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d
911 (1945) ; Pugh v. City of Monroe, 6 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 1942) ; O'Connor v.
Larrabee, 267 Wis. 185, 64 N. W. 2d 815 (1954). See also, South Plains Coaches v.
Box, 111 S. W. 2d 1151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). When bus broke down, the pas-
senger, on request of bus driver, continued part of the journey in a truck driven
by a person not employed by the bus company. It was held that the plaintiff did
not cease to be a passenger of the bus company by so doing.
40 226 N. C. 22, 36 S. E. 2d 713 (1945).40Id. at 26, 36 S. E. 2d at 715.
4. 138 N. C. 77, 50 S. E. 518 (1905).
42 The court also stated that plaintiff's desire to get aboard was not communi-
cated to the driver at a time when it could be done in safety or while the bus was
open for the reception of passengers.
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status before it will hold the carrier responsible for the duties imposed
by reason of the carrier-passenger relationship.
HORACE E. STACY, JR.
Torts-Doctor's Liability for "Unauthorized Operations"
While performing an authorized appendectomy on the plaintiff, de-
fendant doctor punctured cysts on the plaintiff's left ovary and drained
fluid therefrom. He is charged with assault and trespass for performing
the unauthorized cyst punctures.' Plaintiff's testimony indicated express
consent only to the removal of the appendix. Defendant's evidence did
not controvert this but showed by five duly qualified medical experts that
the puncture of such cysts during an appendectomy is good surgical prac-
tice performed in such situations. No emergency immediately endanger-
ing the health of the patient was shown. Plaintiff appeals from the
entry of nonsuit taken after the presentation of the above evidence. The
decision of the lower court was affirmed on appeal.2
"In such case the consent-in absence of proof to the contrary-
will be construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend
the operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the
area of the original incision whenever he, in the exercise of his
sound professional judgment, determines that correct surgical pro-
cedure dictates and requires such an extension of the operation
originally contemplated."8
There seems to be no disagreement among the cases that consent in
some form must be present for any operation.4 The form that this con-
sent takes is generally spoken of as either express consent or implied
consent.
Express consent is usually found when a very broad, general assent
is given to the physician wherein he is told to remedy the situation5 or
to do whatever is necessary to give relief.6 Consent to one operation is
not, however, consent to a second.7 Nor can a surgeon, during an
' Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956). An allegation of
negligence in the cutting of a blood vessel on the ovary resulting in phlebitis of the
left leg was not urged on appeal although mentioned in the pleadings and in the trial
below. [Record, p. 3.]
'Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956). Cf. RESTATEMENT,
ToRts § 62, illustration 5 (1934).
Id. at 362, 90 S. E. 2d at 759.
'Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N. E. 910 (1919) ; White v. Hirsh-
field, 108 Okla. 263, 236 Pac. 406 (1925) ; Valdey v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485,
96 P. 2d 142 (1939); Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (1943).
McClallen v. Adams, 36 Mass. (19 Pick) 333, 31 Am. Dec. 140 (1837) ; King
v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922) ; Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S. W.
2d 7 (1944).
'McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 Atl. 124 (1930).
'Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562 (1906).
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authorized operation on the plaintiff's hand, take fascia lata from the
thigh even though good surgery justifies such a taking.8 But a doctor is
authorized to reopen an incision without additional authority if he 1te-
lieves a needle was left within the patient's body.9 The surgeon has no
defense of consent, however, when the wrong person is treated even
though the patient, trusting the physician, allows him to proceed without
protest.10 If the wrong member of the body is operated on, the surgeon
cannot be excused by showing permission to operate elsewhere; as where
surgeon was held liable for an unauthorized tonsillectomy, and the consent
was to operate on the septum of patient's nose."1 Of course an entirely
different operation cannot be performed 12 even though benefit may be
shown to have resulted. 3 A specific prohibition to an operating surgeon
not to remove any bone or part of a bone during a foot operation cannot
be disregarded by the surgeon. 14 Nor can the sphincter muscle be cut
when doctor is told specifically not to sever it.1' Even more obvious,
consent to a small operation is not consent to a larger, more serious
operation. 16 As can be seen from these few examples, the express con-
sent decision often involves a determination of the extent of the patient's
permission as reasonably deduced from the patient's conduct under the
circumstances or from the actual agreement of the parties.
On the other hand, most of the so-called implied consent cases arise
where an emergency or unforeseen situation exists and the doctor takes
certain remedial action without any consent whatsoever. The very use
of the term "implied consent" is erroneous here; it is ". . . a fiction, since
consent does not exist, and there is no act which indicates it. It is more
accurate here ...to say that the defendant is privileged because he is
reasonably entitled to assume consent, and to act as if it had been given."'
17
'Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N. W. 681 (1930).
'Higley v. Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932).
"0 Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928) ; Samuelson v. Taylor, 160
Wash. 369, 295 Pac. 113 (1931). As to inferences of assent drawn from submis-
sion, see Knowles v. Blue, 209 Ala. 27, 95 So. 481 (1923); Baxter v. Snow, 78
Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931).
" Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363 (1927). See also, Hershey v.
Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924) ; Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39,
76 N. W. 149 (1898) ; Krompoltz v. Hyman, 70 Pa. Super. Ct. 581 (1919) ; Mohr
v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12 (1905).
" Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St., 125 N. E. 910 (1919) ; Maercklein v. Smith,
129 Colo. 72, 266 P. 2d 1095 (1954) ; see also Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363,
227 Pac. 683 (1924). As in the cases in note 11 supra, the malpractice-negligence
cases and the assault and battery cases are hard to distinguish at times. This is
often important in connection with the running of the statute of limitations which
may be different for the two causes of action.
13 Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N. E. 2d 327 (1953).
Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913).
1 Luzzi v. Priester, 295 S. W. 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), a malpractice suit.
10 Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N. W. 448 (1935). Cf. Robinson
v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911) ; Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 153
N. W. 692 (1915).
17 PROSsER, TORTS § 18, p. 84 (2d ed. 1955). Also see RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
Special Note § 62 at 116 (1934).
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The emergency or unanticipated condition generally must endanger the
patient's life or health in some immediate fashion; as where acute appen-
dicitis which endangered the mother and child was discovered during a
duly authorized operation for a tubal pregnancy.1 8 With this implied
consent raised by an emergency or danger to life and health and without
any direct, express consent whatsoever, it has been held that a surgeon
may amputate an arm which was badly injured,19 that a more serious
rupture on the right side of the groin could be remedied 6ven though
specific permission was only for the correction of the less serious left side
rupture,20 that a surgeon could operate to remove an obstruction in the
urinary system which the surgeon himself had introduced thereinto, 21
and that a mangled and crushed foot could be amputated.22 If the trier
of facts denominates the situation as "emergency" this is enough to up-
hold defendant's verdict on appeal as to implied consent.
23
In every case in the above paragraph which found that there was im-
plied consent, the element of emergency or danger to life or health was
present.
Other cases have used the term implied consent in a slightly different
way; as where a mother's consent to an operation on her child was con-
sidered as implying consent of the child.2 4 But, in the usual use of the
term the consent arises from the presence of emergency or possible dire
results. Most of the cases listed which denied an implied consent did so
expressly because there was no emergency. It seems in one case that
Justice Cardozo lists "emergency" as the only direct exception to the
express consent rule.235 A recent Kentucky case states directly that a
mere endangering of the patient's life or health some time in the future
is not such an emergency as would imply consent presently.2 6 It will be
noted that in the principal case, the testimony of the expert witnesses
was that the cysts were certainly not immediately dangerous. The de-
fendant himself testified:
"I say they [the cysts] were dangerous. I can't say how long it
would have been before she would have had to have an operation;
it possibly could have been two or three months before it would
have been necessary for her to have had an operation. It is pos-
" Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D. C. Mun. App. 1943) ; see also Sullivan
v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N. Y. Supp. 575 (1935).J' ackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931).
_- Bennan v. Parsonnett, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 At. 948 (1912).
.
1Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N. W. 168 (1928).
22Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106 (1912).
"Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D. C. Mun. App. 1943).
24 Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915).
-' Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
"Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S. W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
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sible if I had not done anything to this ovary or ovaries, that she
might never have had to have an operation.
27
The expert witnesses testified to the effect that "[ilt is the accepted
theory to puncture them whether they are dangerous or not."28  (Em-
phasis added.) The customary and usual practice of surgeons was estab-
lished; that surgeons usually remedy such conditions is adequately
shown.29  But no emergency or immediate danger was shown. It is
submitted that the principal case goes further in "implying" consent80
in a non-emergency, non-danger situation than any previous case.8 1
The basis of the North Carolina court's decision, then, would not
seem to be any "emergency" theory. The court, rather, believes that
modem medical practice with its use of anaesthesia and isolated operating
rooms demands that some change be made in the former strict consent
rules. It quotes extensively from Bennan v. Parsonnet,32 a New Jersey
case, to show the historic development of modern surgery and the need
for a change in the law. The rule as quoted in the first paragraph above
is then stated with a citation to three cases.83 It is interesting to note
that two of the three cases and the Bennan case were "emergency" or
"danger to life and health" types of cases; the other case was a "volun-
tary submission" case.
34
The consent raised from this non-emergency, modern medicine doc-
trine allows the surgeons themselves to establish the limits as to what a
given operation should cover once the surgeon sees the exact internal
condition after incision. Some latitude is necessary, certainly. The facts
of the principal case as presented by the five experts seem to make a
case for such freedom. The limits of this type of consent still have to
be drawn. How far afield may the surgeon go in remedying non-
emergency situations? The limiting line in emergency cases is not im-
2" Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956), [Record, p. 30.]
28 Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956), [Record, p. 48;
also pp. 34, 38, 42 and 51.]
"0 See Russell v. Jackson, 37 Wash. 2d 66, 221 P. 2d 516 (1950), where physi-
cians testified that if a cyst on an ovary is discovered during an operation it is com-
mon practice to remove it.
'0 It is realized that the term "implied consent" is specifically-and correctly-
avoided by the North Carolina court as a "fetish," Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C.
355, 361; 90 S. E. 2d 754, 758, but for uniformity's sake the term is used throughout
this note.
"1 Cf. McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N. W. 120 (1929) and Boydston v.
Giltner, 3 Ore. 118 (1869). Although stating rather liberal rules to absolve the
physician, both cases differ in their holdings from the principal case. See REsTATE-
M.tENT, TORTS §§ 54 and 62 (1934).
2283 N. J. L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
3 King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922) ; Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah
217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931) ; Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931).
" Baxter v. Snow stated, inter alia, that voluntary'submission to a physician
for diagnosis and treatment would raise a presumption of consent absent contrary
evidence. See note 10 supra.
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possible to draw since it will extend only to the affected area, but where
this emergency boundary is not present some difficulty will be encoun-
tered. It remains to be seen how the court will handle an extension
which is not so universally conceded by the medical experts to be the((usual practice of surgeons."
The general rule still subsists that "every human being of adult years
and a sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his pa-
tient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
35
To this the North Carolina court quickly would add, however, that once
the general permission is given, the doctor may operate as good surgery
demands, correcting also certain other situations even if no dire emer-
gency is present. The limiting boundaries are still to be delineated.
WILLIAM P. SKINNER, JR.
Trial Practice-Hearings for a New Trial-Right of Trial Court to
Take Testimony Outside the Record and to Deny the Right of Cross
Examination
In North Carolina,' as in many other jurisdictions,2 the trial court
has the inherent power to set aside a verdict and order a new trial.3
Where there is no question of law or legal inference ihvolved in a motion
for a new trial, it is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge
whose ruling, in the absence of abuse, is not reviewable on appeal. 4 This
power is considered essential for the orderly administration of justice
since the judge is in a position to observe the trial objectively and protect
the proceedings from unfair influences which may never appear in the
record.5 Since the judge may exercise his discretion and give no reasons
" Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 129; 105 N. E. 92, 93 (1914)
(a much quoted phrase of Justice Cardozo).
'Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N. C. 488, 42 S. E. 936 (1902).
" Common law authority of a trial court to set aside a verdict and order a new
trial is inherent in all courts of common law in the United States. 39 Af. JUR.,
New Trial § 4 (1942).
' This common law power has been partially codified in N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-207
which specifically sets out the trial courts' right to set aside a verdict and grant a
new trial upon exceptions, insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages.
' Muse v. Muse, 234 N. C. 205, 66 S. E. 2d 689 (1951) ; Pruitt v. Ray, 230 N. C.
322, 52 S. E. 2d 876 (1949).
Speaking of the judge's duty to set the verdict aside when he perceives that
justice has not been done, the court said: "His discretion to do so is not limited to
cases in which there has been a miscarriage of justice by reason of the verdict
having been against the weight of the evidence (in which, of course, he will be
reluctant to set his opinion against that of twelve), but he may perceive that there
has been prejudice in the community which has affected the jurrors, possibly un-
known to themselves, but perceptible to the judge-who is usually a stranger-or
a very able lawyer has procured an advantage over an inferior one, an advantage
legitimate enough in him, but which has brought about a result which the judge
sees is contrary to justice. In such, and, many other instances which would not
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for his decision,6 what is encompassed in such a case is never completely
known; nevertheless, if from the proceedings his actions are arbitrary
and capriciofis he may be reversed. 7 An insight into the discretionary
boundaries of a trial judge can be found in the recent case of Williams v.
StUmpf.8
This case involved the issue of whether the defendant had revoked
his offer to purchase the plaintiff's home before plaintiff's acceptance had
been communicated. The jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiff
moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial asserting (1) errors
and (2) that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence-
both matters of record. On the following day a hearing was held on this
motion in which the court called two witnesses to the stand as witnesses
of the court. The first witness was an employee of the real estate com-
pany which had undertaken to sell the house for the plaintiff, and had
handled the transaction. Under questioning by the court, this witness
testified that he had communicated the acceptance several days before
the withdrawal. At the close of this testimony defendant's counsel re-
quested the right to cross examine the witness. The court denied this
request. "This is an action of the Court, nobody else's. I am doing this
on the theory as to whether or not I decide in my discretion to set the
verdict aside. It is not a part of the record, not a part of the trial. This
witness wasn't on the witness stand." Counsel then stated his reasons to
the court. He wanted testimony concerning the witness's numerous
conversations with the plaintiff's counsel. 9 Moreover, he asserted that
before the trial the witness had been unable to tell him when the com-
munication was actually made. The judge apparently felt it was unjust
to allow defendant's counsel to cross examine the witness when in all
probability he would get an opportunity to do so on the new trial.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the
furnish a legal ground to set aside the verdict, the discretion reposed in the trialjudge should be brought to bear to secure the administration of exact justice."
Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N. C. at 489, 42 S. E. at 937 (1902).
o Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N. C. 488, 42 S. E. 936 (1902).
' "The discretion of the judge to set aside a verdict is not an arbitrary one to
be exercised capriciously or according to his absolute will, but reasonably and with
the object solely of preventing what may seem to him an inequitable result. The
power is an inherent one, and is regarded as essential to the proper administration
of the law. It is not limited to cases where the verdict is found to be against the
weight of the evidence, but extends to many others. While the necessity for exer-
cising this discretion, in any given case, is not to be determined by the mere in-
clination of the judge, but by a sound and enlightened judgment in an effort to
attain the end of all law, namely, the doing of even and exact justice, we will not
supervise it, except, perhaps, in extreme circumstances, not at all likely to arise;
and it is therefore practically unlimited." Ellen Settlee v. Charlotte Electric Ry.,
170 N. C. 365, 367, 86 S. E. 1050, 1050 (1915).
8243 N. C. 434, 90 S. E. 2d 688 (1956).
The witness had told counsel that he discussed the case with plaintiff's counsel
numerous times. Counsel also pointed out that plaintiff's counsel did thousands of
dollars worth of business for the witness's employer.
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questions of whether or not the trial court had abused its discretion by
refusing the defendant's counsel the right to cross examine the witness
and by going outside the record for testimony in order to determine
whether in its discretion the verdict should be set aside. The court
expressed regret that the defendant had been denied the right to cross
examine the witness and then said:
"Although there is no evidence that anything improper took
place during the trial, nevertheless the court has power to set aside
the verdict as against the greater weight of the evidence. How-
ever, it is questionable whether the court should take additional
testimony or base its decision only on that which the jury con-
sidered."
This issue on which the court is doubtful was the main ground on
which the defendant based his appeal, yet the court held that such was
not reversible error, giving no reasons therefor. When a trial judge is
faced with the question of whether or not to set the verdict aside he
enters into a difficult area. The usual sanctity that attaches to a jury
verdict, the personal feelings of the presiding judge, and the rights of the
parties on both sides to a fair and impartial jury trial are involved.
Consequently, where a vital issue presents itself in this area it should not
be ignored. It is important in this discussion, as far as the equities of
the particular case are concerned, to be certain that when a trial judge
exercises his discretion he rules on the motion before him. It is obvious
that the trial judge's actions on the hearing in this case negate any idea
that errors had been committed during the trial, and the court found
none. Furthermore it is not plausible that the trial court called the
witness to the stand on the basis of newly discovered evidence. There
is no doubt that if the plaintiff had moved for a new trial on such ground
the court would have ruled against him. Plaintiff would have had the
burden of showing that the testimony offered was not cumulative, i.e.,
merely additional evidence of same kind, to the same fact litigated, and
that the testimony, if desired, could not have been secured at the trial
by the exercise of proper diligence. 0 This he could not have done, since
the witness was in court during the trial and was readily available. As
no errors or irregularities occurred at the trial and the additional testi-
mony does not fall in the category of newly discovered evidence, there
is no doubt that the trial judge made his extrajudicial investigation in
order to rule on the plaintiff's motion.
The answer to the propriety of the trial court's action in going out-
side the record may be found in the various formulae established to aid
a court in deciding whether a verdict is contrary to the weight of the evi-
"' Alexander v. Cedar Works, 177 N. C. 536, 98 S. E. 780 (1919).
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dence. It has been said that the trial court should not disturb a verdict
of the jury where the evidence is such that different minds may reason-
ably and fairly come to different conclusions ;11 or where if he were a
juror he would have decided differently;12 or where on the same facts
he would have arrived at a different conclusion.' 3 These rules contem-
plate on their face that the only evidence to be considered is that which
was before the jury, and the majority of courts so hold when the motion
is based on the record, 14 as it was in this case. To hold otherwise and
allow a judge to weigh the evidence against the verdict by looking at
evidence adduced before and after the verdict, is to permit him to in-
fringe on the jury's function of determining the credibility of witnesses,
weighing the testimony and finding the facts. Such invasion is not con-
doned. 15 The command of our constitution that jury trial ought to re-
main sacred and inviolate cannot be adhered to when the trial judge may
set aside the decision of the jury as against the weight of probative matter
legally before it by consideration of unchecked testimony never before the
jury. New trials Nill not be granted where such action would amount
to a substitution of the court's verdict for that of the jury.16 An Okla-
1 Jackson v. Walker, 126 Conn. 294, 10 A. 2d 763 (1940) ; Harvath v. Tontini,
126 Conn. 462, 11 A. 2d 846 (1940) ; Downes v. United Electric Ry., 80 R. I. 382,
97 A. 2d 107 (1953) ; "Arlia v. United Electric Ry., 64 R. I. 460, 13 A. 2d 242(940) ; Viereg v. Southwestern Wisconsin Gas Co., 212 Wis. 394, 248 N. W. 775
(1933).
"
2Ellett v. Carpenter, 173 Va. 191, 3 S. E. 2d 370 (1939) ; Harris v. Howerton,
169 Va. 647, 194 S. E. 692 (.1938).
" Delvin v. Piechoski, 374 Pa. 639, 99 A. 2d 346 (1953); Caroll V. City of
Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 436, 84 A. 2d 505 (1951).
1' Vose v. Mayo, 28 F. Cas. No. 17,009, 3 Cliff 484 (C. C. Me. 1871) ; Cole v.
Wilcox, 99 Cal. 549, 34 Pac. 114 (1893) ;. Dreary v. Shields, 54 Cal. App. 2d 795,
129 P. 2d 935 (1942) ; Norton v. Lynds, App. 24 S. W. 2d 183 (1930) ; Whallen's
Ex'rs v. Moore, 248 Ky. 348, 58 S. W. 2d 601 (1933) ; Kirby v. Mafox Realty
Corp., 71 N. Y. S. 2d 124, 272 App. Div. 889 (1947) ; Loucks v. Pierce, 341 Ill.
App. 253, 93 N. E. 2d 372 (1951); Patanyi v. Davis, 336 Pa. 476, 9 A. 2d 430(1939). The last two cases cited indicate that-the error might have been cured if
the outside evidence had been presented in open court with the right to cross
examine. 66 C. J. S., New Trial § 161 (1950). Extrajudicial investigations are
analogous to situations where the judge knows facts which did not appear in the
record and the question arises as to whether or not such knowledge should be used
to set aside the verdict. The answer is that such knowledge should not be con-
sidered. "It is a settled maxim, that a judge has a private and a judicial knowl-
edge. But he cannot give a judgment upon his private knowledge; for he is obliged
to give it according to law and what is proved. If he has a private knowledge of
a fact, he may be sworn as a witness, and then the parties have an opportunity to
examine and cross examine him, and to introduce explanatory or counteracting
proof." Gillespie v. Doty, 160 Miss. 684, 692, 135 So. 211, 212 (1931).
" Rayburn v. Crocker, 31 Ala. App. 542, 19 So. 2d 554 (1944) ; Castleberry v.
Morgan, 28 Ala. App. 20, 178 So 823 (1938). "But in exercising the power, the
court should be careful not to infringe the right of trial by jury in matters which
have been left to them by the law." 28 Ala. App. at -, 178 So. at 824.
1" American Cooler Co. v. Fay & Scott, 20 F. Supp. 782 (N. D. Me. 1937);
Cruz v. City of New York, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 367, affirmed, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 665, 179
Misc. 1031 (1943), appeal dismissed, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 495 (1947) ; Turner v. Carey,
227 S. C. 298, 87 S. E. 2d 871 (1955); Stone & Clamp, General Contractors v.
Holmes, 217 S. C. 203, 60 S. E. 2d 231 (1950).
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homa court expressed these views more succinctly when it said:
"Manifestly, the determination of whether the verdict was
contrary to the evidence depended solely upon the evidence; and
for the court to investigate and advise itself as to the facts of the
case by reference to any other source than matters of common
knowledge, which it might take into consideration in weighing the
evidence, was not inconformity with the analogies and fixed prin-
ciples of law. On the record we quite understand the desire of
the trial judge to be informed as to the facts in the case by inde-
pendent investigation. But such investigation by the court as to
the facts is not consonant with the right of trial by jury upon evi-
dence introduced in open court and in the presence of parties.
"There is, perhaps, little, if any, authority directly decisive of
the question involved. At least we have been cited to none, but it -
is clear that the anologies of the law, as well as the specific basis
on the motion that the 'verdict was contrary to the evidence,' re-
quire that the determination of that 'contrariety,' if it exists,
should be determined from consideration of the evidence alone." 17
Assuming that the trial judge in the Williams case was correct in
going outside the record-and it would seem he was not-was it proper
to deny counsel the right to cross examination? Where the motion for
a new trial is based on evidence outside of the record, such as newly
discovered evidence, perjured testimony, misconduct of jurors and other
irregularities certain safeguards are required. If any merit is to be given
to matters outside the record they must be supported by proof.18 This
is generally done by affidavits ;19 though this evidence may be rebutted
in most jurisdictions by the use of counter affidavits.20  The affidavits
may be based on perjured testimony, or sworn to by witnesses unworthy
of credit, or they may allege grounds for new trial which have no exist-
ence.2 ' Counter affidavits serve to point up these defects, and by so
doing, the chances of a second litigation being granted on unreliable
grounds are reduced. Where witnesses have taken part in such hearing
and their testimony does not amount to an affidavit for newly discovered
evidence, the majority of cases have allowed their testimony to be re-
butted by cross examination. 22 The Supreme Court of the state of Wash-
' Picket v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 169 Old. 123, 125, 36 P. 2d 284, 287 (1934).
's 39 Am. JuR., New Trial § 198 (1942).
20 Ibid.
" Chrisco v. Yow, 153 N. C. 434, 69 S. E. 422 (1910) ; McINTosH, N. C. PRAc-
TICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1929) ; ANN. CAs. '1912 D 1303.
21 People v. Sing Yow, 145 Cal. 1, 78 Pac. 235 (1904).
.
2 Brundizi v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 212 N. Y. Supp. 250, 214 App. Div. 400
(1925) ; Maxlip Realty Corporation v. Loesch, 187 N. Y. Supp. 135 (1921) ; Magley
v. Masonic Temple Assn. of Columbus, 80 Ohio App. 520, 77 N. E. 2d 98 (1947).
In the Loesch case the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict because of the. alleged
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ington has put it this way:
"While there can be no question of the power and right of a
court to allow an examination of a witness orally instead of by
affidavit on the hearing of a motion for a new trial, it is never-
theless one of the most important rights relating to the production
of evidence, in both civil and criminal cases, that the party against
whom such witness testifies shall have the right of cross examina-
tion .... ",23
This is equality and fairness to both parties, and at the same time a more
complete and truthful set of facts are produced. Even if the judge in
the Williams case was correct in going outside the record, the facts would
differ from the discussion here only in that the judge called the witness
and conducted the questioning. This would not be sufficient reason to
deviate and discard methods of proof. The defendant should have been
allowed the right of cross examination.2 4 The examination conducted
misconduct of a juror. The trial court, after affidavits had been submitted, ques-
tioned the juror at a hearing before opposing counsel. The attorney for the de-
fendant, in whose favor the verdict had been rendered, made certain objections and
was promptly excluded from the court room, the judge remarking, "This is an
ex parte hearing to determine whether a contempt has been committed." The
supreme court felt that such action was immaterial if the hearing was held to de-
termine whether or not the juror was guilty of misconduct, inasmuch as the de-
fendant had no interest in the contempt proceedings. "On the other hand, if that
testimony was taken for the purpose of determining the motion to set aside the
verdict, the defendant was vitally interested in the hearing, and had an undoubted
right to be present thereat, to object to an examination of the juror for the purpose
of impeaching the verdict of the jury, and in addition had the right to question the
juror himself in order to sustain that verdict." 187 N. Y. Supp. at 137.
22 State v. Ward, 135 Wash. 482, 485, 238 Pac. 11, 12 (1925).
2 "It is true upon petition for new trial the strict rules concerning the protec-
tion of witnesses, and the right of confrontation and cross examination are not
applied, but there are legal limits to the procedure to be adopted. The judicial
rules safeguarding proof in court are founded upon sound reason, and are not to
be departed from without reason." Huey v. West Ossipee Mines, 81 N. H. 103,
106, 122 Atl. 334, 336 (1923). An analagous area is the right to argue the merits
of a motion for a new trial. The answers have varied. It has been held error to
refuse to hear argument on such a motion. Kansas Atchison IL R. v. Consolidated
Cattle Co., 59 Kan. 111, 52 Pac. 71 (1898). Other jurisdictions have held that it
is within the trial courts' sole discretion. Collins v. Nelson, 41 Cal. App. 2d 107,
106 P. 2d 39 (1940) ; Morel v. Semoniam, 103 Cal. App. 490, 284 Pac. 694 (1930) ;
Teems v. Burel, 60 Ga. App. 826, 5 S. E. 2d 405 (1939). Sovereign Camp of
Woodmen of the World v. Luthan, 59 Ind. App. 290, 107 N. E. 749 (1915). New
York and Wisconsin have taken the middle position on this question and have held
that there is no error to refuse to hear oral arguments where the motion is based
on the record. The reason given is that the judge who has presided over the trial
in many instances is completely possessed of all the facts and law, and therefore an
argument would be a waste of time. Sweeney v. Mayor Etc. of New York, 17
N. Y. Supp. 797 (1892) ; Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, 49 N. W. 30 (1891).
Despite these divergent iewpoints there seems to be unanimity of opinion where
the motion for new trial has been made by the court itself. Those jurisdictions
which have considered this particular point have held that it was a deprivation of
due process not to give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. "Oppor-
tunity for a litigant to present his views as to the matters instantly before the court
which may affect his rights is the very foundation stone of our procedure." Hoppe
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by a judge normally will not be adequate, because he has neither the
strong interest nor the full knowledge that is required for effective cross
examination.25 A verdict is at stake. It is a substantial right,26 born
of evidence, that has been subjected to a system of procedural checks and
balances, and its merit deliberated and judged by twelve men. The
elaborate process of the law which produced it should provide the basic
right of cross examination to protect it.
New trials are not favored in the eyes of the law and should not be
granted in an arbitrary manner. It is felt that the methods used in the
Williams case were not based on logic and reason and should have been
considered an abuse of discretion. This case results in giving the trial
court an unusual amount of control over the regulation of a hearing for
a new trial. Perhaps the court feels that it is a wiser policy to give the
trial court a wide latitude in such hearing and that their expressed dis-
approval of the proceedings in the Williams case would be enough to
prevent its recurrence. However, it would seem that until a firmer stand
has been taken on the issues involved this case establishes a dangerous
precedent.
JOHN MARK TAPLEY.
Unemployment Insurance-Availability for Suitable Work-Effect of
Claimant's Refusal to Work on Sabbath
Claimant, a textile worker of thirteen years' experience, became inter-
ested in the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and, as a result, became
convinced that she should not work on the Sabbath, which, in the Seventh
Day Adventist Church, is from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.
On at least one Sabbath, she was excused from work by her employer,
but on another Friday, she stayed away from her employment without
permission and was discharged for such absence. Within a week she
filed a claim for benefits under the Employment Security Act. During
her period of unemployment, she sought work in other mills in the area
but restricted her availability to the first shift, the only shift that would
not interfere with her Sabbath, and freely admitted that she would not
consider employment which would require her to work on her Sabbath.
The Employment Security Commission held that the claimant was
not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits by the circum-
stances of her discharge, that she was able to work and that she had made
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 402, 406, 235 S. W. 2d 347, 350 (1950) ;
Southern Arizona Freight Lines v. Jackson, 48 Ariz. 509, 63 P. 2d 193 (1936) ; Re'
Murray's Estate, 238 Iowa 112, 26 N. W. 2d 58 (1947) ; Anno., 23 A. L. R. 2d 846
(1952).
5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1368 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
.' Edwards v. Hood Motor Co. 235 N. C. 269, 69 S. E. 2d 550 (1952) ; Bundy v.
Sutton, 207 N. C. 422, 177 S. E. 420 (1934).
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an active and reasonable search for work; but that, by restricting her
availability to first shift employment only, she had "so limited the cir-
cumstances under which she would accept work as substantially to elimi-
nate herself from consideration for potential job opportunities.... ." The
Commission also found that 95% of the job openings in the area were
for the third shift, that textile mills normally run from Monday morning
through Friday night, that new employees are normally given second and
third shift work and promoted to first shift employment. Thus, the
Commission held her ineligible for benefits, and this decision was af-
firmed by the Superior Court of Rowan County. On appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded.' The court held
that to interpret the statutes as the Commission had done would require
a claimant, in order to be eligible for benefits, to be available for work
"at any and all times, night and day, Sunday and week days alike," and
would also render G. S. 96-13 and G. S. 96-14 inconsistent. The court
concluded that the language of G. S. 96-13 does not sustain the strict
interpretation applied by the Commission. The words, "available for
work," as used in G. S. 96-13 mean "available for suitable work" in the
same sense as the words "suitable work" are used in the cognate statute
G. S. 96-14. The court held that "work which requires one to violate
his moral standards is not ordinarily suitable work within the meaning
of the statute," and that the claimant, by refusing to consider employment
which would require work on her Sabbath, did not render herself un-
available for work within the meaning of the statute since such work
would have been unsuitable for her.
This seems to be the first occasion on which the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has passed, in definite terms, on the scope and meaning of
the term "available for work"--one of the requisites for eligibility for
benefits under the Employment Security Act. It is certainly a case of
first impression in North Carolina on a claimant's eligibility for benefits
where he has, for religious reasons, placed a restriction on his availability.
A claimant's religious beliefs might affect his eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits in several respects. These beliefs might influence the de-
termination where the problem under consideration would be (1) volun-
tary leaving, where it would enter into the determination of the effect of
claimant's religious beliefs on good cause, (2) refusal of work, where the
religious beliefs would enter into the determination of the "suitability"
of the offered work, and, (3) availability for work, where, as in the
Miller case, religious beliefs caused the claimant to restrict her availa-
bility. This note will be limited primarily to a discussion of these three
factors against the background of a brief history of unemployment in-
surance laws, their purpose and interpretation.
'In re Miller, 243 N. C. 509, 91 S. E. 2d 438 (1956).
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North Carolina passed its Unemployment Compensation Law in
1936 ;2 by 1937 all forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Alaska
and Hawaii had passed similar legislation, pursuant to the Federal Social
Security Act.3 In August, 1935, the United States Congress, by an over-
whelming bipartisan vote, had passed the Social Security Act, which,
by Title III and Title IX, laid the framework for the new program of
unemployment insurance.4 The federal act levied a tax on employers in
industry and commerce, and, by means of a "tax offset," made it advan-
tageous for the states to enact state laws which would pay unemployment
benefits.5 This new program of unemployment insurance was designed
to be on a federal-state basis, rather than on a federal basis like the
Federal Old-Age Insurance program. It contemplated federal-state co-
operation, but the federal government was not to make or match pay-
ments to individuals. Its grants to the states were for the proper and
efficient administration of the state unemployment laws ;6 the entire cost
of administering these programs was to be financed by federal funds.7
In this federal-state system of unemployment insurance the individual
states were free to develop the program that was most adapted to the con-
ditions of that state.8 Since each state legislature enacted its own laws,
specifying the workers to be covered, the taxes the employers would pay,
the benefits to be paid, the requirements for receipt of benefits, and the
organization within the state government to administer the law,9 the
laws vary greatly from state to state. However, the states generally
agree as to the purpose of the unemployment insurance laws, which is
said to be to provide relief'0 or protection against involuntary unemploy-
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96 (1950). N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 598, s. 1, substituted
"Employment Security Law" for "Unemployment Compensation Law." Hereafter
in this note, North Carolina's Law will be referred to as the "Employment Security
Law," other state laws by their titles, while the generic terms "unemployment in-
surance" and "unemployment compensation" will apply to both.
'U. S. EMPLOYMENT SERvICE, BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, U. S. D'T
OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SEcuRITY REVIEw, vol. 22, no. 8, Twenty Years of Un-
employment Insurance in the U. S. A. 1935-1955 9 (1955). Hereafter all jursidic-
tions will be called "states" in accordance with the definition of state in sec. 1101
of the Social Security Act, and in sec. 1607(j) of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act.
'Ibid.
'Ibid. "The Federal Act . . . provided that when a State had an approved
unemployment insurance law, its employers could credit the taxes they paid to the
State against 90 per cent of the Federal Tax."0 Dw. or R~sEA~cHr AND STxrATICS, SOCIAL SEcIlTY ADMIN., U. S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDucATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY BULETI, vol. 18, no. 12,
Twenty Years of Unemployment Insurance 3 (1955).
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY RVIEW, op. cit. supra note 3 at 9.8 Dr. OF DETERMINATIONS AND HEARINGS, UNEMIPLOYMkENT INSURANCE SERVICE.BUInAU OF EMPLOYCENT SECURITY, U. S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON Or STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954, Preface III (1954).
o EMmLOYMENT SECURITY REVIEW, Op. cit supra note 3 at 9.
1
o 
0 Mattey v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa. Super. 36, 63 A. 2d 429 (1949).
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ment,": i.e., to those persons thrown out of work through no fault of their
own.
1 2
The Declaration of Public Policy of the North Carolina Employment
Security Law (which is similar to that of many other states) provides:
"As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter,
the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows:
"Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious men-
ace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State.
Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general inter-
est and concern which requires appropriate action by the legis-
lature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now
so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker
and his family. The achievement of social security requires pro-
tection against this greatest hazard of our our economic life. This
can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable
employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during
periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unem-
ployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the
serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legisla-
ture, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public
good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require
the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the
State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves
to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault
of their own.' 3
The North Carolina court has said of the purpose of the Law that
"From the clear language in which the underlying purposes of the Un-
employment Compensation Act are declared.., it is to be gathered that
the Legislature intended to provide a wide field of usefulness for this
agency for social security and for mitigating the economic evils of un-
employment."1 4
Although the roots of the unemployment compensation program lie
in the Poor Laws which spoke of "sturdy beggars" and "able-bodied
laborers,"' 5 it is not a public assistance program nor a "dole" system
where benefits are based upon need, but a type of social insurance, fi-
" Glover v. Simmons Co., 17 N. J. 313, 111 A. 2d 404 (1955) ; Krauss v. A. &
M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277 (1953).
2 Mohler v. Dep't of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N. E. 2d 762 (1951) ; Ackerson v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Minn. 271, 48 N. W. 2d 338 (1951); Nordling v.
Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N. W. 2d 576 (1950).
" N. C. GEN. STxT. § 96-2 (1950).
" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709,
716, 15 S. E. 2d 4, 8 (1941).
"
2 ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 2 (1950).
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nanced by the persons on whom the workers are economically dependent
and providing for benefits payable without proof of need.16 Since the
program was not designed to be a public relief measure nor to "furnish
a welcome sedative to those who prefer to drift more comfortably on the
tides of indolence,"' 17 benefits are not payable to all persons who are un-
employed.' 8  Mere unemployment is not enough.19 The recepit of bene-
fits is conditioned on compliance with the requirements and conditions
prescribed by the various state statutes. Each state has certain require-
ments designed to limit payments to workers unemployed primarily as
a result of economic causes, to delineate the risks which the laws cover,20
to exclude from benefits those persons who are only casually, temporarily,
or occasionally employed,21 and to provide for the relief from the distress
of invohntary unemployment for persons who are ordinarily workers
and who would be workers now but for their inability to find jobs.22
These requirements are means of ascertaining the claimant's attach-
ment to the labor market: Is the claimant usually a worker? Has he
worked for the specified period and earned a qualifying amount of wages
in a type of employment covered by the laws? Does he have an honest
desire to become re-employed? In short, has the claimant been a worker
in the past and is he currently available for work? All states require a
claimant to demonstrate his past and present labor force attachment.23
Past labor force attachment is uniformly tested by the requirements
that a claimant must have worked in insured employment and must have
earned a specified amount of wages in such employment.24 These tests
are easily administered since they require only the application of an
arbitarary standard to the particular facts.
A claimant's present labor force attachment is more difficult to as-
certain. All states attempt to test one's present attachment to the labor
force by requiring that he be "able to work and available for work," and
twenty-six states, including North Carolina, require, in addition, that
he actively search for work.2 5 All states also require that a claimant be
"0 Riesenfeld, The Place of Unemployment Insurance Within the Patterns and
Policies of Protection Against Wage Loss, 8 VAND. L. REV. 218, 223 (1955).
" Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 24 N. J. Super. 277, -, 94 A. 2d 339, 342(1953).8 Neff v. Bd. of Rev., Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 52 Ohio Ops. 285, 67 Ohio L.
Abs. 276, 117 N. E. 2d 533 (1953) ; Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463,
65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
" Glover v. Simmons Co., 17 N. J. 313, 111 A. 2d 404 (1955).
"0 COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra note
8 at 75.2 DIvISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., U. S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Vol. 19, no. 1,
State Unemployment Insurance Legislation 1955, 19-20 (1956).
2 Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277. (1953).
"' ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 2. 24 Id. at 75.2
'COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra note
8 at 75; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13 (1950). See Freeman, Active Search for Work,
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free from any disqualifications under the statute.2 6 The "able to work
and available for work" tests have been described as positive conditions
for the receipt of benefits while the disqualifications are negative expres-
sions of conditions under which benefits may be denied to an otherwise
eligible claimant.27
Since the normal administrative practice in North Carolina is to con-
sider the disqualifications before passing on the eligibility of a claimant, 28
the various aspects of disqualification which might be influenced by re-
ligious beliefs will be here first considered.
Voluntary Leaving
All states, with the exception of Montana, provide for disqualification
for leaving work without good cause.29 In twenty states the good cause
must be good cause connected with the work, or attributable to the em-
ployment, or involving fault on the part of the employer; in the other
states good cause is not so restricted.30 For a voluntary leaving of em-
ployment without good cause connected with the employment, North
Carolina disqualifies a claimant for a period of from four to twelve
weeks.3 '
Two aspects of this provision seem to cause the bulk of the litigation:
(a) what constitutes voluntary leaving? and (b) what constitutes good
cause?
Some courts say that "voluntary" means a free exercise of the will.8 2
Other courts recognize that, although a worker freely decides to leave
his job, his decision need not necessarily be voluntary. 3 "The pressure
of necessity, of legal duty, or family obligations, or other overpowering
circumstances, and his capitulation to them, may transform what is osten-
sibly voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment. '3 4
10 OHIo ST. L. J. 181 (1949). There are other eligibility requirements, generally
as follows: (1) unemployment (2) filing of a claim (3) registering for work at a
public employment office and (4) serving a waiting period. See Williams, Eligi-
bility for Benefits, 8 VANDER L. Rzv. 286 (1955).
2" For details of the variations in state laws on disqualification, see COMPARISON
OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANcE LAWS, op. cit. supra note 8 Tables 23-31
and Chapter IV generally. See Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving
and Misconduct, 55 YALE L. J. 147 (1945) ; Sanders, Disqualifications for Unem-
ployment Insurance, 8 VANDER. L. REV. 307 (1955).
17 ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 75.
2 6 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. N. C. -8243, Employment Security Commission
Statement of Policy no. 54 (1954).29 Montana disqualifies for any voluntary leaving-with or without good cause.
20 COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANE LAWS, op. Cit. supra note
8 at 80-84.2 1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(a) (Supp. 1955).
22 State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S. E. 2d 198 (1949).
22 Craig v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 83 Ohio App. 247, 83 N. E. 2d 628 (1948);
Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898
(1946).
"
4 Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 119 Ind. App.
191, -, 84 N. E. 2d 895, 897 (1949).
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Once it has been determined that a claimant has quit his job, and that
he has done so voluntarily, then it must be ascertained whether this vol-
untary leaving of employment was with good cause. It should be noted
that the factors constituting good cause will differ in the various juris-
dictions in light of the fact that 20 states require the good cause to be
connected with the work.35 It seems that personal reasons would more
often constitute "good cause" in those jurisdictions where the criterion is
not restricted to causes connected with the employment.
The Attorney General of North Carolina has given an interpretation
of good cause for the use of the North Carolina Employment Security
Commission:
"In ascertaining whether or not an employee voluntarily left
his employment, it would be justifiable to consider the mental
processes, constraining or compulsive forces or objective influ-
ences, or the freedom or lack of freedom from external compul-
sion or necessity which led up to the claimant's leaving work, but
the Commission should in every case be fully satisfied that, where
an employee has left the employment, the reasons for so doing were
of an impelling character, which, in the opinion of the Commis-
sion, afforded ample and complete justification for the severance of
his employment. This would exclude all fictitious or feigned rea-
sons or excuses for failure to continue in the work and would
comprehend only such causes as operated directly on the employee
which made, in the opinion of the Commission, his continuance in
employment impossible, or attended with such circumstances as to
make it unreasonably burdensome for him to continue therein."36
A Pennsylvania decision contains a discussion of good cause:
"... 'good cause' must be so interpreted that the fundamental pur-
pose of the legislature shall not be destroyed. Even in matters
connected with his employment there must be some limit to the
legally approved list of good causes for quitting employment. The
quitting must be such a cause as would reasonably motivate in a
similar situation the average able-bodied and qualified worker to
give up his or her employment with its certain wage rewards in
order to enter the ranks of the 'compensated unemployed.' ...
"An employee may contend that the character and habits of
his fellow employees are distasteful to him, he may contend that
the work he is engaged in (such as making of war munitions or
- See note 30 supra; See also, Kempfer, Disqualifications for Vohntary Leav-
ing and Misconduct, 55 YALE L. J. 147 (1945) and Sanders, Disqalification for
Unemployntent Inurance, 8 VANDER. L. REV. 307 (1955).
" 6 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. N. C. 1975.01 (1944).
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alcoholic beverages) offends his religious or moral principles, or
he may contend that his family objects to his working in a job in
which he becomes begrimed with dirt yet these and similar rea-
sons cannot be legally accepted as 'good cause' for leaving one's
employment....
"If every reason which appealed to an employee's head or
heart is to be accepted as a good cause for his or her voluntarily
leaving a job in a locality where there is no other work available,
the Unemployment Compensation Law will become in many in-
stances an invitation to a compensated rest. 3 7
The courts are not in agreement as to what constitutes good cause.88
Would a claimant's religious beliefs constitute good cause for leaving
employment? It seems that those states which allow personal factors
to constitute good cause would be more likely to allow compensation to
a claimant who quit for religious reasons than would those which require
that the good cause be "good cause connected with the work or attribu-
table to the employment, or involving fault on the part of the employer."
Apparently there have been few decisions at the state supreme court
level which have discussed this particular problem. One court held that
a claimant had left work voluntarily without good cause where, in spite
of having been told that he could not have time off for a religious holiday
because the union contract prevented using a substitute, he nevertheless
took the day off.39
This question has been before the various state unemployment com-
missions. Generally, though not always, the commissions have held that
a claimant who has left work for religious reasons has voluntarily severed
the employment relation but with good cause and hence is not disquali-
" Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 358 Pa.
224, 237, 56 A. 2d 254, 260 (1948).
" Claimant held to have had good cause for leaving employment when the leav-
ing was for the following reasons: to take sick wife back to her home community,
Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Rev. Bd., 119 Ind. App. 191, 84 N. E. 2d 895 (1949) ;
because employer failed to pay wages promptly, Deshla Broom Factory v. Kinney,
140 Neb. 889, 2 N. W. 2d 332 (1942) ; because of family obligations, Wolfson v.
Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 167 Pa. Super. 588, 76 A. 2d 498 (1950) ; to join hus-
band in another locality, It re Teicher, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. 2d 739 (1944) ;
because minor claimant's parents insisted she accompany them to California, West-
ern Printing and Lithographing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 260 Wis. 124, 50 N. W.
2d 410 (1951).
Claimant held not to have had good case for leaving employment when the
leaving was for the following reasons: because of dissatisfaction with earnings,
Dep't of Ind. Rev. v. Scott, 36 Ala. 184, 53 So. 2d 882 (1951) ; to get married,
Moore v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 73 Ohio App. 362, 56 N. E. 2d 520 (1943) ; to
join husband in another city, Stone Mfg. Co. v. S. C. Emp. Sec. Comm., 219 S. C.
239, 64 S. E. 2d 644 (1951) ; to care for young children, Judson Mills v. S. C. Un-
emp. Comp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. 2d 535 (1944) ; because of increase in
duties, In re Anderson, 39 Wash. 2d 356, 235 P. 2d 303 (1951).




fled.40 These findings by the commissions seem to be well reasoned.
Religious beliefs causing the severance of employment clearly appear to
be the kind of "necessitous and compelling" 41 reasons that transform
voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment, the compensa-
tion of which is one of the basic purposes of the unemployment insurance
acts.
42
It is significant to note that although a person may be determined to
have voluntarily left his employment with good cause and thus not be
disqualified, it is possible that he may still be held ineligible for benefits
because of unavailability. The same causes which justify a claimant in
leaving employment may also prevent his being held available,4 3 depend-
ing upon the extent to which his severing of the employment relation
indicates an intention on his part to withdraw from the labor market.44
Refusal of Work
All states provide for disqualification for refusal of work; the statutes
contain diverse provisions concerning the extent of the disqualification,
factors to be considered in determining whether work is or is not suitable
and whether the claimant has good cause for refusing it, and the pro-
visions under which new work may be'refused4 5
States are required by the provisions of the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act,4 6 in order to protect labor standards, to include the so-called
"Labor Standards Provision" in their Acts. These provisions are stand-
ard throughout the states, and North Carolina's provisions would seem
to be typical:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no
work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied
,0 See, e.g., Ben. Ser. Reports, 3963, N. Y. A (1952) ; 3759, N. Y. B (1952);
589, Pa. B (1950). This refers to Benefit Series Service, Unemployment Insurance,
which is prepared by the Division of Determinations and Hearings, Bureau of
Employment Security, U. S. Dep't of Labor. This service contains reports of sig-
nificant administrative and court decisions.
"1 Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d
898 (1946) ; Flannick v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 606, 82 A. 2d
671 (1951). See also Homing v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 177 Pa. Super. 618,
112 A. 2d 405 (1955).
42 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1950) ; see also note 11 supra.
'
0 Hoffstot v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa. Super. 43, 63 A. 2d 355
(1949).
" Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277 (1953).
An example of this would be where the claimant left his employment because of
illness. In cases of this type, his ineligibility for benefits would only extend to
the time when the factor causing the unavailability was abated, as contrasted with
a predetermined period which would have been the case had he been held dis-
qualified.
' COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANCE LAws, op. cit. supra note
8 at 88. See Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134 (1945);
Machuga, Suitable Work under Unemployment Compensation Statutes, 10 OHIo
ST. L. J. 232 (1949).
"' SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, op. cit. supra note 6 at 3.
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under this chapter to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing
to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (a) If
the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute; (b) if the remuneration, hours, or other con-
ditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the
individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
(c) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be
required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from joining any bona fide labor organization. '47
Most statutes, in addition to the labor standards provisions, contain
rather standardized criteria for ascertaining the suitability of the work
offered.48 North Carolina's tests are:
"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an indi-
vidual, the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved
to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior
training, his experience and prior training, his experience and
prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for se-
curing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of
the available work from his residence." 49
Under the provisions of the statutes in forty-seven jurisdictions, a
person is disqualified when he fails without good cause to apply for
available and suitable work to which he is directed,50 or to accept suitable
work when proffered to him ;51 in the four remaining jurisdictions, he
may be disqualified for refusal without good cause to accept an offer
of employment for which he is reasonably fitted by experience and train-
ing.52 Here again the disqualification period and factors in determining
disqualification vary from state to state.5 3
47 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (Supp. 1955).
,New York and Delaware disqualify for refusals of work for which the claim-
ant is reasonably fitted and Montana and Wyoming disqualify for refusal of work
for which he is physically and mentally qualified.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(1) (Supp. 1955). For details in the various states
see Table 26, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS, op. cit.
supra note 8 at 90.
oBigger v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 4 Ter. [Del.] 553, 53 A. 2d 761 (1947);
Muncie Foundry Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Rev. Bd. of Emp. Sec. Div., 114
Ind. App. 475, 51 N. E. 2d 891 (1943) ; S. S. Kresge Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Comm.,
349 Mo. 590, 162 S. W. 2d 838 (1942); Hanna v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev ,
172 Pa. Super. 417, 94 A. 2d 178 (1953).
" Bigger v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., supra note 53; Muncie Foundry Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Rev. Bd. of Emp. Sec. Div., mtpra note 53; see also Pacific
Mills v. Dir. of Div. of Emp. Sec., 322 Mass. 345, 77 N. E. 2d 413 (1948).
" Claim of Delgado, 278 App. Div. 237, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (3d Dep't 1951);
Claim of Greaser, 279 App. Div. 702, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 239 (3d Dep't 1951) ; Claim
of Crowe, 280 App. Div. 427, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (3d Dep't 1952).




Religious beliefs are given effect under the provision that the commis-
sions are to consider the "risk to claimant's morals." As one writer
pointed out: "This element is frequently viewed broadly to give effect
to ofie's moral precepts regardless of their consistency with prevailing
ethical standards.... In order to make the work unsuitable, however,
the connection between the condition pertaining to the job and the claim-
ant's moral principles should be direct and not fanciful or nebulous. ' 54
In the usual case based on refusal of work for religious reasons, the re-
ligious views of the claimant are certainly not inconsistent with the cur-
rent ethical standards of a sizable minority.55 The states uniformly
require the claimant to establish the sincerity of his religious beliefs;
the element of good faith permeates every area of unemployment com-
pensation, and where claimant has not acted in good faith or in further-
.ance of a conscientious religious belief, compensation has been denied.56
Recently the Ohio courts had occasion to consider, in the case of Tary
v. Board of Review5 7 the effect of a claimant's refusal of employment
for religious reasons. In this case the claimant was a conscientious mem-
ber of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. When her job, which had
required no Saturday work, terminated, she applied for and received
unemployment benefits until she refused a job referral because it would
have required her to work half-day on her Sabbath. The administrator
thereupon suspended her benefits; the referee affirmed this finding; the
board of review disallowed her application for further appeal.
Claimant thereupon appealed to the court of common pleas which
reversed the action of the board of review; this was affirmed by the court
of appeals, and, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, was once again
affirmed.
The court pointed out that, when Kut v. Albers Super Markets Inc.5 8
(an earlier Ohio decision involving religious beliefs) was decided, the
Act in Ohio required the claimant to be available for work in his usual
trade or occupation, or in any other trade or occupation for which he was
reasonably fitted. However, by a 1949 amendment, the Act was amended
to require claimant to be available for suitable work and to be ineligible
for benefits for refusal without good cause to accept an offer of suitable
work. It also provided that, in determining whether work was suitable,
the degree of risk to claimant's morals was to be considered.
The court noted that this amendment made Ohio's statute in accord
Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134, 144 (1945).
Usually cases based on refusal of work for religious reasons involve Orthodox
J'ews or Seventh Day Adventists since their Sabbath is on Saturday.
" See Ben. Ser. Report 9021-Mass. A (1955).
17 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N. E. 2d 56 (1954); See Note, 30 NOTRE DAME LAw.
176 (1955) ; Note, 8 VANDER. L. REv. 519 (1955).
, 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N. E. 2d 643, appeal dismissed 329 U. S. 669, rehearing
denied 329 U. S. 827 (1946).
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with those of other states where the provisions had been interpreted to
excuse rejection of proffered employment if it would involve a violation
of claimant's religious conscience and tend to offend his morals and con-
tinued: "It is our interpretation that the General Assembly intended,
by the 1949 Amendment, to confer rights based upon bona fide moral
convictions. Conscientious religious beliefs constitute an integral part
of an individual's morals."5ssa
It seems probable that courts in other jurisdictions would reach the
same result as the Ohio court did in the preceding case since forty-seven
jurisdictions require acceptance of suitable work only and generally pro-
vide very similar criteria for ascertaining this suitability. 59 The commis-
sion decisions reflect a well settled rule in most jurisdictions that a con-
flict with a claimant's religious views renders the work unsuitable,60
although there are decisions to the contrary.61
In the four states which have no suitability requirement it would
seem theoretically possible that a claimant could be disqualified for the
refusal of a job even if it violated his religious beliefs. There are appar-
ently no state supreme court decisions from these states on this point
but the administrative decisions do not indicate that such a result has
been reached.62
Able to Work and Available for Work
The "able to work" requirement seems to cause no great difficulties.
The variations from state to state are minor: some states require a
claimant to be "physically able" or "mentally and physically able" but
the effect of these variations is negligible.63 This requisite is said to be
present to distinguished unemployment insurance from workmen's com-
pensation or health insurance.6 4  "Generally speaking 'able' refers to
mental attitudes and physical capabilities of claimant. . ".."05 Normally
this requirement has been leniently interpreted to allow benefits to physi-
cally disabled persons unless they are utterly incapable of working.('
" See notes 53, 54 and 55 supra and corresponding text.
' 7 Ben. Ser. no. 12, 9007-N. C. A (1944); 5 Ben. Ser. no. 10, 7643-Cal. A(1942); 10 Ben. Ser. no. 4, 11372-D. C. A (1947); 10 Ben. Ser. no. 2 11273-Va. A(1947); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 9596-Ky. A (1945); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 6, 9537-Pa. A
(1945); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 9, 9851-Wash. A (1945); 9 Ben. Ser. no. 4/5, 10491-Pa. R.(1946); Ben. Ser., Report, 19609-Wisc. A (1954) ; Ben. Ser., Report, 5357-Ill. B(1954).
"1 7 Ben. Ser. no. 2, 8362-Mass. A (1944); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 4, 9365-Pa. A
(1945) ; see 11 Ben. Ser. no. 2, 12207-Minn. A (1948) ; 9 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 10645-
Mich. A (1946) ; 12 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 13563-Pa. R (1949).
" See cases cited in note 60 .rupra.
"' COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, Op. cit. stpra note
8 at 75.
"' Revers v. Dir. of Div. of Emp. Sec., 323 Mass. 339, 82 N. E. 2d 1 (1948).
"Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123, 128
(1945).
"ALTMAN, op. cit. mtpra note 15 at 130.
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The term "available for work" is not defined in the North Carolina
Employment Security Act nor can it be defined in precise, mechanical
terms which are applicable to all cases.67 Consequently, more appeals
are taken from determinations by the administrative agencies on availa-
bility than from any other type of determination under the state unem-
ployment insurance laws.68 Although availability depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case,69 it has generally been understood that
availability is synonymous with "attachment to the labor market"70 and
that it is designed to test each claimant's attachment thereto.71
The satutory requirement that a claimant must be available for work
is not ordinarily interpreted to require total availability under all cir-
cumstances, in view of the usual stipulation that only suitable work need
be accepted and that work may be refused if good cause exists.72 How-
ever, some jurisdictions require that the claimant be exposed to the labor
market unequivocally and unrestrictedly,73 and specify that he may not
attach restrictions not customary in his occupation"4 or in the type of
employment to which he is suited.75 Thus, though it is clear that gener-
ally a claimant may impose some conditions or limitations on his em-
ployability without impairing his availability for work, 6 it is equally
clear that he may also restrict his labor to the point of unavailability. 7
Certainly claimants may not impose restrictions which in effect destroy
17 Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 61 N. W.
2d 526 (1953).
o ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 4.
"See, e.g., Dep't of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36 So. 2d
496 (1948); Leonard v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N. E. 2d
567 (1947); Shannon v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 155 Ohio St. 53, 97 N. E. 2d 425
(1951).
"' Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion
of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation, 22 N. C. L. REv. 189, 28 MiNN. L.
Ruv. 387 (1944).
" See e.g., Roger v. Admin. Unemp. Comp. Act, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844
(1946) ; see also Leonard v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., supra note 69; Fleiszig
v. Bd. of Rev. of Div. of Unemp. Comp. of Dep't of Labor, 412 Ill. 49, 104 N. E.
2d 818 (1952).
" Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 456, 61 N. W.
2d 526 (1953).
"Schettino v. Admin., 138 Conn. 253, 83 A. 2d 217 (1951) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
App. Bd. of Mich. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich. 468, 25 N. W. 2d 586 (1947);
Walton v. Wilhelm, 120 Ind. App. 218, 91 N. E. 2d 373 (1950).
" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
" Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 456, 61 N. W.
2d 526 (1953).
"Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d
898 (1946) ; Mee's Bakery, Inc. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 162 Pa. Super. 183,
56 A. 2d 386 (1948).
"I Leclerc v. Admin. Unemp. Comp. Act, 137 Conn. 438, 78 A. 2d 550 (1951);
Jackson v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 124 Ind. App. 648, 120 N. E. 2d 413
(1954); Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Holmes, 152 Ohio St. 411, 89 N. E. 2d 580
(1949) ; Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951) ;
Jacobs v. Off. of Unemp. Comp. and Placement, 27 Wash. 2d 641, 179 P. 2d 707
(1947).
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the market for their services,78 or show their unwillingness to accept
work.79 The problem is, of course, whether or not the restrictions serve
to limit the work which a claimant can accept to such a degree that he is
no longer genuinely attached to the labor force. It is essentially a matter
of degree to ascertain to what extent a claimant can impose restrictions
and on what these restrictions must be based.
The North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission's
Statement of Policy No. 6 provides: "Whenever a claimant so limits the
circumstances under which he would accept work as substantially to
eliminate himself from consideration for potential job opportunities, he
shall be considered unavailable for work."80
The courts, as a rule, have dealt harshly and critically with claimants
who restrict their employability. One court has said that the laws were
never intended to guarantee a claimant employment shackled with each
and every condition he might impose.8 ' Claimants have been held in-
eligible where they restricted their availability to certain hours,82 types
of work,83 working conditions, 4 and wages, 5 to mention only a few of
the more common restrictions.
Restrictions to a particular shift pose one of the most difficult prob-
lems in availability. Women have most often been the claimants who
have imposed restrictions on their availability. 6 This is understandable
because generally it is the woman who must remain in the home during
certain hours or days to perform her domestic duties and therefore it is
she who most frequently imposes conditions, particularly restrictions as
to time. However, the courts have usually dealt harshly with these
claimants. As one court said: "It is held in most jurisdictions which
have dealt with the matter (or with analagous problems) that a female
worker may not limit her availability to a certain shift or period of time
because she must care for her children at other times."87  Usually a
"8 Goings v. Riley, 98 N. H. 93, 95 A. 2d 137 (1953) ; Robinson v. Md. Emp.
Sec. Bd., 202 Md. 515, 97 A. 2d 300 (1953).
" Robinson v. Md. Emp. Sec. Bd., supra note 78; Freeman, Able to Work and
Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123 (1945).
"06 CCH UxEmP. INs. REP., N. C. ff 1950.11, Unemp. Comp. Comm. Statement
of Policy No. 6 (1942).
"In re Krieger, 279 App. Div. 681, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 916 (3d Dep't 1951).
"
2 Leclerc v. Admin., 137 Conn. 438, 78 A. 2d 550 (1951) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
App. Bd. of Mich., Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich. 468, 25 N. W. 2d 586 (1947);
Judson Mills v. S. C. Unemp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. 2d 535 (1944) ; Keen
v. Texas Unemp. Comp. Comm., 148 S. W. 2d 211 (Texas Civ. App. 1941).8 Haynes v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S. W. 2d 77 (1944);
Claim of Delgado, 278 App. Div. 237, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (3d Dep t 1951) ; Unemp.
Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).8
,Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
8 0 Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N. H. 48, 45 A. 2d 886 (1946). 6 CCH UNEMP. INs.
REP. N. C. -8213 New Matters 111950 (1952).88 ALTMAiq, op. cit. supra note 15 at 230.87Tung-Sol Elec. Inc. v. Bd. of Rev., Div. of Emp. Sec., Dep't of Labor and
Industry, 35 N. J. Super. 397, 114 A. 2d 285 (1955) and cases cited therein.
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claimant stands a better chance of being found available when the limi-
tation is to the first shift,88 although there are decisions to the contrary.
The North Carolina Employment Security Commission's decisions reflect
the same attitude as that of the courts.8 9
In considering the effect of one's religious beliefs on availability, it
should be remembered that the availability requirement is designed to
test the claimant's attachment to the labor market. Therefore, if a claim-
ant's religious-inspired restriction does not serve to take him out of the
labor market, he should be held available. That was the theory of the
Michigan court in the case of Swenson v. Michigan Employment Se-
curity Commission:9" The claimants were Seventh Day Adventists who,
prior to their lay-off, had been in the employ of two or more concerns in
Battle Creek, where thousands of Seventh Day Adventists were employed
on a full time basis. In their applications for unemployment benefits,
they indicated that they could not, because of their religious beliefs, work
from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. The Commission held them
ineligible for failure to establish their availability. The referee set aside
the Commission's determination. The appeal board reversed the referee
and the circuit court reversed the appeal board. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Michigan, claimants were found available for work and
entitled to benefits under the Act.
The court pointed out that the claimants had neither been offered nor
had they refused employment. The court distinguished the Koski case9 '
(an earlier Michigan case involving a restriction as to time) on the facts
as not involving a religious question and pointed out that the decision in
the Tary92 case had changed Ohio's position from that held in the Kut
case.
93
The court quoted from the circuit court's opinion:
"The law is designed to apply to all situations within its contem-
plation, and the Commission's attitude, if upheld, would com-
pletely exclude thousands of citizens of this state from the benefits
of the Act. That could never have been the intent of the legisla-
ture; nor should we construe the Act as to accomplish that result.
Furthermore, we suggest that the policy of this state in this matter
has been definitely established by the legislature in the language of
the statute.
88 ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 230.
"6 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. N. C. New Matters 1950; 8209 (1952); 8213
(1952) ; 8214 (1952) ; 8283 (1955) ; 8296 (1956) ; 8246 (1954).
0340 Mich. 430, 65 N. W. 2d 709 (1954).
"Ford Motor Co. v. App. Bd. of Mich. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich. 418,
25 N. W. 2d 586 (1947).
'2 See note 57 smpra.
"Kut v. Albers Super Markets Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N. E. 2d 643 (1946).
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"'To exclude such persons would be arbitrary discrimination
when there is not sound foundation, in fact, for the distinctions
and the purposes of and theory of the Act are not thereby served.
Seventh Day Adventists, as a matter of fact, do not remove them-
selves from the labor market by stopping work on sundown Fri-
day and not resuming work until sundown Saturday, as is ap-
parent from the reason that employers do hire them.' "3a
Another possible theory of holding a claimant who has placed a limi-
tion on his availability because of religious convictions to be available
nonetheless is to decide that a claimant need be available for suitable
work only. Once this position is reached the court can then apply the
usual criteria for the determination of suitability, one of which is to con-
sider the risk to claimant's morals, and find that the work which would
violate a claimant's conscientious religious beliefs is unsuitable for him,
with a consequent finding of availability. This was the theory employed
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Miller case.
Only seven states by statute require that a claimant be available for
suitable work only.94 However, the majority view seems to be, even
without such a statutory requirement, that the availability test is met
when claimant is available for suitable work which he does not have good
cause to refuse-when he is genuinely attached to the labor force. 95
Thus, as a matter of actual practice, many other states require availability
for suitable work only. It would appear that by the Miller decision
North Carolina now falls into this latter group. G. S. 96-13 contains
the standard availability requirement that a claimant, in order to be
eligible for benefits, must be available for work, but availability is not de-
fined. The Miller case apparently gave the North Carolina Supreme
Court the first occasion for applying the concept of suitability as found
in G. S. 96-14, the section on disqualifications, to the interpretation of
availability, a requisite for eligibility, as found in G. S. 96-13. However,
early commission decisions reflect that it has long been the policy of the
commission to require availability for suitable work only. 0
This decision would seem sound in that it aligns North Carolina with
... Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 340 Mich. 430, 437,
65 N. W. 2d 709, 712 (1954). The latter paragraph was quoted from the circuit
court's opinion.9 Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, North Dakota, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
" Reger v. Admin., 132 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844 (1946) ; Claim of Sapp, 75
Idaho 65, 266 P. 2d 1027 (1954) ; Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N. E. 2d
183 (1952) ; Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. Zd 277
(1953).
",1 Ben. Ser. no. 8, 704-N. C. A (1938); 5 Ben. Ser. no. 2, 6963-N. C. A
(1942). However in one case in another jurisdiction, the Board of Review was
reversed by the court for requiring availability for suitable work only, in absence
of express statutory authority for so doing. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Bd. of Rev.,
Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. 2d 152 (1942).
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the majority interpretation of availability, makes this provision more
flexible to the needs of the workers, provides for minority claimants'
free exercise of their religious and moral beliefs and affirms the policy
of the Commission to require availability for suitable work only.
Had the court not applied the concept of suitability to the meaning of
availability, a contrary result would probably have been reached or if the
same result had been reached, it would have been an exception 97 to the
general interpretations. In considering this case it is important to re-
member that here, unlike the Swenson case, supra, which the court cited
and approved, the claimant had removed herself from 95% of the labor
market by being available for first shift work only when the custom in
the local labor market was to hire new employees for second and third
shifts only. Ordinarily these factors would have necessitated a finding
of unavailability; however, the court was not faced with this issue since
their initial finding was that the work was not suitable for the claimant.98
Having adopted this view the court should experience no difficulty
in following the Tary case, supra, if given a similar set of facts, nor
should it encounter any difficulty in holding that religious reasons consti-
tute good cause for voluntarily leaving employment.
This case constitutes a liberal interpretation of the North Carolina
Employment Security Law and a realistic judicial recognition of facts
which cause claimants to restrict their employability. It should enable
the North Carolina courts to give the Law a broad and liberal construc-
tion to aid in "mitigating the economic evils of unemployment." 99
THOMAS P. WALKER.
Workmen's Compensation-Death of Nightwatchman as Arising Out
of and in the Course of Employment
In a proceeding under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act
the evidence shoVed that a nightwatchman was murdered while drinking
coffee in a drive-in 25 feet from the premises of his employer and
100 yards from the building he was required to watch. The murder
occurred about 4:00 A.M., which was during the hours of his employ-
ment. The employer had not given him permission to leave the premises
but had given him permission to drink coffee on the premises. Compen-
sation was allowed on the grounds that the injury arose by accident out
of and in the course of the employment.' This is typical of some of the
" 1 ALTair, AVAiLABmirY FOR WoRK, 180 (1950).
"' But See 12 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 13545-N. C. R (1949) ; 7 Ben. Ser. no. 12, 9007-
N. C. A (1944).
" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709,
15 S. E. 2d 4 (1941).
' U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Croft, - Ga. App. -, 91 S. E. 2d 110 (1955).
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difficult cases that are presented before workmen's compensation boards
throughout the country, and it illustrates the difficulty of construing the
rather nebulous phrase "arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment,' t which appears in the law of almost every state as a condition
precedent to the right to receive compensation for injury arising by
accident. 2
From the genesis of the act as we know it today-in Germany in
1884-through the first State enactment in Wisconsin in 1911, to the
time of the last state enactment in Mississippi in 1948 the underlying
motive has been elimination of the burdensome common law remedies
with which the industrial worker had to contend, and to bring about a
quick and efficient means of recovery for their injuries. It was, there-
fore, evident from the beginning that acts must be liberally construed
so as to effectuate their purpose.3  However, as Professor Horovitch in
his book has aptly put it, ". . . the shades of Abinger and Shaw still
dictate decisions through the dogged hands of judges steeped in ancient
learning. In the minority of courts common law principles, long out-
worn, are brought back to deny recovery in present-day compensation
actions."4
It is evident that by the nature of the act and the wording of this all
important phrase there can be no hard and fast rules of law, and each
decision will have to rest on its particular fact situation.5 As a conse-
quence there has been a lack of unity among the states and even within
individual states. The courts have gradually adopted general rules or
standards to apply to the many and varying fact situations that arise, as
in street accidents, 6 meal time accidents, 7 and accidents of traveling em-
ployees.8
Regardless of their type of work, employees must establish the exist-
ence of three definite requisites before being allowed recovery,0 i.e., (1)
that claimant suffered a personal injury by accident; (2) that such injury
2 HoRovITcH, INJURY AND DF-ATi UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 72
(1944). The North Carolina provisions are N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(f), 3 (1929).
'Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 448, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955) ;
Essick v. Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950) ; Graham v. Wall. 220
N. C. 84, 16 S. E. 2d 691 (1941) ; Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38,
153 S. E. 591 (1930).
' HOROVITCH, INJURY AND DEAT UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
viii (1944).
'Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N. C. 733, 735, 155 S. E. 728, 730
(1930).
'Note, 27 WASH. U. L. Q. 139 (1941) ; Annot., 80 A. L. R. 126 (1932).7 Note, 17 N. C. L. Rxv. 458 (1939). 8 Note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 159 (1945).
Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N. C. 477, 57 S. E. 2d 760 (1950).
When the death is by violent means there is a rebuttable presumption of death by
accident. McGill v. Lumberton, 215 N. C. 752, 3 S. E. 2d 324 (1939). The claim-
ant's proof can consist of attending circumstances, as when the unexplained death
is a natural and probable result of a risk of the employment. Poteete v. North State
Pyrophyllite Co., 240 N. C. 561, 82 S. E. 2d 693 (1954).
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arose in the course of the employment; (3) and that such injury arose
out of the employment.' 0
An accident within the meaning of the act is "an unlooked for and
untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured em-
ployee."' 1  An assault is an accident within this definition when it is
without design on the workman's part even though intentionally caused
by another.'
2
"Arising out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous and in-
volve two ideas and two conditions, both of which must be proved by
the employee. "Arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the acci-
dent, as springing from the work the employee is supposed to perform,
while "in the course of" refers to the time, place and circumstance under
which the injury by accident occurred.' 3 An injury therefore can occur
in the course of one's employment but not arise out of it, as when a
nightwatchman is injured while washing his car on the employer's
premises. 14
The Georgia court applied these generalities in the principal case in
affirming the Board's award of compensation. The court based its de-
cision on an earlier Georgia case where it was said: "It has been held
that acts of ministration by a servant unto himself, such as quenching
his thirst, relieving his hunger, protecting himself from excessive cold,
or while seeking shelter from a storm during working hours, where the
employee intends to return to work after the storm passes, and numerous
others, readily conceivable, performance of which while at work is rea-
sonably necessary to his health and comfort, are incidents of his employ-
ment and acts of service therein ... though in a sense they are personal
to himself and only remotely and indirectly conducive to the object of his
employment; and that an accidental injury sustained in the performance
of such an act is compensable as one incurred in the course of the em-
ployment and resulting therefrom."' 5 The court stated that since the
"° Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N. C. 372, 64 S. E. 2d 265 (1951) ;
Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S. E. 2d 668 (1949) ; Taylor v. Wake Forest,
228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947) ; Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22
S. E. 2d 907 (1942).
" Gabriel v. Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 316, 42 S. E. 2d 96, 97 (1947) ; Brown v.
Carolina Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 767, 32 S. E. 2d '320, 322 (1949). The
act does not contemplate recovery for all injuries, but only those by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment. Bryan v. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724,
24 S. E. 2d 751 (1943).
"Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S. E. 2d 668 (1949) ; Geltman v. Reliable
Linen Supply Co., 128 N. J. L. 443, 25 A. 2d 894 (1942) (motorist assaulted by
another motorist) ; Pinkerton Nat. Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga. 548, 122
S. E. 202 (1924).
" Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N. C. 399, 82 S. E. 2d 410
(1954) ; Sweatt v. Rutherford County Board of Education, 237 N. C. 653, 75 S. E.
2d 738 (1953) ; Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S. E. 2d 680 (1952).
" Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S. E. 2d 680 (1952).
" Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 47 Ga. App. 367, 368, 170 S. E. 535, 536
(1933).
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watchman did not tarry long he was still in the course of his employ-
ment; and since it is a common hazard of a nightwatchman's job that
he be set upon by robbers or burglars, it arose out of the employment.
A contributing factor was that the deceased could survey most of the
building from where he was sitting in the drive-in.
This seems to be an extreme case in that it allows recovery by an
employee whose duty is to guard his employer's property, but who has
completely left the premises of his employer and is attacked by someone
who, so far as appears, had no intention of trespassing on the employer's
property. However, the decision is commendable from a policy view-
point, because it broadly interprets the key words of the act and more
nearly effectuates its desired purposes."0 There was a dissent on the
grounds that the watchman had abandoned his employment, that the
injury was directed against the watchman for purely personal reasons,
and thus, that the accident did not arise out of the employment.'
7
North Carolina apparently would not be so liberal. In Smith v.
Newman Machinery Co.1s almost the same situation arose with the ex-
ception that the store was on the employer's premises. There the court
recognized the special hazard of the watchman but said: ". . . the facts
in the case at bar disclose that he was not making his rounds at the time
of the injury or performing any service for his employer,'u 9 and denied
recovery.
"' HoRoviTcH, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
vii. "The author does not argue for unlimited liability in all cases. But if some
of the judges could be present in the classrooms where compensation cases are being
discussed before law students or students in economics, and hear the reactions of
those who will dominate the scene when we are no longer here, they would cease
their attempt to fly in the face of common sense, and stop introducing narrow
common-law rulings into compensation cases. They would no longer attempt to
stem the tide of reasonable liberailty which the acts promised, and which should
have arrived at our shores generations ago .... An ashman's widow cannot under-
stand how an intelligent judge can rule that she and the five children must go on
charity because her husband did not wait for the employer's truck to stop, but had
jumped off when it was going three and one-half miles an hour, in order to rush
or facilitate his work. To tell her it was an 'added risk' is to raise her contempt
for the law." For a criticism of this work see Malone, Book Review, 23 N. C. L.
REv. 173 (1945).
7 GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (1920). "... nor shall 'injury' and 'personal in-
jury' include injury caused by the wilfull act of a third person directed against an
employee for reasons personal to such employee." The North Carolina Act does
not contain this provision but the court has judicially interpreted the Act in accord
with it. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N. C. 733, 155 S. E. 728 (1930).
For other cases see note 23 infra.
8206 N. C. 97, 172 S. E. 880 (1932). This case has not been cited in a single
decision since it was decided.
" Id. at 99, 172 S. E. at 881. Nightwatchmen are generally given a liberal
treatment by the courts in view of their hazardous activity. As the North Carolina
Court has described it, they are "within the zone of special danger." Bain v. Tra-
vora Mfg. Co., 203 N. C. 466, 468, 166 S. E. 301, 302 (1932) ; West v. East Coast
Fertilizer Co., 201 N. C. 556, 559, 160 S. E. 765, 766 (1931). Some states require,
either by legislative enactment or by judicial interpretation, that the worker be
employed in a hazardous or extrahazardous occupation in order to be covered by
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Generally, an assault inflicted on a workman by a third person is
regarded as "accidental" within the meaning of the act.2 0 Also, it meets
the "arising out of" requirement when the employment is such as natu-
rally to invite an assault, as when the employee is protecting his em-
ployer's property. and the assault naturally results because of the em-
ployment and not because of something unconnected with it.21 But if
the assault is unconnected with the employment or is for other reasons
personal to the employee and the assailant, it generally does not arise
out of the employment. 22 In such case the employment is not the cause
of the assault, though it may be the occasion thereof.23
The North Carolina Court has laid down the following test for de-
termining whether an accidental injury arises out of an employment:
"There must be some causal relation between the employment and the
injury; but if the injury is one which, after the event, may be seen to
have had its origin in the employment, it need not be shown that it is
one which ought to have been forseen or expected." 24 Of course, it is in
the application of this test that the court has difficulty. The decisions
both by the Commission and the courts seem to be wholly inconsistent
at times, as can be seen by a few pertinent examples. Recovery was
denied when an employee, who was in his car ready to leave the plant,
the act. Hoffman v. Hazelwood, 139 Or. 519, 10 P. 2d 349 (1932) ; Annot., 83
A. L. R. 1018, 1067 (1933) (concerning watchmen as being within the classification
of hazardous duty). The North Carolina Act does not distinguish between hazard-
ous and non-hazardous employment.
-0 Cases cited note 13 supra. Beem v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 337 Mo. 114,
85 S. W. 2d 441 (1935); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Jordan, 140
Okla. 238, 283 Pa.c. 240 (1929).
" American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 54 Ga. App. 320, 187 S. E. 724 (1936)
(watchman killed while making rounds) ; Griffin v. McLellan Stores, 1 1. C. 144(1929), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 41 (1955) (store walker stabbed while apprehending
thief) ; Todd v. Eastern Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 Atl. 42 (1925)
(watchman killed by personal enemy; compensable because of nature of employ-
ment).
2" New v. Crystal Ice & Coal Co., A-785 (Feb., 1942), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 42
(1955) (claimant injured in fight after he had been fired or quit) ; Neill v. Ragland
Const. Co., 216 N. C. 744, 6 S. E. 2d 491 (1940) (two watchmen in dispute over
matter foreign to their employment) ; I. T. I. 0. Co. v. Lewis, 165 Okla. 26, 24
P. 2d 647 (1932) (watchman shot for unknown reason) ; Tise v. Newman Machine
Co., 1 I. C. 237 (1930), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 42 (1955) (fight having no relation
to employment); January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S. W. 2d 117
(1929) (watchman killed by wife's paramour) ; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Hardesty, 77
Ind. App. 205, 133 N. E. 398 (1921) (watchman killed for personal reasons).
" The courts seldom apply the "but for" test as laid down in a New Jersey de-
cision. The claimant was employed at a butcher shop and was shot in the eye by
an arrow as he was burning trash in the backyard of the shop. The court said:
"But for the employment, the appellant would not have been in the backyard and in
the path of the arrow." Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 N. J. Super. 129, 93 A. 2d 598
(1952), aff'd, 12 N. J. 807, 97 A. 2d 593 (1953).
2" Withers v. Black. 230 N. C. 428, 433, 53 S. E. 2d 668, 672 (1949) ; Conrad
v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N. C. 723, 726, 153 S. E. 266, 269 (1930). It is
not necessary that the employment be the sole cause of the injury, just so it is a
contributing cause. Mississippi Products, Inc. v. Gordy. - Miss. -, 80 So. 2d
793 (1955).
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got out and slipped on a fruit peeling after having been beckoned to by
a watchman ;25 but was allowed when an employee slipped on oil in the
street as he was going for the mail.26  Also, recovery was denied when
an employer was stabbed in the back for an unknown reason while he
was working in a mill;27 but was allowed when a nightwatchman was
killed by an unknown assailant,28 or a robber. 29
In those cases where the accident has been brought about by means
other than an assault, the test of whether it arises out of and in the course
of the employment is the same as in the assault cases. There was no
recovery where a nightwatchman fell asleep on a train track and was
killed by a passing train ;3o where a nightwatchman was bitten by a spider
while engaged in his work;31 and where a watchman was sitting in a
chair in front of defendant's garage waiting until he was to make his
next round, and was struck by a wheel that ran off the axle of a passing
car.3 2  It was thought that in these cases causal connection was absent.
But where a cemetery keeper was run over by a car as he was crossing
the street to the funeral home, the risk was incidental to the employment
and arose out of the employment.8 3
The fact that the employee is performing personal acts for his own
benefit will not in itself bar recovery.34  The court relied heavily on this
- Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N. C. 356, 359, 196 S. E. 342, 344
(1938). "When an injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contribut-
ing proximate cause, or comes from a hazard to which the workman would have
been equally exposed apart from the employment, or from a hazard common to
others, it does not arise out of the employment." Id. at 359, 196 S. E. at 344.
"6 Clinton v. Shuford Nat. Bank, 9304 (Sept., 1940), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 39
(1955). The Commission distinguished the Lockey case, supra note 25, on the
grounds that it was not clear there whether or not the employee was on duty at
the time of the accident.
"' Phillips v. Highland Plc. Mfg. Co., 9129 (May, 1940), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 42
(1955).
" Stanland v. Wilmington Term. Whse. Co., 2 I. C. 331 (1931), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 42 (1955).
" West v. East Coast Fertilizer Co., 201 N. C. 556, 160 S. E. 765 (1931)
accord, Malloy v. Caldwell Wingate Co., 284 App. Div. 798, 135 N. Y. S. 2d 445
(1954) (watchman found dead one story below where he usually worked) ; Schmitt
v. Bay Ridge Hospital, 277 App. Div. 957, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 632 (1950) (watchman
found dead at foot of stairs where his work might well have taken him, even though
it was on a public street) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 So.
2d 666 (1947) (watchman accidentally shot by young son of watchman's employer).
"' Davis v. Elk-Dixie Furniture Corp., 3768 (Sept. 16, 1933), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 36 (1955).
"Howard v. Statesville Flour Mills Co., 4869 (Nov. 3, 1934), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 37 (1955).
" Bunting v. State Hwy. & P. W. Comm., 9526 (July, 1940), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 37 (1955).
" Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S. E. 2d 680 (1952).
" Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, Inc., 74 So. 2d 282 (Fla., 1954) ; Wam-
hoff v. Wagner Electric Corporation, 354 Mo. 711, 190 S. W. 2d 915 (1945);
McCarter v. Ruby Cotton Mills, Inc., A-1405 (Dec. 28, 1942), N. C. W. C. A. Ann.
44 (1955) ; Keel v. Brown Paving Co., 9963 (Jan., 1941), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 44
(1955); Clews v. Blythe Bros. Co., 8609 (April, 1939), N. C. W .C. A. Ann. 44
(1955) ; McKinley v. Belk's Dept. Store, 5676 (Sept., 1935), N. C. W. C. A. Ann.
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principle in the present case. Usually if he has abandoned his work.
completely he will be unable to recover. 35 It is not necessary that the em-
ployee be in the exact spot designated by the employer; but in the cases
that have arisen in North Carolina the court has been careful to say that
the employee was in a place where he had a right to be.36 It is generally
stated that if the injury has no relation to or connection with the employ-
ment and is undertaken solely for the pleasure and convenience of the
employee or a third person, it is not compensable.3 7 However, if it is
done pursuant to continued acquiescence by the employer, the result is
sometimes different.38
North Carolina, both at Commission and court level, has held gen-
erally to the narrower view in the type of cases under consideration in
this note. The principal case seems to lean toward a far broader con-
struction of the act and on its exact facts seems to reach a desirable
result. However, as was said above, the purpose of the act is not to place
upon the employers the burden of absolute liability for all injuries to
their employees,3 9 so there must be a dividing line, and each case must
be decided separately. This will naturally produce inconsistencies, and
it will take time and experience to harmonize the various fact situations
with the standards that are set up.
HAMLIN WADE.
44 (1955) ; In Re Bollman, 73 Ind. App. 46, 126 N. E. 639 (1920). But see Han-
son v. Globe Indemnity Co., 85 Ga. App. 179, 68 S. E. 2d 179 (1951) (injury sus-
tained during fifteen minute rest period not compensable). The courts sometimes
make a distinction, which seems to be unreasonable, between injuries sustained
during a definite rest period and those sustained while stopping work specifically to
do certain personal acts.
" Vollmer v. City of Milwaukee, 254 Wis. 162, 35 N. W. 2d 304 (1948) ; Stall-
cup v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., 217 N. C. 302, 7 S. E. 2d 550 (1940; Smith
v. Hauser & Co., 206 N. C. 562, 174 S. E. 455 (1934); Pittsburgh Coal Co. of
Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill. 54, 153 N. E. 630 (1926). Compensation
probably was denied in these cases because the injury was not in the course of the
employment.
" Howell v. Standard Ice & Fuel Co., 226 N. C. 730, 40 S. E. 2d 197 (1946);
Brown v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 32 S. E. 2d 320 (1944) ; Gordon
v. Thomasville Repair Co., 205 N. C. 739, 172 S. E. 485 (1934).
" Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S. E. 2d 680 (1952) ; Montgomery v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 39 Ga. App. 210, 146 S. E. 504 (1929) ; Guiliano v. Daniel
O'connell's Sons, 105 Conn. 695, 136 Ati. 677 (1927) ; Kraft v. West Hotel Co.,
193 Iowa 1288, 188 N. W. 870 (1922). But compare Puffin v. General Electric Co.,
132 Conn. 279, 43 A. 2d 746 (1945), where claimant was allowed recovery for
severe burns suffered as a result of lighting a cigarette and setting fire to her
angora sweater while she was in the rest room on the employer's premises during
her employment.
"Wamhoff v. Wagner Electric Corporation, 354 Mo. 711, 190 S. W. 2d 915
(1945) ; Annot., 161 A. L. R. 1461 (1945) ; Peppers v. Wiggins Drug Stores, Inc.,
1 I. C. 164 (1929), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 54 (1955) ; Taylor v. Hogan Milling Co.,
129 Kan. 370, 282 Pac. 729 (1929).
" The English counterpart to the American Workmen's Compensation Acts also
requires that the injury must be by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment, but there is one notable distinction. The accident is presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, to have arisen out of the employment once it
is proved to have been in the course of the employment. National Insurance (In-
dustrial Injuries) Act, 1946 (c. 62) § 7(4).
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